SOUTH AMERICA
LOOKS AT
THE UNITED STATES

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

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SOUTH AMERICA
LOOKS AT
THE UNITED STATES

BY

CLARENCE H. HARING

PROFESSOR OF LATIN-AMERICAN HISTORY AND ECONOMICS,
HARVARD UNIVERSITY

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PREFACE

The following pages are the outcome of a year's residence and travel in South America, in 1925-1926, under the auspices of the Bureau of International Research of Harvard University and Radcliffe College. They represent a sincere and, I trust, unbiassed effort to arrive at an understanding of some of the more general factors that govern the relations between the people of the United States and the nations of the southern continent. The writer harbors no illusions about the pitfalls that beset an investigator of these matters, and realizes that a year's residence is altogether too short a time to enable one to arrive at wholly satisfactory conclusions. Yet even these brief observations may not be without value, if only because they are associated with a special interest, of much longer standing, in South American history and politics.

A rapid review of the ground covered in this volume appeared as an article in *Foreign Affairs,* April, 1927, and some of the materials were used in a short address given at the Annual Meeting of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia, in the same month and year.

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I am very glad to avail myself of this opportunity to express my appreciation of the privileges afforded me by the Bureau, and to thank especially Professor A. C. Coolidge and Professor G. G. Wilson for their interest and assistance in the preparation of this book.

C. H. HARING.

Harvard University,
May, 1927.

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CHAPTER I

THE COLOSSUS OF THE NORTH

One of the most significant aspects of inter-American relations during the past twenty-five years has been the increased influence exerted by the United States over the political destinies of countries in and about the Caribbean Sea. Porto Rico was taken from Spain in 1898. In 1916 the Virgin Islands were purchased from Denmark to prevent their sale to another European power. The two youngest of American republics, Cuba and Panama, introduced to international society under American auspices in 1902 and 1903, are protectorates of this country. More recently, the island republics of Haiti and Santo Domingo have also become protectorates, and the former is at present occupied and in part administered by American naval forces. Among the five tiny states of Central America the United States has assumed a position of benevolent leadership, which is being exerted to the end that incessant domestic commotions may be eliminated and something like a union or federation between them achieved. The construction and defense of the Pan-

ama Canal has added the isthmus to the coastline of the United States, and given to the "American Mediterranean" a strategic importance it did not formerly possess. An American naval base has been created at Guantánamo on the south coast of Cuba, and by treaty with Nicaragua the right has been acquired to maintain bases on the Corn Islands off the east coast and in Fonseca Bay on the Pacific. In other words, the United States has become the principal Caribbean power, and in a sense a Spanish-American power as well.

This new position which we have assumed implies, and has frequently resulted in, diplomatic or military intervention in the affairs of our immediate neighbors. We have stepped in when chronic disorder, political or financial, might lead to interference by European states to safeguard the investments of their citizens, or enforce the payment of indemnities for damages unjustly inflicted; or when violent domestic disturbance has threatened our own peace or put in jeopardy the lives and interests of American citizens. The United States has supervised elections, through the presence of American officials, sometimes by invitation of the native government, sometimes against its wishes, as in Panama in 1908 and 1912, and in Santo Domingo in 1913. It has sent special agents to mediate between hostile or warring factions, as in Cuba in 1906 and Honduras in 1924. It has sometimes landed marines to protect American and other foreign property, or to assist in maintaining peace, generally for a few weeks only, but in the case of the "legation guard" in

Nicaragua, for twelve years. In Santo Domingo a combination of incessant factional strife and financial demoralization forced the United States Government in 1916 to assume the military and political administration of the republic, a grave responsibility from which it was able to withdraw only seven years later. Similar conditions in Haiti had led to the occupation of that country by marines in 1915 and the imposition of a treaty placing its government under the financial and political tutelage of this country. And in Haiti circumstances have not yet permitted the American forces to be withdrawn.

It was the decision to build the Panama Canal that had much to do with this new orientation of policy toward neighboring Latin states. But this new course we would have entered upon had no canal been constructed. From the early days of the republic, American statesmen were highly sensitive to the political fortunes of Latin communities near our own shores or frontiers. Their strategic significance in war or politics was obvious from the beginning, and it was doubtless largely with this in view that the Monroe Doctrine was promulgated in 1823. In those early years, our concern was with Cuba, Florida and Texas, as today it is with Cuba, Haiti and Central America. Florida we soon purchased, and Texas we annexed at the price of an inglorious war with Mexico. But the delicately adjusted balance of power in the Caribbean kept Cuba a dependency of Spain until the American Civil War and the abolition of slavery made its acquisition seem less immediately pressing. And when Cuba finally fell

within the orbit of American influence it was as a republic freed largely through its own indomitable efforts.

Meantime, with the rapid growth of the United States in population, industry and wealth, we developed an economic power, the extension of whose sway to the south was as inevitable as it was irresistible; and a sphere of influence was acquired which in turn necessitated a more active and incisive diplomatic policy. The situation was a delicate one, from the point of view both of our own commitments and of those of Europe. The words of Professor Archibald Cary Coolidge, written twenty years ago, describe it very adequately:

"Never have people been emigrating so freely as today; never has capital been invested in foreign lands to the same extent; hence opportunities for conflicts are being multiplied. At present . . . it is in some of the Latin-American countries that we meet the conditions best suited to produce international difficulties of a financial kind, frequently complicated by ill-treatment of resident foreigners. When we find an ignorant mixed population, a government consisting of a few greedy politicians grouped about a dictator soon to be overthrown by some rival and his band, and this in regions whose splendid natural resources inevitably tempt foreign capital, which is now scanning the whole world for chances of profitable investment, we have almost ideal conditions for trouble. What makes matters worse is that the parties to such a dispute are often not those who made the original transaction. An irresponsible. . . Latin-American president may profit by his brief lease of power to conclude a loan with foreign bankers on terms which constitute a crushing burden for the future of the unfortunate people over whom he is momentarily ruling. He disappears, and they are left to pay the bill. On the other side, a group of

shady capitalists, advancing money under these circumstances, will hasten to unload their bonds on the unsuspecting public of investors, to whom the transaction is represented as a reasonable and normal one. . . . It is notorious, too, that the decisions of the courts of some Latin-American states, owing to corruption or to subservience to the Executive, cannot be accepted as final by the rest of the world. To cap the climax, in some of these same countries legislation has been made, forbidding foreigners to appeal to their home governments for protection."

Such were the circumstances which we had to face in the weaker, unstable countries about the Caribbean Sea. And given our traditional political policy and enlarged economic interest in that region, it became necessary to try and keep the peace and prevent European encroachment, yet without condoning or shielding the wrong-doer. It was after the Spanish-American War of 1898, however, and the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty of 1901, that the preponderant position of the United States in relation to the Caribbean assumed a real importance. To take a position in advance of trouble, we came to exercise a general police jurisdiction in that region. The proneness of the Caribbean peoples to revolution, often involving foreign lives and property, and the disordered financial condition of many of their governments, gave excuse for European interventions which might endanger our engagements in the Isthmus of Panama. To avert such interventions, and the possible creation of new and permanent European interests commanding the approaches to the canal, it was necessary that the political and economic stability of these wayward countries be assured. "The

argument was that the task assumed was imposed by the conditions and the times; that so long as the United States would not allow other powers a free hand in the western hemisphere, we were in honor bound to maintain order and security in the American states; that not territory and power, but the political stability and financial security of those states was sought, in the interest of both natives and foreigners; and that the proprietorship of the canal laid upon the nation a special obligation to shield the waterway from extra-American attack and competition." [1]

The position was clearly stated in a well-known passage in President Roosevelt's message to Congress of December 6, 1904:

"Any country whose people conduct themselves well can count upon our hearty friendship. If a nation shows that it knows how to act with reasonable efficiency and decency in social and political matters, if it keeps order and pays its obligations, it need fear no interference from the United States. Chronic wrong-doing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation and, in the western hemisphere, the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrong-doing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power." [2]

[1] Ogg, F. A.—*National Progress, 1907-1917* (vol. 27 of *The American Nation: A History*) New York, 1918, p. 263.

[2] This is a step somewhat in advance of the position taken by President Roosevelt at the time of the European intervention in Venezuela in 1902, that coercion of an American state was not contrary to the Monroe Doctrine, provided it did "not take the form of the acquisition of territory by a non-American power."

Whether or not our present rôle in the Caribbean is to be regarded as but a development of the Monroe Doctrine, as an effort to supplement or adapt it under the pressure of new conditions, is probably an academic question. Certainly it carries matters much farther than was contemplated by American statesmen in 1823. The Monroe Doctrine was in the nineteenth century a protective measure, but passive, negative in character. Our Caribbean policy is also defensive, but a policy of tutelage, supervision, active interference. The Monroe Doctrine was in the beginning wholly political. It has in the twentieth century come to be involved in economic engagements which were formerly alien to it. Yet in the parts of Latin America nearest our shores a paramount and permanent interest has arisen, a sphere of influence which would have occasioned these recent developments had the Monroe Doctrine never been formulated. And there are some who believe that to associate this paramount interest with the Doctrine serves merely to embarrass us in our relations with the continent at large.

The plain fact of the matter is that today we control the political destinies of Mexico, Central America and other nearby Latin regions as effectively as if we exercised a formal protectorate over the entire area. It results from an evolution in international relations, in the balance, or unbalance, of political and economic power, which, given the circumstances, was as inevitable as the expansion of the British Empire or the rise of a modern Germany. To the extent that this control is aimed to safeguard practical rights acquired in the

West Indies and Panama, by maintaining financial and political stability in their neighborhood, it may have some measure of moral justification as well.[3] When it is extended to give special protection to the interests of private investors, it easily exposes itself to criticism. President Taft's policy of "active intervention to secure for our merchandise and our capitalists opportunity for profitable investment" represents a kind of diplomacy which may easily make the United States Government the unsuspecting tool of adventurous or unscrupulous business interests, in a way incompatible with the national dignity or with the country's ultimate welfare. Official encouragement and defense of bankers and concession-holders means putting the armed forces of the nation at the service of private interests, many of which have entered these backward countries fully aware of the risks involved and discounting them in advance. It excites the suspicion and fear of Latin Americans generally, and makes difficult if not impossible the fostering of a spirit of inter-American comity and good will. Fortunately, the United States Government has since in official statements renounced such

[3] "As Great Britain knows by long experience, and as the United States may soon be willing to admit, 'imperialism' is not necessarily the outcome of ambitious greed and aggression. It may be reluctant; it grows easily from the perpetual and almost ubiquitous struggles between order and disorder, and often denotes the triumph of good government. It frequently follows on the defense of legitimate interests; and, once the Great Northern Republic has established definite material interests among its less stable neighbours, political intervention is a natural consequence at some time or another." Editorial in *The Times*, London, December 23, 1926.

a course, and in so far as advantages accrue to the private investor they should be incidental to the broader demands of national policy.

It may conceivably be maintained that, at least in recent years, we have used our responsibilities wisely. In individual instances our dealings with the Caribbean countries, and with Mexico, though never wholly satisfactory either to them or indeed to ourselves, have generally been patient and just. The United States has not permanently deprived any Latin-American state of its autonomy or its opportunity for self-development. In spite of great temptation to the contrary, it has twice kept its promises to evacuate Cuba, and preserved to the people their political independence. We have improved sanitation, stamped out diseases, discouraged revolution, put finances on a more stable and orderly basis. Although we have built up a commerce with these neighboring states which is not only mutually advantageous but of far greater importance to them than their trade with any other nation, we have forced upon them no preferential tariffs nor demanded any exclusive trade privileges.[4] American investment is dominant in these countries, but it has also been the decisive factor in stimulating their material advancement, and with material advance their social and political betterment. We have remained faithful to our policy of the "open door," and whatever commercial advantage we may enjoy has been won in a

[4] The Reciprocity Treaty with Cuba may be cited as an exception, but it was demanded by the Cubans themselves, to insure them access to our markets.

free field against all competitors, by methods open to all.

Such is the apologia of our Caribbean policy. Whatever its justification, however, the experience is not relished by those presumed to be its beneficiaries. It is likewise not popular with the people south of Panama. The recent intervention of the United States in the domestic politics of Nicaragua, and the recurrence of the periodical "crises" in the relations between Washington and Mexico City, have loosed, as usual, the floodgates of criticism in the South American newspaper press. Not that the present agrarian, labor, and anti-clerical government of Mexico commands much sympathy among the upper, directing classes of Argentina, Chile or Brazil, and still less are the latter concerned about the vagaries of factional chiefs in the republic of Nicaragua. But to them a vital American principle seems to be at stake, the principle of the legal equality and political independence of American nations. The United States seems to be setting up an "implied and partial protectorate" which may be extended to the whole of the western hemisphere. And the tendency runs counter to the growing power, stability and pride of the nations on the southern continent. For them the old dangers from Europe, especially with the prostration that has followed the World War, no longer exist, and anything like North American tutelage is more and more resented. Our policy in the Caribbean can scarcely have the hearty acceptance of the stronger, self-sufficient American states.

The existence among our southern neighbors of a belief that the United States harbors imperialistic designs upon the entire hemisphere should not be surprising, even to the provincial "Yankee" mind. The Monroe Doctrine itself, for the maintenance of which many Americans believe that the Latin republics owe them a debt of gratitude, has not been regarded by these republics as an expression of international altruism, nor in fact was it from its inception ever intended so to be. That this principle of American policy has served at times to protect weaker Latin-American states from European aggression is doubtless true; but the interpretations of the Doctrine in later practice have also given occasion for the charge that it is but a camouflage for the political and economic hegemony of the United States. Certain international events of the past have lent force to such an interpretation. Not only the establishment of protectorates during the past twenty-five years over new or incorrigible republics in the West Indies and Central America—the cession by Mexico in 1846-1848 of a third of her territory to the United States after a war for which Mexico was not solely responsible, the picaresque activities of Wm. Walker and other North American adventurers in Central America in the following decade, the imbecile "dollar diplomacy" of the United States during the War of the Pacific between Chile and Peru, the "Baltimore incident" with Chile in 1891—all have been used, and are used, by the hostile propagandist to inculcate fear or suspicion of the United States. Even the

recent expedition of American army fliers round the southern continent was interpreted in some quarters as a bombastic, militaristic swagger, and was so played up on both coasts. In this pragmatic world there are of course two sides to every question; but it is just this that North Americans, including their statesmen, have often been prone to forget. There is also a Latin-American side.

American statesmen in public addresses and in messages to Congress have with fair consistency endeavored to counteract the Latin's suspicion of the Anglo-Saxon. Visits to South America by Americans of political prominence have also been the occasion for expressions of good will, notably those of Secretary of State Elihu Root in 1906, Robert Bacon in 1913, and ex-President Roosevelt in 1913-1914. Very significant was the journey of Secretary Root on the occasion of the Third International Conference of American States at Rio de Janeiro in 1906. His words to the Conference have often been quoted:

"We wish for no victories but those of peace; for no territory except our own; for no sovereignty except the sovereignty over ourselves. We deem the independence and equal rights of the smallest and weakest member of the family of nations entitled to as much respect as those of the greatest empire, and we deem the observance of that respect the chief guaranty of the weak against the oppression of the strong. We neither claim nor desire any rights, or privileges, or powers that we do not freely concede to every American Republic. We wish to increase our prosperity, to expand our trade, to grow in wealth, in wisdom, and in spirit, but our conception of the true way to accomplish this is not to pull down others and profit by their ruin, but to help all friends

to a common prosperity and a common growth, that we may all become greater and stronger together."[5]

President Wilson in an address to a commercial convention at Mobile in October, 1913, expressed similar sentiments, and began to define that policy toward Latin America by some called the Wilson Doctrine. This was more clearly enunciated in his message to Congress on December 7, 1915, and in a memorable address to the Second Pan-American Scientific Congress in Washington one month later. Eschewing all thought of "political suzerainty or selfish control," he declared that "all the governments of America stand so far as we are concerned upon a footing of genuine equality and unquestioned independence . . . that the states of America are not hostile rivals but cooperating friends . . . in a very true and deep sense a unit in world affairs, spiritual partners, standing together, quick with common sympathies and common ideals." He suggested, therefore, that all the American republics should unite "in guaranteeing to each other absolute political independence and territorial integrity."[6]

This disclaimer of imperialistic aims on the part of the United States made a deep and lasting impression in many sections of Latin America, especially in the larger states of the southern continent. By many of

[5] Root, Elihu—*Speeches Incident to the Visit of Secretary Root to South America,* Washington, 1906, p. 12.

[6] *Congressional Record,* LIII, 95, 96. In the same spirit the American Institute of International Law, at its first session in Washington early in 1916, adopted a declaration of the independence and equality of nations.

the most important newspapers the President's message was hailed as of the greatest political importance, "as memorable and as transcendental" as the message of President Monroe a century earlier. It became the basis of an immense admiration and respect for President Wilson, which was vastly increased by his public statements during the World War and his rôle at the Conference of Versailles, an enthusiasm which persists to this day and is an element of no little significance in cementing the friendship between Latin and English America. Some Latin-American critics, it is true, were quick to see that this new orientation of American policy, even if it represented more than the opinion of a single statesman, did not necessarily imply the scrapping of the Monroe Doctrine, and that the two might not be wholly compatible with one another. In fact, their identification has been the occasion of much confusion of thought on both continents. Moreover, at this very time the United States was establishing a military occupation of the island republics of Santo Domingo and Haiti, in a way that scarcely promised an ending of the days of American tutelage. Nevertheless, the ideals of moral, political and economic solidarity enunciated by Root and Wilson, and reiterated by succeeding presidents and secretaries of state, have had a calming effect upon South American opinion. And the acceptance by President Wilson in 1914 and 1915 of the friendly offices of certain South American powers in the disputes between the United States and contending factions in Mexico, produced a favorable impression, establishing a precedent for co-

operation in the solution of other problems that may arise involving American states. These incidents have served, together with the numerous Pan-American congresses, political, scientific, financial, etc., of the past generation, to pave the way toward something like a genuine Pan-Americanism.

Another factor which may be contributing to better understanding between the two Americas is the entrance into the Latin-American journalistic field of the great North American newspaper associations, the Associated Press and the United Press. These vast agencies for the gathering and disseminating of news have been operating in South America for only a decade, and, although not to the exclusion of European agencies, they now furnish service to the most important newspapers of all the Latin countries. The United Press alone supplies more than eighty papers in South America. Until ten years ago virtually all the foreign news printed in the southern continent came through European channels, even news about the United States, and it was necessarily colored by the political and economic prepossessions of European governments and peoples. As economic rivalry with the United States was keen, the choice and the presentation of American news was not always calculated to redound to the credit of Americans, and frequently aimed to do actual harm. At present virtually all American news comes from the United States directly, and a great part of European news as well, so that our foreign rivals sometimes raise against the American press service the same complaints formerly levelled against

their own news agencies. Whether these American press associations always exhibit a becoming sense of responsibility regarding the kind of news distributed to the Latin-American papers is perhaps a debatable question. They are, of course, first and foremost business organizations, and share some of the tendency unfortunately characteristic of American journalism, of putting profit before policy. Nevertheless, the control of North American press news by agencies centered in the United States is a distinct improvement over conditions earlier prevailing in South America.

The motion-picture has also been an obvious and important means of acquainting the Argentine or the Peruvian or Venezuelan with the United States. In South America, as in other parts of the world, the picture theatre is "the people's club-house," and there too American cinematograph films dominate the field. Whether in a metropolis like Buenos Aires or in the remote towns of the Andes, American "movies" and "movie stars" have become almost as much a matter of popular interest as they are in the United States. While some assert that the influence is for good, to the writer this seems extremely doubtful. It is true that by means of the motion-picture, information is imparted, directly or incidentally, about the technical achievements of the United States, in industry and in science and in the comforts and luxuries of daily living. But life and morals as portrayed in the average American film are not the life and morals of the great majority of United States citizens. The impresario of the moving-picture industry—the common use of the

term "industry" in this connection is itself significant—like the impresario in American journalism, is chiefly interested in profits, and to sell his product too often features the sensational. The South American, who generally has had no opportunity to know the United States at first hand, is naturally unable to discriminate between the usual and the abnormal, and accepts the latter as characteristic. As a consequence, the picture of the United States conjured up in the minds of many of our Latin-American neighbors is curiously and wondrously wrought.[7] The effect to that extent is unfortunate for our political and social relations, just as is the effect of many newspaper "specials" sent by correspondents in the United States and featuring sensational news because of its marketable value. The situation is not one peculiar to South America; it presents a problem in the Orient and in other parts of the world as well.

More abundant means of communication with South America, forced upon the United States by the circumstances of the World War, have likewise contributed to a better understanding between the two continents. The American-controlled All America Cables system has been extended from Buenos Aires and Montevideo to São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro in Brazil, where formerly the British possessed a monopoly of telegraphic communication with the rest of the world. Today the United States may converse by cable directly

[7] The Argentine, in turn, has complained of the false impression of his country given to the world by the filmed version of "The Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse."

with all the countries of South America except Venezuela. Rates are cheaper, service is better, privacy in commercial messages is more assured, and European rivals no longer possess a means of espionage upon American trading activities, as was possible when messages to the United States were relayed in England or Germany. Before the World War the Brazilian or Argentine who needed to visit the United States generally crossed the Atlantic to catch his steamer in Europe, and recrossed it to reach New York. The journey from Rio de Janeiro consumed nearly a month of time. Today American steamship lines have been established between New York, San Francisco and New Orleans and all the principal ports on the two coasts of South America, and the passenger schedule between New York and Buenos Aires has been lowered from twenty-two to seventeen days. The effect of the opening of the Panama Canal need not be dwelt upon. With a direct, convenient and comfortable steamship service, South Americans as never before come to visit the United States, instead of confining their foreign travel, as formerly, to Europe. Americans, too, are flocking to South America, and learning from first hand observation that their Latin neighbors are not all Indians or their culture a primitive barbarism. The increasing number of Latin-American students who come to the United States for instruction is a familiar phenomenon to those associated with our universities and technical schools. In 1925 there were nearly a thousand, most of them devoting their attention to engineering, medicine, agriculture, and other

technical subjects, rather than to the liberal arts.[8] Whatever may be their influence in carrying home a juster appreciation of North Americans and their country, their presence is a source of enrichment of student life in the United States, and it is to the interest of both continents that the migration continue.

Greater mutual comprehension, whether achieved by more intimate trade relations, perfection of international news service, or individual contacts by scholars and men of affairs, provides the obvious basis for closer political understanding among the peoples of the western hemisphere. Such mutual comprehension, however, is still far from realization. That distrust and suspicion of the United States among the nations of Latin America may not be so deeply rooted or so widespread as was formerly the case is the hope and belief of many sympathetic observers. That it still exists, and needs to be eliminated, scarcely needs demonstration. To discuss the sources of present-day mistrust is the purpose of some of the following chapters.

[8] See *The Foreign Student in America,* New York, Association Press, 1925.

CHAPTER II

THE NATIONS OF SOUTH AMERICA

On the South American continent are ten republics, each with its characteristic personality and its national ideals. They differ in wealth and population, in political and social development, but they have a similar historical background, and many aspirations in common. They stretch over an area twice the size of that of the United States, and are inhabited by more than fifty million people. Nine of these republics were once provinces of the former vast empire of Spain, but Brazil owes its origin to Portugal. In the Spanish countries, except Argentina and Uruguay, the bulk of the population is Indian or part Indian; in Brazil we find also a mixed race, with a considerable admixture of the negro, especially in some of the tropical states. The type of civilization throughout is that of Mediterranean Europe, modified by an American, frontier environment. Largest in territory and in number of inhabitants is Brazil, which for these reasons and because its cultural traditions hark back to Portugal rather than to Spain, is generally inclined to pursue an international policy somewhat different from that of its Spanish neighbors. The foremost in wealth, education and material progress is Argentina, which

aspires to exercise a leadership over the whole of the continent.

The South American republics, like Mexico and the Central American states nearer by, have had their political difficulties from the early days of independence. Some, like Argentina and Uruguay, after many years of *Sturm und Drang,* have not only attained to a degree of stability comparable with that of the United States, but more recently have achieved genuinely popular governments, in which elections are more than a political gesture and liberty is not confused with anarchy. The secret ballot has been adopted, and labor and middle class elements have come to exert a preponderating influence in political affairs. In Brazil, too, political stability seems to be relatively secure, but popular education is less generally diffused, democracy is non-existent, and while constitutional forms are observed government is the privilege of a numerically small political oligarchy. Chile in the nineteenth century was fortunate in the possession of one of the most stable and intelligent governments south of the Rio Grande. But again it was the government of a political minority closely associated with the landed aristocracy and with the Church. As in Argentina, however, the past two decades have seen the evolution of an organized labor movement, and a progressive liberalizing of the government. The definite defeat of the old oligarchy in the elections of 1920, and the rise to power of a new, inexperienced political class has resulted in uncertainty and inefficiency in the management of public affairs, and given excuse to ambitious army

officers to try and ape the ways of a Mussolini or a Primo de Rivera. But those who know Chileans best are most confident of their future.

The Andean republics north of Chile and the interior state of Paraguay still lie within the storm-belt of Latin-American politics. As in Brazil, political power is the monopoly of a small group of whites and educated *mestizos,* in these countries usually divided into two factions or parties, Conservatives and Radicals, clericals and anti-clericals, but often displaying few well-defined principles, except the determination to remain in office. National elections are generally a farce, as is inevitable among a people most of whom, although by the constitution assured all the rights of citizenship, are wholly ignorant of the privileges and duties of a democracy.[1] The official candidates are nearly always returned, and frequently nothing short of violence can bring the Opposition into power. Revolution, therefore, has been generally accepted as an appropriate extra-legal means of changing the government, and revolution has generally brought with it financial disorganization and a depreciated currency. Some of these states, moreover, because of inadequate communications, were till lately very much isolated from the rest of the world, and received few immigrants from Europe. The civilized population therefore retains to a large extent the modes of thought and the habits of its colonial forefathers; Spanish cus-

[1] This passage is based upon the writer's article, "From Mexico to Argentina," in *These Eventful Years* (2 vols., London and New York, 1924), II, 348-380.

toms prevail to a much greater degree than in Chile or Argentina.

Yet in most of these countries since the beginning of the present century significant and hopeful changes have been taking place. Railways have been constructed, foreign capital has come in, public sanitation is being introduced, and more attention is being given to the problems of popular education. A greater moderation, moreover, and a broader intelligence have characterized the ruling class. There is everywhere a growing national self-consciousness, a realization in all these republics that they must mend their ways if they are to be received on a footing of equality in the community of civilized nations. This feeling has been engendered in part by increased participation in world politics, in part by the example of more stable American neighbors. But it is also a consequence of enlarged experience in self-government, an experience denied the peoples of Latin America during the three centuries of colonial life that preceded the era of independence.

The Latin republics of America were formally introduced into the charmed circle of international society before the recent War. It is interesting to recollect that to the first Hague Conference summoned by the Tsar of Russia in 1899 only Mexico of all the Latin-American states received an invitation. At the second Conference in 1907 all of these states except Costa Rica and Honduras were represented. For the first time they were admitted to a degree of international fellowship that signified something more than the mere recognition of sovereignty and independence.

And although "the attitude of the Great Powers toward them resembled that of parents of the old régime: children at the international table should be 'seen and not heard,'—as a matter of fact the Hispanic Americans were both seen and heard!" They revealed to Europe "a skilful intelligence, a breadth of knowledge, a capacity for expression, and a consciousness of national character" which could not be overlooked.[2] In the World War of the following decade, five of the ten South American states officially severed relations with the Central Powers. Brazil alone, however, became a belligerent. Two other countries, Uruguay and Peru, took steps virtually equivalent to a declaration of war, confiscating German ships interned in their harbors and assuming an attitude benevolent to the Allies. Five governments remained officially neutral, believing that no sufficient cause existed to justify their pursuing any other course. They were Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Paraguay and Venezuela. Brazil by virtue of her size and her belligerency became at Versailles the spokesman for all her sister states, was a charter member of the League of Nations, and by the Treaty of Versailles one of the nine powers originally represented in the League Council. Altogether seventeen Latin-American republics have joined the League, and their delegates have taken an active part in the deliberations at Geneva. In the past few decades, therefore, as never before, these countries have entered upon their political birthright. The world has slowly come

[2] Shepherd, W. R.—*The Hispanic Nations of the New World,* New Haven, 1918, p. 151.

to recognize that here is not a vague block of peoples indistinguishable one from another—the "Latin America" of popular parlance—but a galaxy of quite individual nations, differing in achievements and prospects, but all of them showing notable progress, political and social, and possessing vast possibilities for the future. "Latin America" has become something more than a mere geographical expression.

Extensive in area—Uruguay, the smallest South American republic, is larger than all New England—and with an abundance of natural resources, it is reasonable that these countries should aspire to play a rôle in the world commensurate with their size and economic importance. They lack population, a sufficiently numerous or intelligent laboring class, and capital for industrial development. Foreign capital and European immigration, these constitute the great needs and are the source of some of the principal problems, both domestic and foreign, of the Latin republics. In general capital has been more easily secured than colonization; until recently the European immigrant has preferred the more alluring prospects and the closer proximity of the United States. But as has been well said, "if the capital arrives without a corresponding number of immigrants to settle permanently in the country, the States concerned can hardly fail to become lands of exploitation. Producers of raw materials needed abroad, having few manufactures of their own and small domestic consumption besides, the Latin-American nations . . . necessarily

(depend upon) foreigners."[3] And to the dangers of foreign economic domination these southern countries have become much alive.

The ever-increasing demand for foodstuffs by the world at large, competition for the raw materials of manufacture, and the accumulations of capital in more highly industrialized countries seeking markets for investment, have given the South American republics a vast importance, and thrust upon them perils and responsibilities from which they cannot escape even if they would. In the nineteenth century foreign investments were mostly British; but already before 1900 German, French and Spanish capital had begun to pour into the continent, and since the World War most of the foreign loans, whether public or private, have been supplied by this country. In spite of post-war prostration, Europe continues to invest, and if its commitments before 1914 amounted to over two and a half billion dollars, they have been increased by several hundred million since.

Argentina with over thirty-five million head of cattle, stands first among the countries of the world as an exporter of beef and by-products, having long ago supplanted the United States in this respect. Uruguay is also preeminently a pastoral country, and southern Brazil is assuming a new importance in the cattle industry. The arid, wind-swept plateau in the extreme south of the continent constitutes one of the great sheep-raising areas of the world, and Patagonian competition in mutton Australasia finds it increasingly diffi-

[3] William R. Shepherd, in *The New York Times,* January 23, 1927.

cult to meet. The largest hide and wool market of the world today is at Buenos Aires.

For the production of wheat, maize and other cereals Argentina again is one of the favored nations of the earth, while in her province of Mendoza, under the shadow of the Andes, wine is produced in abundance. But the finest fruits, and wines rivalling those of France and Germany, come from across the mountains in the "tapeline" republic of Chile. The tropical countries of the north, with their vast area and exuberant soil, have since colonial times supplied Europe with the characteristically plantation products which have become necessities of modern life. The state of São Paulo alone in Brazil grows enough coffee to supply half the world's demand, while Colombia and Venezuela, which produce finer grades, take second and third rank respectively among coffee-growing countries. Cacao is also one of the chief exports of Venezuela, as it is of Brazil and Ecuador. The coastal belt of Peru is assuming importance as a cotton and sugar producing area, while central and northern Brazil, given transportation facilities and a sufficient labor supply, may easily some day become one of the great cotton areas of the world.[4] Sugar, Brazil's principal crop in colonial times, may be grown almost anywhere from the state of Parana northward. Only Brazil and Peru as yet produce these international staples on a commercial scale, but a region similarly endowed as to climate and soil exists in the so-called Gran Chaco, today a

[4] Today it produces about 600,000 bales, a fourth of which are available for export.

wilderness embracing parts of northern Argentina, eastern Bolivia and western Paraguay. Tobaccos of excellent quality may be grown in Colombia, Venezuela, Paraguay and Brazil, although only the Brazilian product finds a considerable market abroad. What are required in most cases are foreign capital, labor, and continued improvement in methods of production.

The forest resources of the continent are enormous in variety and extent, but the lumbering industry is still in its infancy. South America continues to import millions of feet each year from the United States. The rubber of the Amazon country still remains the most important of the forest products, although since 1910 it has suffered severely from the competition of plantation rubber from the Orient. Amazonia too offers opportunities for the development of plantations, if cheap labor can be had. But although a few plantations have been planted, as yet there is little improvement in the rubber industry at large.

Geologists tell us that along the entire great western mountain system, from Panama to Chile, are indications of stores of petroleum. Productive areas are being exploited on the northwest coast of Peru and at Comodoro Rivadavia in Patagonia, and the oil fields about Lake Maracaibo, in Venezuela and Colombia, seem destined to become as important as those of Tampico in Mexico. The southern Bolivian field also shows promise, and the entire petroleum reserves of South America are calculated as probably as great as those of the United States. Since the days of the Span-

ish conquest in the middle of the sixteenth century, the mines of Colombia, Bolivia and Peru have supplied the world with countless wealth in gold and silver, and indeed were one of the principal factors in the evolution of modern European capitalistic society. Some of the richest metalliferous deposits are still to be found in that part of the globe. Bolivia is one of the chief sources of tin, Chile of copper, Brazil of manganese, and Colombia of platinum and emeralds. The iron ore deposits of Brazil alone have been estimated at several billion tons, and what other mineral wealth lies hidden in the mountains of Brazil and the Andean republics, unexploited for want of cheap and adequate transportation, is as yet unguessed.

The amazing material and social development of the United States during the past half century has served to distract attention from progress along similar lines in other New World nations. Yet this progress, though less spectacular, is also worthy of record. In the southern half of the continent, Chile, Argentina, Uruguay and southern Brazil, railway facilities are fairly abundant, and on the main lines, generally British owned, the service in speed, regularity and comfort compares favorably with that of analogous roads in this country.[5] Some of the railways in the mountainous parts of the continent represent extraordinary feats of engineering, as in the line from São Paulo to Santos in Brazil, and the Oroya Railway that climbs nearly sixteen thousand feet into the Andes from Lima

[5] Brazil possesses nearly 20,000 miles of railway, Argentina over 22,000 miles.

in Peru. In 1909 Buenos Aires was linked with Santiago de Chile and Valparaiso by a railway across the continent, and the time is not far distant when parallel lines will traverse the Cordillera north and south of the original "trans-Andine." All-rail communications are complete from Victoria, north of Rio de Janeiro, to Montevideo in Uruguay, and from Buenos Aires to La Paz in Bolivia, whence one may continue northward to Cuzco in Peru or to the Pacific at Mollendo. And the linking of southern Peru with Lima, and thence with Ecuador and Colombia can be only a matter of time. The possibility of journeying by train from the mouth of the Magdalena River on the Caribbean south to Patagonia and Punta Arenas is no mere idler's dream. Considerable progress in the electrification of railways has been achieved in Chile and in the Brazilian state of São Paulo; and given the scarcity or high price of coal, this development seems the logical one in most parts of the continent.

It will not be the privilege of the present generation to witness anything like an industrialization of South America. In most of the republics coal and iron are either lacking or unavailable for want of adequate transport. Only Chile has sufficient coal close at hand for her own industrial needs, but it is of low grade, and in the northern nitrate provinces is being replaced as a fuel by petroleum. The tapping of the oil reserves of the continent may serve to compensate for the lack of the older fuel, but the chief resource of the South American countries will lie in the development of hydro-electric power. All of the Andean states have

water-power in abundance. The east coast of Brazil is equally favored, and the region of the River Plate may some day be supplied by high-power transmission lines from the western foothills or from the great Iguassu Falls on the borders of Brazil. Such developments, however, require a large expenditure of capital, and this, for reasons that vary from one country to another, will probably be slow in forthcoming. All of the countries are still at the stage in which their energies are most easily and profitably employed in the extractive industries of agriculture, stock-raising, and mining. These will long continue to be the chief sources of the nations' wealth.

Nevertheless, in the more progressive states, the amount of industrial activity is considerable, and this in addition to the manufacture of articles of common consumption, such as soap, pottery, cheap furniture, etc., which virtually all communities produce for themselves. The manufacture of cotton textiles in Brazil has become a large industry. In 1925 there were some three hundred spinning and weaving mills in operation, representing a capital of over one hundred and twenty-five million dollars, and supplying eighty per cent. of the domestic consumption. In Brazil, Argentina and Chile the tanning industry, with its allied manufacture of boots, shoes, leggings, saddles, etc., serves a large proportion of the home demand, and the better grades of domestic footwear compare favorably with those imported from abroad. The manufacture of butter, cheese and casein has in recent years had a remarkable growth, and in 1925 nearly forty-nine thousand

tons of these dairy products were exported from Argentina. This latter country, without available coal of its own, possesses approximately fifty thousand industrial establishments turning out goods of the annual value of well over a billion dollars, and Brazil follows a close second. It is Chile, however, which will probably experience the most intensive industrial evolution, in relation to its size, in the near future. With a limited agricultural area, but abundance of water-power and minerals, an excellent climate, and a sturdy, industrious laboring class, conditions seem especially favorable to the development of a considerable manufacturing activity. A large metallurgical plant employing hydro-electric power, at this moment under construction in the south at Valdivia, is a significant sign of the times. Yet the present capital invested in industrial enterprise in Chile is probably not over two hundred million dollars.

As already remarked, European immigration is everywhere of vital importance, that there may be a larger and more skilled laboring class. Yet today only Brazil and the River Plate countries receive immigrants in any considerable numbers. The migratory movement from Europe was greatly retarded by the World War, but is again resuming its former volume, especially since the recent restrictive legislation of the United States has diverted the immigrant to other shores. At present close to a hundred thousand are going each year to Brazil for permanent settlement, and about as many more to Argentina. The vast majority come from the south of Europe, from the culturally related states of Portugal, Spain and Italy.

Five hundred thousand Italians or children of Italians live in the city of Buenos Aires today, and two million live in Brazil, half of them in the state of São Paulo, where their influence is of utmost importance in making that state the most energetic and progressive in the Brazilian republic. German immigration, though less numerous, has been equally significant in the agricultural and industrial progress of southern Brazil and southern Chile.

The development of industry also implies the appearance of organized labor. This has been especially true of the River Plate countries and Chile, where labor is playing an increasingly important rôle in the political life of the community. Strikes are of greater frequency and seriousness, and in Argentina during the years immediately following the World War the government was forced to adopt stern repressive measures to avert the general paralyzation of industry. The promoters of social unrest are the European newcomers who congregate in the large cities and bring with them the radical doctrines that prevail among the proletariat in the Mediterranean countries. Foreign labor leaders have in several instances been expelled. The net result, however, has been to better considerably the economic and social condition of the laboring classes. In recent years in most of the South American republics labor legislation has come in for a large share of public attention. Especially in Uruguay, Argentina, Chile and Peru constructive measures have been adopted establishing a maximum eight hour day and workingmen's compensation, requiring safety de-

vices in industry, proper sanitation, and adequate safeguards for the health of women and minors. More and more welfare activities—schools, dispensaries, recreation grounds, etc.—are being introduced into the larger commercial and industrial establishments, especially if they are controlled by British or American capital. And better housing is likewise occupying the attention of both public and private agencies as they come to appreciate modern conceptions of responsibility to labor. In metropolitan districts—Montevideo, Santiago, Lima—housing programs are planned under government auspices to provide more adequate accommodations for workingmen, and so raise the general level of moral and physical health.

In many other respects the South American nations are today alive to the importance of modern movements for social amelioration. In cities like Montevideo and Buenos Aires hospitals are numerous and surprisingly well equipped, equal in fact to the best in other parts of the world, and public health and sanitation are adequately provided for. Nowhere exists a more effectively organized or more intelligently managed public service than in the *Directoria do Serviço Sanitario* of São Paulo. Physical culture has become a requirement in the public schools of every South American country, and hygiene is taught by means of public lectures and demonstrations. The seaports of Brazil and the west coast, once ravaged by yellow fever and other tropical diseases, have been entirely freed of these scourges, generally through the efforts of their own medical men and scientists. And throughout

most parts of tropical America a determined campaign against the hook-worm is being waged under the guidance of the Rockefeller Foundation. The temperance movement has become a live social issue in most of the southern republics, and by legislation, public education and the influence of private associations, the sale and consumption of alcoholic beverages is in many places being regulated and restricted. Prison reform has also received attention, and the penitentiaries of Buenos Aires and São Paulo, in equipment and organization as reformatory agencies, are unsurpassed by any similar institutions in this country.

Provision for primary education in most of the South American republics leaves much to be desired, and the number who proceed as far as the secondary schools (our junior colleges) is far less than in the United States. Nevertheless the school systems, at least in urban districts, contain most of the elements commonly found in modern communities, and in one or two of the most progressive states do not rank much below those of the most advanced countries of North America and Europe. It has been said that Argentina during the past generation has spent more per capita in the education of its children than any country in the world except Australia. As in most Latin-American countries, education by law is free and compulsory between the ages of six and fourteen, but here at least an effort is made to provide teachers, buildings and equipment. In the cities we find medical and dental inspection for school children, special instruction for defective and abnormal children, and night schools for

adults and working people. Normal schools and institutions for agricultural, trade, and commercial training are numerous, and are preparing the nation for the industrial evolution of the future. The universities, following European rather than English or North American traditions, are groups of professional faculties only, lacking the residential "undergraduate" colleges of arts and sciences with which we are familiar, and women are admitted everywhere on equal terms with men. At the best of them the standards of instruction are high. Indeed, not only Argentina, but other progressive countries show a keen desire to align themselves with the most modern experiments abroad, sending experts to observe foreign educational practice, and engaging the services of foreign specialists as well.

The literary and artistic record of modern Latin America compares favorably with that of similar transplanted European societies. Rubén Darío of Nicaragua is commonly accepted as one of the greatest Spanish poets of modern times, as José Enrique Rodó of Uruguay was one of the most distinguished writers of prose. Andrés Bello, Venezuelan by birth and Chilean by adoption, was gifted as a poet, scholar and jurist. Ecuador was the birthplace of that "most majestic singer of Spanish-American independence," José Joaquín Olmedo, as Peru has contributed the sonorous verse of José Santos Chocano. Both in quantity and in quality the verse of Latin America has exceeded that of Anglo-Saxon America. And the novel and the story have recently attained to a considerable degree of de-

velopment and importance. Among older works, the exciting adventure-tale *Amalia,* written by the Argentine, José Marmol, and Jorge Isaacs' romantic Colombian novel, *Maria,* are perhaps best known outside the southern continent, and both have been translated into English. Of recent writings, the novels of Enrique Larreta and Manuel Gálvez (Argentines), Carlos Reyles (Uruguayan), Alcides Arguedas (Bolivian), and Rufino Blanco-Fombona (Venezuelan), have received wide recognition in Europe, as bearing the stamp of independence and originality necessary to proclaim them natives of America. There has appeared also in Brazil a notable array of original, creative personalities, as revealed in the poetry of Castro Alves and Olavo Bilac, the criticism of José Verissimo, and the novels of Machado de Assis, Graça Aranha, and Alfred d' Escragnolle Taunay. The earlier literature of the nineteenth century was still very colonial, imitative, mediocre in character, until the triumph of French Romanticism about 1830 crystallized an influence already established by the French political and philosophical writings of the eighteenth century. Since then France has exercised a scarcely disputed artistic and intellectual hegemony, and the rise of each new literary "school" on the Seine has had its repercussion in Latin America. Only in recent years are there signs of a reaction against France in favor of a native intellectual autonomy. Many of the intellectual leaders, however, have been men of extraordinary versatility, like Bartolomé Mitre of Argentina, poet, journalist, historian, scholar, soldier and statesman at one and the same

time, and like his successor in the presidency of the republic, Domingo Faustino Sarmiento, who was an educator, publicist, political philosopher, author of fifty printed volumes. Versatility has sometimes been at the expense of artistic perfection, but it has produced personalities of unusual interest and power.

Chile, Argentina and Brazil possess national academies of art and conservatories of music in which excellent training is given, often under foreign masters, and the continent has contributed to the world some notable operatic singers as well as instrumental musicians of the first rank. Intelligent appreciation of music and painting is as widespread as in this country, and probably, in nations preponderantly Spanish and Italian, more genuinely popular. Venezuelans point with pride to four native painters of the first order, Cristóbal Rojas, Arturo Michelena, Tovar y Tovar, and our contemporary, Tito Salas. The canvases of Michelena display a breadth of conception and powerful technique which gained him immediate recognition in Europe, and the heroic battle scenes of Tovar y Tovar on the ceilings of the National Palace in Caracas well repay the stranger's visit. The work of contemporary Chilean and Argentine painters and sculptors is much better known in Europe than in this country, and some of it has gained signal recognition. The fine arts generally, however, like the literature of South America, while revealing many points of originality, still remain largely derivative in character.

Scholarship and scientific research as yet have generally lagged behind achievement in the United States.

The universities of South America turn out thousands of young men and women as teachers, lawyers, physicians and engineers. But the pursuit of pure science apart from its practical, every-day application is still in its infancy, and attention to laboratory instruction leaves something to be desired. Much historical writing, and some good history, has been produced. The educated South American writes with an unwearying facility and resourcefulness alien to most of our own countrymen. But his "history" has generally been vitiated by superficiality, by the prepossessions of factional politics, or by the snares of sociological theorizing. Polemic has often usurped the place of cool, impersonal, and well-grounded scholarship. Yet in medicine and law the contribution has not been inconsiderable. The late Dr. Oswaldo Cruz of Brazil enjoyed an international reputation for his services in sanitation and tropical hygiene. And both Brazil and Argentina are sending forth physicians and surgeons of note. Dr. Alejandro Álvarez of Chile, Dr. Rodrigo Octavio and the late Ruy Barbosa of Brazil, and the lamented Luis Maria Drago of Argentina, are counted among the world's most distinguished authorities on international law. And at the University of Buenos Aires has been organized, in the Institute of Historical Investigations, a group of young historical scholars whose work vies with the best produced in Europe or the United States.

We of this country have remained generally oblivious to the social and cultural achievement of the nations of South America. These republics face, and are proceeding to solve, the same social and industrial

problems—the shock of capital and labor, of democracy and oligarchy, the prevalence of radical economic theorizing, and the demands of popular education—that are the preoccupation of contemporary civilized society everywhere. Artistic and literary production reveals conditions differing in no essential particular from those prevalent in the United States, and giving promise of a significant aesthetic evolution in the future. South America stands on the threshold of an era of vast promise both material and intellectual, an era not only of increasing European immigration, active exploitation of natural resources, and expanding transportation facilities by land and by sea, but of increasing political stability, hand in hand with the emergence of a genuinely thoughtful and original culture taking equal rank with that today developing in the Anglo-Saxon America of the north.

CHAPTER III

INTER-AMERICAN RELATIONS

A HUNDRED years ago the United States was a very young nation, small and relatively weak, with only a generation of independence behind it. By the War of 1812 waged against Great Britain, however, and by the promulgation a decade later of the principle of foreign policy enunciated by President Monroe, it already claimed and obtained the right to be heard on questions of international import. The independence of the new Latin republics it welcomed with enthusiasm, pleased by the flattery of imitation. It joined with them in an apostolate of freedom, with them "cherished the common aspiration of making the New World a land of free republics, secure from foreign control." But while the newly emancipated peoples to the southward were contending with the disruptive forces of sectionalism and personalism in their domestic life, the legacy of a despotic colonial régime, the United States, more homogeneous in race, more favored in its inherited political traditions, forged rapidly ahead in population, wealth and general well-being. Numbering among its citizens more than the population of all the Latin-American nations combined, developing within itself an extraordinary industrial and

commercial energy, it came to represent an economic and political power which South Americans viewed with increasing uneasiness. It seemed that the danger of foreign encroachment no longer emanated from Europe. It resided in the western hemisphere itself, in the overweaning power and pride of the great Anglo-Saxon republic.

We meantime, absorbed in the processes of our own territorial and material expansion, in the nineteenth century paid relatively little attention to the regions south of Panama. As a people provincially indifferent to most things foreign, unless they be the fashion decrees of Bond Street or the Rue de la Paix, we displayed an ignorance of our southern neighbors that was nothing short of colossal. And it must in truth be added that these neighbors, equally absorbed by the preoccupations of the frontier, understood as little of the true inwardness of this Anglo-Saxon phenomenon in the north, and sometimes cared less. Indeed, Americans generally, whether citizens of the United States or of Peru, of Brazil or of Argentina, knew more about Europe, with which they were connected by common ties of origin, than they did of one another. Europe and America supplemented one another, moreover, commercially. One was an industrial area, the other a producer of raw materials. The United States could use some of the tropical products of South America, but for a long time had little she could offer in exchange more cheaply than could Great Britain. The latter had capital to offer for loans, needed by governments and people in both Americas. Great Britain in par-

ticular, therefore, throughout most of the nineteenth century enjoyed a commercial preponderance in the markets south of Mexico, and with it a certain amount of political leadership as well. Nevertheless, among these American peoples there persisted something like a common consciousness of similar interests and similar ideals. And by the end of the century this consciousness found expression in the beginning of a series of international congresses which, if they achieved less than enthusiasm anticipated, have at least served to dispel some of the accumulated ignorance of the past and to foster the spirit of cohesion among the American nations.

These common interests and ideals, as Dr. Alejandro Álvarez of Chile has pointed out,[1] are the product of similar historical experiences. All of the American nations were once colonies of European powers, and took form under somewhat similar conditions far removed from those prevailing in the Old World. These colonies almost simultaneously revolted, and made themselves sovereign states, states based, in aspiration at least, upon principles of democracy and equality—equality of individuals and equality of nations. Common interests and ideals have also been the consequence of similar economic and social experiences, growing out of frontier, pioneering conditions. Most of the American nations have had large territories to be exploited and populated, with consequent emphasis upon exten-

[1] "Pan-Americanism and the International Policy of America," in *Revista Chilena*, March-April, 1923, translated in *Inter-America*, December, 1923.

sive rather than intensive agriculture and industry, and with the social problems peculiar thereto. The American peoples have therefore come to recognize again, especially in more recent years, a harmony and community of interests, a solidarity and uniformity of views upon international questions and in the solution of domestic problems, that is not found among European states, and that has helped to neutralize in South America distrust of the power and ambition of the northern republic.

The Pan-American idea is commonly said to owe its inception to Simón Bolívar, the "Liberator" who gave independence to five South American republics. But Bolívar conceived rather of a confederation of the Spanish-speaking nations, possibly to serve as a counterpoise to the English-speaking federal republic on the northern continent.[2] In 1824 he aimed to give practical expression to the idea when he invited the newly organized governments of Spanish America to send delegates to a congress to meet in 1826 at Panama, where would be discussed among other things a "treaty of union, a league and confederation of American states, that should last for all time." Later, but not by Bolívar, Brazil was also invited although a monarchy, and the United States although not Latin-American. The Congress was thus put upon a Pan-

[2] Other Latin-American leaders, notably Juan Egaña of Chile, had expressed a similar aspiration even before Bolívar; which was natural under the circumstances, given the common Spanish origin of these new republics and the example of the former English colonies in North America.

American basis. On account of jealousies, domestic or international, not all of the states were represented, though all accepted the invitation. American representation was so long delayed by discussions in the Congress at Washington that before our delegates arrived the Panama meeting had adjourned. This first inter-American Congress was in fact not an unqualified success. Treaties drawn up and providing for something like an American league of nations were not carried into effect even by the states represented. They could not be, for the entire conception was premature. Most of the Latin states were entering upon a period of social and political anarchy that made effective cooperation impossible. The United States, moreover, soon became involved in a course of territorial accretion at the expense of Mexico, and in filibustering adventures in Central America, that caused an estrangement between it and its "sister" republics.

From time to time after 1826 steps were taken among the Spanish-American states to bring about other meetings with objects similar to those at Panama. But the United States was not included, and the meetings if held were without practical result. Mexico sent out several invitations in the decade between 1830 and 1840. In 1847 a congress of the Pacific states of South America assembled at Lima, and another at Santiago de Chile in 1856. In 1864 Peru invited all the Spanish republics to send delegates again to a congress at Lima. In each instance the occasion was in part the fear of foreign encroachment, by Spain or by the United States, and at each meeting were discussed the bases of

some form of international cooperation among American states that would substitute arbitration or other peaceful methods for the arbitrament of war. Treaties and conventions were drafted embodying these ideas, and "cementing upon substantial foundations the union which exists between them, as members of the great American family . . . as well as giving further guarantees of their independence and territorial integrity."[3] But the treaties or conventions were never ratified. When immediate dangers were dispelled, the enthusiasm for a league or confederation seems soon to have evaporated. The South American governments preferred to remain sufficient unto themselves, completely independent in political action, governed by the circumstances of each case as it arose. Moreover, lack of communications and of material resources, as well as disparity of political development, still made confederation in practice extremely difficult.

After the American Civil War, when with the disappearance of slavery the pressure for territorial expansion to the southward abated, Latin-American uneasiness regarding this country gradually relaxed; and when Colombia and Chile in 1880 signed a treaty providing for the compulsory arbitration of all controversies between them that could not be settled by way of diplomacy, they agreed that if unable to unite upon an arbitrator, the President of the United States should act in that capacity. They also agreed to con-

[3] Quoted from the "Continental" Treaty of 1856 between Chile, Ecuador and Peru, in *Principles of American Diplomacy,* by J. B. Moore, New York, 1918, p. 381.

clude at the earliest opportunity similar conventions with other American states, "to the end that the settlement by arbitration of each and every international controversy shall become a principle of American public law." [4] The republic of Colombia immediately issued invitations to all the American governments to send representatives to a conference a year later at Panama, in order to give to the treaty full international effect. But as Chile, Peru and Bolivia were then involved in the so-called War of the Pacific, the conference did not materialize. And it was at this point that the United States stepped in to seize the initiative. In November, 1881, James G. Blaine, then Secretary of State, invited the independent states of the New World to participate in a general congress at Washington one year later, "for the purpose of considering and discussing the methods of preventing war between the nations of America." But the War of the Pacific still persisted, the assassination of President Garfield brought about a change of administration in Washington, and the invitations were withdrawn. The project, however, was only postponed. Such a congress did assemble at Washington, upon invitations sent out by President Cleveland with the authorization of the American Congress, in the winter of 1889-1890. It was the first Pan-American Conference of more recent times, designated technically the International Conference of American States. All the nations were represented except the Dominican Republic.

[4] Urrutia, F. J.—*La evolución del principio de arbitraje en América*, 2nd edition, Madrid, 1920, p. 90.

The program indicated by the United States Government was very extensive. Its political purpose was "the formulation of a definite plan of arbitration of all disputes arising between American nations." But the Conference was also to bring the nations together by fostering economic bonds. Increased trade relations and greater mutual intercourse were to form the basis of a better political understanding. Not all the economic proposals were acted upon, but a plan of international arbitration was adopted, *ad referendum,* to be obligatory in all cases except those which, in the judgment of one of the nations involved, might imperil its independence. The most important achievement was perhaps the creation of a Bureau of American Republics, later re-named the Pan American Union, and today a sort of permanent commission for directing and encouraging international cooperation in the two continents.

Since 1890 a vast number of Pan-American congresses and conferences of one sort or another have been held, political, economic, judicial, intellectual; congresses in which all the American nations have taken part on a basis of equality and reciprocity, to which many have made important contributions, and out of which there has come much discussion, and occasionally some effective action. The second International Conference of American States was held in Mexico City in 1901-1902, the third at Rio de Janeiro in 1906, the fourth at Buenos Aires in 1910, and a fifth, scheduled to meet at Santiago de Chile in 1915

but postponed on account of the distractions of the World War, assembled in March, 1923.[5]

At Mexico City and Rio de Janeiro schemes of compulsory arbitration were again discussed, with no very effective results,[6] but at the Santiago meeting proposals for something like an American league of nations were the chief political issue. Uruguay sponsored the scheme of an international association with organization and functions similar to those of the existing World League, but limited to purely American matters. Costa Rica urged the enlargement of existing arrangements so as to create three departments of international government: a legislature to be contained in the current International Conferences, an executive to be lodged in the governing board of the Pan American Union, and a judicial branch to be provided for by the creation of an Inter-American Court. Some of the larger states were not prepared for so radical a step, and the deliberations resulted in a compromise. The scope of action of the Pan American Union was enlarged and its organization modified to make it a more truly representative international body. The organization of an Inter-American Court was referred to a Commission of Jurists scheduled to meet later at Rio de Janeiro.

[5] The sixth Conference is to meet at Havana in 1928.

[6] In 1902 a convention providing for the compulsory arbitration of pecuniary claims that could not be settled by diplomacy was ratified by several American governments, and in 1910 at Buenos Aires its time limit indefinitely extended.

The American republics meantime agreed to conform their international actions to the terms of a Continental Treaty drafted at Santiago and signed by all the delegations—perhaps the greatest single achievement of the Conference. Its provisions are very much like those suggested to the nations of the world by the United States Government in 1913. All controversies which cannot be settled through diplomatic channels are to be submitted to an inter-American commission of inquiry for impartial investigation and report. The commission is to be composed of five members, citizens of American states, and its report is to be rendered within one year of its first meeting, the parties to the dispute agreeing not to declare war or make preparations for hostilities until the report is delivered. Thus an interval is provided for passions to cool, and for public opinion among the nations at large to exert a moderating influence.

These International Conferences of American States are not legislative bodies. Obviously, the delegates can only discuss, and make recommendations to the governments represented; or in their diplomatic capacity sign treaties when so empowered, treaties which must be ratified by the respective governments before they become operative. The Continental Treaty has since been ratified by eight American states.[7]

The growth of international cooperation in the New

[7] Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Guatemala, Haiti, Paraguay, United States, Venezuela. The vexed question of limitation of armaments, which failed of solution at the Santiago Conference, in reality affected only three states, Argentina, Brazil and Chile, and was therefore of local rather than of inter-continental significance.

World in recent decades has not been confined to the political sphere. Especially at Santiago de Chile joint action in the solution of common social problems was recognized as a vital part of Pan-Americanism. In the matter of hygiene an extended international program of public health was worked out. Resolutions were adopted providing for the study of labor problems in anticipation of the next Conference, and of laws prejudicial to the civil and political status of women. Prohibition—a new subject for these international gatherings—received its due share of attention, and recommendations were made concerning appropriate methods of restricting the liquor traffic and its evil effects.[8]

One of the most promising means of approach to the solution of problems of international cooperation lies in the strengthening of the juridical ties that bind the nations into something a step removed from the jungle. In the Pan-American movement it has received corresponding emphasis. At Rio de Janeiro in 1906 provision was made for an International Commission of Jurists to formulate codes of international law, both public and private, for the western hemisphere. This Commission, more clearly defined in 1910, held a meeting at Rio de Janeiro in 1912, where its modus operandi was definitely agreed upon, and would have assembled again in 1915 had it not been submerged in the confusions of the World War. It was renewed by

[8] Such as compulsory education, high license, the closing of drinking resorts on certain days and hours, their removal from the vicinity of public buildings, and the prevention of liquor traffic with prohibition communities.

the Conference at Santiago in 1923, and held an important meeting at Rio de Janeiro in the spring of 1927. Side by side with it exists the American Institute of International Law organized in 1912 at Washington. It is a federation of twenty-one national societies representing the twenty-one republics of the New World, the Institute itself being composed of five representatives from each national society. Its purpose is the study and solution of world problems by a development of the principles of international jurisprudence, and its ultimate aim, in cooperation with the International Commission, is to create a code of international law for the two Americas. The work of these organizations should have an important influence upon the evolution of any league of nations, whether in the New World or in the Old.

Within recent years, in 1915 and 1920, two Pan-American Financial Conferences have met in Washington, occasioned by the economic derangements growing out of the World War. The first was called together by President Wilson to consider the monetary and banking situation, but it adopted recommendations on many other subjects intended to facilitate commercial relations between the United States and Latin-American countries, at a time when the latter were pretty effectually cut off from the markets of Europe. Such matters were the establishment of a common gold standard of value, better transportation facilities, the arbitration of private commercial disputes, and uniformity of legislation in regard to bills of exchange, customs regulations, port charges, registration of

trade-marks, etc. To secure the translation of these resolutions into legislative action, a permanent Inter-American High Commission was created, consisting of a "section" of nine members in each republic appointed and presided over by the Minister of Finance. The United States Section has been designated as a Central Executive Council to coordinate the labors of the High Commission, and to formulate and submit drafts of treaties embodying the conclusions of the Conferences. Some of the resolutions have been given legislative sanction by the respective American governments. These Conferences, attended by finance ministers and by prominent merchants and bankers from all parts of the New World, have not resulted in any startling innovations in the financial and commercial structure of the hemisphere, but they have been the occasion of many international friendships between individuals, and serve to contribute to the spirit of inter-American cooperation. In many respects their deliberations were merely auxiliary to the economic programs already outlined in the political conferences of American states.

Of Pan-American Scientific Congresses there have been three, the first at Santiago de Chile in December-January, 1907-1908, the second at Washington in 1915-1916, and the third at Lima in December, 1924, —all of them held under government auspices of the country in which they met, and with government financial support. Their purpose, of course, is primarily intellectual, "to increase the knowledge of things American, and to disseminate and make the culture of

each American country the heritage of all American republics." But the mere program of the different sections of the Congress which met in Washington was a catalogue of all the American problems. At this gathering all the nations were officially represented, as well as most of the important learned societies and educational institutions of the western hemisphere. Over two hundred Latin-American delegates were in attendance, and more than a thousand from the United States. Altogether it was perhaps the largest international gathering of its sort in history.[9] Intellectual elements too are aiming at a permanent international organization, analogous to the Inter-American High Commission—a Pan-American Intellectual Union, including among its sections a Universities Union, a Library Union, and an Archeological Union. But most of this lies still in the realm of prophecy.

The Pan American Union, especially with the innovations introduced in 1923, has come to be more and more the clearing-house for these manifold inter-American activities. This international institution is maintained by the twenty-one American republics,[10] and controlled by a Governing Board composed of the Secretary of State of the United States and the diplomatic representatives at Washington of the other twenty American nations. It is administered by a

[9] Stuart, Graham H.—*Latin America and the United States,* New York, 1922, p. 21.

[10] One of the oddities of Pan-Americanism is that it does not yet include the Dominion of Canada, although the latter is one of the largest and most progressive of American states, and to all intents and purposes as independent as Cuba or Nicaragua.

Director-General and an Assistant Director-General chosen by the Board. It collects, compiles and distributes information of all sorts regarding the commerce, law and general progress of the American nations. It publishes a monthly Bulletin in three editions, Spanish, Portuguese and English, possesses an extensive library, and is housed in one of the most splendid buildings in Washington.

At the Conference at Santiago de Chile in 1923 provision was made that an American republic which may not have a diplomatic representative accredited to the Government of the United States may appoint a special delegate to the Board, and that the chairman, hitherto the American Secretary of State *ex officio,* shall be chosen by the Board. At the same time the functions of the Union were increased. It is now invested with the powers of a sort of permanent Committee of the International Conferences of American States. It is specifically charged with the compilation and classification of information as to treaties negotiated between American states; it is directed to cooperate with other organizations working along Pan-American lines, and through four permanent committees to foster economic relations, labor organization, public hygiene and the promotion of educational facilities. In short, the Union is coming to be a dynamic center for all inter-American activities. Only in the political sphere has its influence proved incommensurate with the possibilities offered.

It is clear that there has developed a steadily increasing cooperation, coordination of effort, among Ameri-

can states, which commonly goes under the name of Pan-Americanism. It reveals itself today under five principal aspects or manifestations, political, juridical, economic, social, and intellectual.[11] It has its warm advocates and its bitter foes. The former hail it as "the most advanced existing expression of international solidarity," as outlining in an informal way a true society of nations, in which all retain their independence and sovereignty. It is a society of nations, moreover, which has not resulted from a treaty or covenant, but has begun with the creation of a very rudimentary international organization, designed as it progresses to complete itself.[12]

Its foes are equally alive to the desirability of international cooperation and solidarity, and many of them advocate some form of inter-American organization. But they are convinced that the disparity in wealth and power between the United States on the one hand, and all the other countries of the hemisphere on the other, makes equality between nations practically impossible and association with the United States dangerous. These critics are naturally found almost exclusively among the Latin peoples of America. Many of them admire the United States for its manifold achieve-

[11] There have also been many other Pan-American congresses in recent years of a more specialized interest: a Child Welfare Congress at Buenos Aires in 1916, at Montevideo in 1919, and at Santiago de Chile in 1924; a Sanitary Congress at Montevideo in 1920, and at Havana in 1924; a Good Roads Congress at Buenos Aires in 1925; a Press Congress at Washington in 1926; etc.

[12] "Pan-Americanism and the International Policy of America," by Alejandro Álvarez, *Revista Chilena*, March-April, 1923.

ments, whether political, social or economic, and would, if they could, accept frankly its leadership. Others allow the black bile of their apprehension to color whatever they say or think about this country. With all of them the stumbling block is our policy of supervision in the Caribbean.

American statesmen in the past have frequently declared that justice and not force shall govern the free development of the republics of the two American continents. And the American people have recently shown pretty conclusively that they are opposed to a diplomacy of violence. Nevertheless, the traditional confidence in the fair play of the United States has recently been seriously imperilled. Whatever may have been true in the past, and without questioning the sincerity of the Department of State in seeking the friendship of the Latin-American nations, it seems clear that what is needed today is an intelligible declaration of American policy in general. It is conceivable that the difficulties of reconciling the legitimate interests and ambitions of large and small states, or of backward states and those more progressive, may be insurmountable. If this be so, it may be better to face the facts squarely, and, while encouraging friendly relations with other American nations, have it frankly understood that as the biggest and wealthiest people we regard our own interests in the western hemisphere as paramount and expect them always to receive prior consideration. Richard Olney announced as much as Secretary of State in 1895. It is possible that on the basis of such an understanding closer relations can be achieved, since

the Latin republics of America are for economic reasons virtually forced into the orbit of the United States. Whether such relations can at the same time be cordial, with peoples daily more conscious of their national individuality, is perhaps doubtful. But at least there would be less ground for misunderstanding, and we should escape the uncomfortable charge of hypocrisy.

If, however, the above course is not an unavoidable one, if the United States is to continue to cooperate effectively in the development of a Pan-American solidarity, it can only be by contriving more successfully than in the past to square national policy with its professions of benevolence and friendship.[13]

To quote an admirable suggestion in this connection: "One step . . . the United States might surely take: whenever it feels it necessary to institute any action which would be a departure from ordinary diplomatic relations, as in the Dominican Republic, Haiti and Nicaragua, it would do well to lay its reasons for such

[13] "It is the great misfortune of most of our diplomatic and military moves in Latin America that we do not make ourselves understood. Very likely we grossly misunderstand, at times, the Latin Americans themselves. But it is an enormous pity that even when we set out to help them, as we think, we are apt to do it in so malapropos and blundering a manner that we only succeed in filling them with resentment. It is doubly true of our relations with Mexico and Central America that in diplomacy the 'tone' is everything—that it makes the song, as Lord Palmerston said. This truth we have unhappily failed to recognize and live up to in our recent dealings with our neighbors to the south. What we need to correct is not so much our intentions as our manners." From an editorial in *The New York Times,* January 14, 1927.

action fully and frankly before all of the Latin American republics, either by an identic note addressed to their several governments or by an explanation at a meeting of the Pan American Union. Such a course would go far to prevent misunderstanding and to maintain good will." [14]

[14] Blakeslee, G. H.—*The Recent Foreign Policy of the United States*, New York, 1925, p. 116.

CHAPTER IV

BARRIERS OF RACE

DISTRUST of the United States among the peoples of Latin America in the past has been for the most part a political distrust, engendered by episodes in the diplomatic history of the western hemisphere, increased by the extraordinary growth of the United States in population, wealth and political prestige, fostered by European rivals who would like to see the preponderant influence of the great northern republic displaced by that of certain kindred trans-Atlantic peoples; and its strength has been in inverse ratio to the distance from the shores of the United States. It is most powerful in Mexico, in the small and backward states of the West Indies and Central America, and in the neighboring, continental republic of Colombia. In the more distant or more progressive states farther south, beyond the circle of the Caribbean, this sentiment becomes not so much a fear of political absorption as a dread of the overwhelming economic power commanded by the United States, especially since the World War. For today Latin America must come to New York for most of its financing, and it looks in the same direction for a large share of its imports. With it also is mingled a personal dislike of Americans, men and women, who in increasing numbers have been

coming to reside in Latin America as the representatives of United States industrial and financial enterprise.

It is commonly asserted, especially by Latin-American writers, that the chief obstacle in the way of inter-American understanding and cooperation is the divergence in temperament and traditions between the Latin, or Indio-Latin, races and the Anglo-Saxon. It constitutes a barrier the importance of which, however, is easily exaggerated. Dislike or distrust of the foreigner is a trait not peculiar to any one nation or group of nations. It is a legacy, doubtless, of a more primitive, tribal age when "stranger" and "enemy" were virtually synonymous, and when only a rigid code of hospitality to the chance traveler made possible any peaceful contact between one people and another. It is not so many generations ago that foreign merchants in a European city resided for safety's sake in an enclosed area of their own, subject to their own magistrates and law. And even in the most enlightened and emancipated of moderns this atavistic instinct to suspect or hate the foreigner sometimes rises insidiously to the surface. What keeps it alive are provincial ignorance and a psychological blindness or inability to understand and appreciate an alien point of view. Both are subject to correction through education and experience.

The younger, pioneering peoples of the New World, whether in Latin or in Anglo-Saxon America, display this particular sort of provincialism to a marked degree—it is a familiar phenomenon of the frontier. But they also reveal another of an opposite tendency. Lack-

ing the long-established traditions of the much older nations of Europe, they look to them for precept and example in literature, jurisprudence, fine arts, and in modes of daily living. Their culture remains for a long time essentially imitative; acquiring wealth, they hasten to live abroad to rub elbows with the elect in Paris or San Sebastian; and they measure their own achievement entirely by foreign standards. Though politically independent, in other respects they remain in a colonial *milieu*. But if the example of economic and mechanical progress, of literary and scientific influence, in the four or five "great" powers dominating the world tends to give to weaker or more backward nations a sense of impotence, it sometimes serves to generate its own antidote in an exaggerated egotism and national pride. This "protective coloring"—inferiority complex, we call it today—may be salutary in countries in which vast territory, the influx of foreign immigrants, and difficulties of communication, impede or retard the formation of a definite national type. It does not always conduce, however, to the development of a spirit of international comity and good will.

Considerations of this general nature enter into any discussion of the relations between Latin-American peoples and the United States. And they apply in a measure to one party as well as to the other. They become more formidable when to them are added the further complications of differences of race, of color, of language, and of religion.

The inferiority complex is a fact easily observed in Latin Americans, and requires little comment. It is a

consequence of historical circumstance, and connotes a transitional stage in their national evolution, from the colonial status to that of intellectual as well as political independence. Latin Americans hate, admire, envy and fear the United States at one and the same time. But they also feel the difference of race. They have difficulty in understanding the psychology of the "gringo," or Anglo-Saxon. He is always something of a mystery to them. The Anglo-Saxon, incidentally, seems to have as much difficulty in arriving at a sympathetic appreciation of the Latin. This psychological difference, the writer believes, is often exaggerated. It is exaggerated by those too stupid or lazy to make the effort to understand an alien attitude of mind; it is over-emphasized by individuals who have a special interest in widening the breach between the two racial groups. It is, moreover, more easily talked about than defined.

It has been said that the Anglo-American is more inclined to base his actions upon facts, the Latin American upon impressions. If so, the difference may be of far-reaching consequence. The Latin American is accused of merely playing over the surface of things, rarely penetrating to fundamentals. He delights in rhetoric, ostentation, but lacks constancy and character. He accepts new ideas, undertakes new projects with great enthusiasm, but frequently fails to show the energy and perseverance required to carry them to fruition. He spends huge sums on the embellishment of his principal cities, but neglects to establish adequate schools or build schoolhouses. Medical students

are often brilliant in book-lore, but fail to realize the importance of practical laboratory and clinical experience. A luxurious municipal library is built, but nothing is done for the creation of local, popular libraries which the common people can really use. Or again, the sense of political and social morality is weak. The Latin American finds it difficult to understand an attitude of disinterestedness. In public affairs he is rarely able to subordinate self to the public welfare. He cannot engage in an enterprise, whether politics or sport, without striving himself always to occupy first place, hold the center of the stage, *seem* to be directing affairs—in contrast to the "spirit of cooperation and self-abnegation" displayed by North Americans in the World War.[1]

The Anglo-American, on the other hand, more practical and realistic, has the qualities of mind that make a better engineer, a more aggressive man of business; he receives a training that produces more experienced physicians, more genuine scholars. While his politics are by no means free from graft and corruption, there is a sufficiency of altruism and of a spirit of public service in the community effectively to leaven the whole lump. His practical bent, however, has not been uniformly a virtue. It has made him somewhat slower, for instance, to appreciate the need of beautifying his great cities, making them a joy to look at and to live in, rather than mere utilitarian centers of trade and manufacture. He is more careless of the niceties of

[1] All of the above criticisms the writer has heard from the lips of Latin Americans themselves.

social intercourse, less genuinely interested in music and the fine arts, although his wealth gives him greater opportunities to command them; he affects a brusqueness of manner and of speech which he mistakes for a sign of personal forcefulness. The old Greek spirit of moderation is more alien to him; he becomes more easily vulgar than his Latin contemporaries.

Of course, generalizations of this sort are always dangerous. There are many exceptions among individuals on both sides of the line. And the Latin Americans themselves cannot be discussed as a unit. Nation differs from nation—the Chileans are a more practical and realistic race than some of their neighbors; the modern Argentines, compounded of many European elements like the people of the United States, and with a similar geographical environment, are displaying the same signs of political and material progressiveness. The "differences" noted above, moreover, are more apparent in tropical or sub-tropical countries, where European immigration has been slight, and where the bulk of the population are Indian or represent a mixture of the white race with the Indian or the negro. It is also a debatable question as to how fundamental these "differences" are. The whole matter of the mixture of unlike races has never been adequately studied or approached in a scientific manner. There is certainly nothing in the history of Latin America to prove the essential inferiority of the mestizo. And some of the shortcomings of both the Latin and the Anglo-American are without question matters of historical inheritance or the influence of a frontier environment.

The Anglo-American has been more fortunate in his historical background; his "vulgarities" are a temporary manifestation of the frontier—of the geographical frontier only recently disappeared, and of the "frontier of the immigrant" with which he is still struggling. The frontier in Latin America has always preserved something of the aristocratic tradition of an older European society. While stressing the social amenities, it has been altogether lacking in experience of popular government and in the public virtues which such experience engenders. The problem on both sides seems to be, therefore, largely a matter of education. The whole political history of Latin America during the past hundred years is a history of slow and often painful education in self-government. And considering the obstacles involved, in some countries the progress achieved has been remarkable.

Latin America is educating itself in ways other than political. The development of a general interest and participation in sports during the past decade has been extraordinary. Association football is now played in all the countries south of the equator, and the matches draw enormous crowds. At first on an amateur basis, it is slowly becoming semi-professionalized. A series of international matches is played every year between Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina and Paraguay. There are other matches between representative teams of Peru and Chile, and Chile and Argentina, and the sporting page bulks large in most South American newspapers. In Asunción, in distant, "backward" Paraguay, a concrete stadium has been constructed by the government

for football, and every considerable village seems to have its primitive football field. International athletic meets are also held, the most recent in Buenos Aires in 1926, and they are followed with keenest interest in the several countries represented. Golf has taken a strong hold upon Uruguay and Argentina, and with the encouragement of British and American residents it is making progress in Brazil, Chile and Peru. Buenos Aires has numerous rowing clubs at Tigre, just outside the metropolis, and along the line of the electric railway from Retiro to Tigre the foreign visitor is astonished at the number of beautifully appointed athletic grounds for tennis and track. São Paulo and Buenos Aires each publishes a magazine devoted wholly to sport. And in Peru the devotees of the bull-fight ruefully admit that that form of diversion is doomed to disappear—the Sunday afternoon crowd prefers a football match. Moreover, at least in Argentina and Uruguay, the women are taking to outdoor sports. They play golf and tennis, in increasing numbers, and in a way that would scarcely have seemed possible fifteen years ago. Physical culture has become part of the requirements in the public schools in all Latin-American countries, and the boy scout movement has made a widespread appeal.

This new interest in athletics and the outdoor life is of more importance than might at first thought appear. The physical benefits to be derived therefrom are obvious, but as important are the social effects. Through games the Latin American is learning the meaning of fair-play, of cooperation and subordina-

tion of the individual to the achievement of a common end. The lessons acquired on the athletic field will be carried into political and social life, and will serve to narrow greatly the chasm that supposedly separates the Latin "psychology" from that of the Anglo-American.

Differences, nevertheless, do exist, and account for some of the misunderstandings between the two racial groups in America. The older generation inherits a conception of the United States whose most celebrated literary expression is found in a little book entitled *Ariel,* written some twenty-five years ago by the Uruguayan, José Enrique Rodó. Many of the newer generation, better informed, have not yet entirely separated themselves from the erroneous ideas there set forth, and special interests exert themselves to keep these ideas alive. *Ariel* is a book which belongs to what in Spain is called the "regenerationist literature" following the military defeat of 1898. It was a clarion call to the youth of Latin America for loyalty to Hispanic ideals and traditions, at a time when the mother country was sunk in dejection and despair: "Do not let yourselves be seduced by the material power of Caliban [the United States]; raise your eyes to Ariel, genius of the air and of the spirit." Rodó's concept of "Americanism" may be quoted in his own words: "The utilitarian conception as the idea of human destiny, and equality at the mediocre as the norm of social proportion." [2]

Rodó was not blind to many of the virtues of Anglo-American civilization. He was a man of insight and

[2] *Ariel,* translated by F. J. Stimson, Boston, 1922, p. 89.

high intelligence, unlike many more recent and more superficial writers who in their hatred of the United States apparently believe that no good can come out of them. The spirit of political liberty in the North Americans he admires, as well as their "pagan joy in health, in skill and in strength," and "the capacity, the enthusiasm . . . for doing things." He also recognizes that they "have been able to save from the shipwreck of all the idealities . . . the firm rein of the moral sense." [3] But their culture, though practical, is "neither spiritual nor refined"; it is summed up in the morality of a Benjamin Franklin: "A philosophy of conduct which has for its goal a commonplace sagacity, a prudent usefulness, in whose bosom will never rise the emotions of holiness or heroism." [4] What Rodó failed to perceive in American life, the gospel of social service less frequently heard in Latin-American countries, the ideal of efficiency and the fulfillment of one's duty in one's work, the calvinistic belief in the alliance of prosperity and morality, in success and the making of money as a means to a social end, these things we need not discuss here. In the years since *Ariel* was written, the United States has become not only the economic center, but an artistic, scientific and intellectual center of the world as well, and Rodó today would be the first to recognize and acknowledge his error. But many of his compatriots of lesser insight, either ignorant of the true inwardness of North American civilization, still believe that the United States is but the incarnation of a brutal materialism to be despised and shunned by the

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 100-102. [4] *Ibid.*, p. 114.

"idealistic" Latin, or trading upon the ignorance of others, spread this misconception abroad by malicious propaganda.

The element of ignorance, then, is of fundamental importance in an understanding of the problem of Latin-American dislike or distrust of the United States. Closely related to it are those other factors, difference of language, difference of religion, and the race or color prejudice of North Americans. Difference of language becomes less formidable with the general increase of education. The speaking of English is almost as common as that of French among cultivated Latin Americans today, and the well-nigh universal instruction in Spanish in the schools of the United States in recent years is a happy augury for the future. That American business firms should still occasionally send to South America representatives who are unable to speak the language of the countries to which they are accredited and who show little incentive to learn it, is but a survival of that provincialism to which reference has already been made. At most, however, the language barrier in the Americas is of less seriousness and complexity than among the nations of Europe. In so far as Roman Catholicism is the creed of millions of citizens of the United States, it can scarcely be said that a religious barrier exists. But the widespread activity of North American Protestant missionary agencies in a continent traditionally Roman Catholic makes the Latin American think of the United States as a Protestant country. Religious proselytism by North Americans he naturally resents, with its implica-

tion that his countrymen are heathen to be classed with the South Sea Islanders and the tribes of inland Asia. The South American nations are Christian communities. It is a question if the results achieved in the way of religious conversion are at all commensurate with the effort and money expended. And missionary enterprise as purely religious propaganda the writer believes does more harm than good as an agency for bringing into closer sympathy the peoples of North and South America.

The most important and most beneficent aspect of North American missionary effort, however, is educational. The Young Men's Christian Association and the Young Women's Christian Association are becoming solidly established in the principal South American cities, and in so far as they avoid the appearance of proselytism and direct their energies into social services, their coming is welcomed and their activities are supported by intelligent local opinion. Rio de Janeiro several years ago subscribed over one hundred thousand dollars to the local Y.M.C.A. toward a site and a new building, and in São Paulo, Montevideo and Buenos Aires public support is perhaps even more pronounced. The Methodists have a number of excellent schools in South America—Bennett College in Rio de Janeiro, the American Institute of La Paz, the Crandon Institute for Girls in Montevideo, etc.—in which instruction is given of primary and secondary grade, and generally superior in method and content to that offered in the local public schools. The Colegio Internacional in Asunción, maintained by the Disciples of

Christ, is one of the most progressive forces in the educational life of Paraguay, and one of the few foreign schools in South America in which the teaching is conducted in the native Spanish. Mackenzie College, a Presbyterian institution, and the only foreign school of collegiate grade, has long been a source of pride to São Paulo; and the Presbyterians also have a girls' institute in Curytiba, the capital of Parana, and an agricultural school at Cuyabá in Matto Grosso. The Seventh Day Adventists have their excellent agricultural schools in South America as in other parts of the world, one just outside the city of São Paulo, another near Buenos Aires, and a school near the border of Peru and Bolivia whose work of uplift among the Indians is a matter of concern to the ignorant local clergy in both countries.

In most of the American schools in South America there is little or no Protestant propaganda, and to that extent they are successful in avoiding native hostility. But even in these educational activities, a tactful consideration of native susceptibilities is imperative. When at the Pan-American Protestant Congress held at Montevideo in April, 1925, a campaign was announced to raise $2,345,000, most of it in the United States, for "educational, social welfare and health work in South America, designed to cement the friendly relations between the United States and Latin-American nations," there was curious comment in some of the native newspapers. And it is always a question if such patronizing does not serve rather to alienate than to conciliate. The rôle of rich and indulgent

uncle is sometimes a difficult one to play even in the best regulated families.

North American Protestant activities, while they cannot be charged with political motives, are yet sometimes used as a text by the clericals in South America for attack upon the supposed political ambitions of the United States. The Protestant Congress referred to above, for instance, was the occasion for a diatribe in the daily press by Dr. Juan Llambias de Olivar, entitled "Protestantism the Instrument of Pan-Americanism" (i.e. Yankee imperialism); and comments in the same strain appeared in *El Colegio,* the organ of the College of the Sacred Heart at Montevideo. The excellent newspaper, *El Bien Público,* journal of the Catholic Party in Uruguay, is frankly hostile to the United States because of its religious affiliations. The native reaction to Protestant propaganda is clearly indicated in an editorial which appeared in *La Nación* of Buenos Aires. Commenting upon the attacks by Roman Catholics against a Baptist mission in Granada, Nicaragua, the newspaper, while maintaining its usual friendly and judicial attitude, suggested that "perhaps the government filibuster William Walker was more prudent, for the first thing he did when he thought seriously of seizing the power in Nicaragua was to become a convert to Catholicism and maintain very cordial relations with the clergy." [5]

The Anglo-Saxon prejudice against men of color is a constant factor of disturbance in the relations between citizens of the United States and those of many

[5] *La Nación,* Buenos Aires, October 30, 1925.

Latin American countries, and it works infinite harm to the cause of international fraternity. It does not operate against nations like Uruguay, Argentina and Chile which in reality contain less "color" than does the United States. It is active against the citizens of countries like Brazil, which with a large negro and mulatto population draws no color line, against the Andean republics which are mostly of Indian or mestizo complexion, and against our more immediate neighbors about the Caribbean Sea. But even an Argentine or a Chilean occasionally suffers. The writer is acquainted with a distinguished South American scholar, educated partly in the United States, who is at least covertly anti-American in sentiment because at the middle-western university which he attended the community was unable to distinguish a white man from all the "other mulattos and half-breeds" of which South America is popularly supposed to consist.

It is perhaps at Panama, where contact between citizens of the United States and Latin Americans is closest and most frequent, that the effects of this race prejudice are best observed. It poisons our relations with that little republic at every turn. That many educated Panamanians should be at heart hostile to the United States is not strange when Americans in the Canal Zone, whether military, naval or civilian, secretly or openly look down upon them as "niggers." The official delegate from Haiti to the Pan-American Congress assembled at Panama in June, 1926, was refused admission to the Hotel Washington at Cristóbal in the Canal Zone, although he was a man of consider-

ably greater personal distinction than most of the delegates sent from the United States. In fact, except in so far as both natives and Americans happen to be members of the Union Club in Panama, there is little or no mixing of any social sort. Americans are haunted by the possibility that back in the fourth or fifth generation there may have been an accession of color, although upper class Panamanians are quite as "presentable" as are most white residents of the Canal Zone. And as for the American soldier or marine, he shows his fine contempt for the native in the streets, and is repaid in kind. Is it any wonder that the Pan-American Congress mentioned above deliberated in an atmosphere not overly cordial to the United States?

The exhibition of a raw race prejudice in the presence of our Latin neighbors is as often as not the outward and visible sign of that inward and spiritual crudity displayed by so many Americans who travel or reside in foreign parts. As a matter of fact, Americans in South America do not as a whole represent the best that the United States has to offer in intelligence, breeding or personality. Perhaps it is not to be expected that they should. But as a class they are not liked by South Americans. Argentines may be correct in their contention that Americans in their country do not measure up to the best in the British colony there. The same feeling seems to prevail in Uruguay and in Brazil. Americans are criticized for their loud manners, their excessive drinking, their aloofness from the natives, and their frequent refusal to learn Spanish or Portuguese. It is true that these last two qualities

they share with the British, but the latter are quieter in manner, are believed to drink less, and they are better liked. Whether American commercial representatives in South America, whatever their business acumen, are really inferior in personality to their British or German competitors is a debatable question; certainly the quality is improving, especially among men in executive or managerial positions. But unfortunately there is too much justification for the strictures made against American residents in general. Some come from the United States burdened with a consciousness that in intelligence and cleverness they are superior to the natives, whom consequently they are inclined to look down upon. In reality, few of them are able to associate on a plane of intellectual or social equality with the educated Chilean or Argentine. They do not, often cannot, read the native press, and spend their spare time in the club over cocktails. There is often little more to be said for their wives. Recently arrived from Main Street, often without social experience, and with no real interests to engage their time, their activities are perforce confined to bridge-playing and the purveying of scandal. They find little in common with native women, from whom they are generally separated by the barrier of language, and so soon become discontented and dislike the country.[6]

The fact of the matter is that the United States has not an exportable surplus of first-class men and women

[6] Generalizations, however, are always dangerous. The Y.M.C.A. in Buenos Aires reports that native charities receive more attention from American women than from British.

to send to South America.[7] In this respect it differs from the older, more densely populated, or less prosperous countries of Europe. The best young men find the opportunities for wealth or distinction too numerous at home to be attracted to foreign fields. And the charge is even made that American corporations with organizations in South America sometimes send there men whom they do not know what to do with at home, to get them out of the way. The criticism is of the same nature as that directed against North American firms which supply in place of the goods ordered something "just as good" which it is more convenient to ship. South Americans naturally resent that we should seem to think anyone or anything good enough for them, and those friendly to the United States often express the wish that we would send more of our best to them so that their compatriots may know what the United States really stands for.

The general criticisms levelled against North Americans in the southern continent are not confined to business representatives, commercial travelers, or concession seekers. They apply also to tourists. As in Europe, the impression obtains that most of them are loud mannered, ostentatious, strangers to the courtesy and dignity one expects as a matter of course among Latin Americans. It is extraordinary what our countrymen and women will do when freed from the restraints of the home town. Either the reservoir of

[7] Many companies also seem unwilling to pay the salaries necessary to interest such Americans in living permanently in South American countries.

innate vulgarity in the provincial middle-class of the United States is much greater than in the same class in Latin countries, or the latter rarely obtain the means to travel abroad and impose their shortcomings upon the suffering foreigner. Middle-class Britishers and Germans are perhaps no better than Americans, but they, too, travel less. They have neither the resources nor the leisure to swarm on those "winter cruises" round South America made possible by the wide diffusion of wealth in the United States. Early in 1925 some six hundred Americans arriving in Buenos Aires on a "tour" and offered the hospitality of the Jockey Club, so comported themselves in the club enclosure at the race course—especially about the bar—that the club for a time shut down on visitors' privileges to all foreigners. What had been intended to be a gesture of friendliness to American business men only served to create a dislike and contempt for American citizens in general. It will not be proffered again.

Citizens of the United States who appear in Latin America in semi-official rôles—members of Congress and even those connected with the army and the navy—sometimes produce no better impression than does the average tourist. An American congressman who accompanied the United States delegation to the Pan-American Good Roads Conference at Buenos Aires in the autumn of 1925 made himself notorious by his bluster and his appetite for publicity. It may be the popular mannerism in the community he represents at home, but it does not "go" in South America. An-

other congressman visiting Latin America, a senator this time, was at his own request taken by the representative of the Associated Press to call on the editor of a prominent daily of Buenos Aires. The Associated Press man later returned to the editor's office to apologize for the senator's bad manners. The writer himself overheard an American, also a legislator, who with several friends appeared in mufti at a large formal reception and dance given at the Union Club in Panama City, when politely requested by the president of the club to leave the dance floor because he and his party were not in evening clothes, invite him out to the sidewalk that he might "punch his face." It is this sort of thing that creates dislike of Americans personally, engenders anti-American prejudice, and blinds our Latin neighbors to the real sentiments and achievements of the United States. Not all Americans, of course, are subject to these criticisms, but there are enough to explain the charge of vulgarity made against a whole nation, and they complicate immensely the task of creating good relations between North and South America.

CHAPTER V

ECONOMIC PENETRATION

THE possession of vast natural riches by relatively "new" nations may be a source of danger as well as of potential well-being. It is obviously the basis of whatever material development is attained. But regions so favored, unless they have also a responsible government, a numerous population and a vigorous industry, may become the theatre of the economic ambitions and rivalries of more powerful countries, or at least the scene of intensive foreign capitalistic enterprise which may undermine their economic if not their political independence. Investment of foreign capital easily leads to economic absorption, and economic absorption to political control. This has happened in the Caribbean republics, because of their political insecurity and lack of responsibility in financial matters. It might conceivably happen under similar circumstances in some of the more backward states of the southern continent.

The North American is a relatively recent arrival in the South American business field. He was preceded by the trade emissaries of virtually every country of Europe. The evolution of the United States from

the agricultural to the industrial stage, and thence to the mercantile and financial stage, came a century later than in England. The rapid industrialization that has taken place during the past two generations, however, was bound to bring us as a competitor into the great export markets of the world; and the process was vastly hastened by the peculiar economic conditions created by the World War.

Trade with South America has increased enormously, as well as capital investment in that continent. Our exports in 1926 amounted to over 443 million dollars, and imports to 568 million dollars, a gain in total trade of 300 per cent. over that of the years immediately preceding 1914.[1] The articles imported are chiefly coffee, nitrate of soda, copper, wool, hides, rubber and cacao. In return we send machinery, motor cars, iron and steel, cotton goods, lumber and grain. Our industrial investments are not only much greater, but they have also become more diversified, since they are not so largely concentrated in mining properties as they were in 1914. With the cessation or decrease of the flow of capital from Europe, the governments, too, of South America have come to look chiefly to New York for their financing. In 1912 the total investments of the United States in South America were estimated at about 170 million dollars, of which less than 15 millions represented public securities. In 1924 they had increased to 1,229 millions, over half of which, however, had been loaned to national, state or municipal

[1] United States Department of Commerce, *Trade Information Bulletin*, No. 460.

governments.[2] In total volume of trade with South America we have outdistanced all rivals, including Great Britain, our most formidable competitor, and the percentage of United States trade is larger than that of Great Britain in all countries except Argentina, Uruguay and Bolivia. Our investments, however, still fall far short of those from Europe, barely exceeding the figures for Germany, while British capital interested in the railways of Argentina alone nearly equals the entire American investment in the southern continent. The notable absence of American capital in enterprises which consume imported American supplies is a serious obstacle to the future development of commercial relations with that part of the world.

Enlarged economic interest in South America means also increased responsibility. The outbreak of the War found us entirely unprepared for the unprecedented demands suddenly put upon our manufacturers, in large part for European types of merchandise such as we had ourselves been importing from Europe. Under the circumstances, while sales increased out of all proportion to the normal flow of trade, business practice became extremely lax, especially by export commission houses that sprang up overnight in New York and elsewhere. Little effort was made to meet the specifications of customers, or to give credit facilities, orders were filled imperfectly or in part, goods were carelessly packed, and American business in gen-

[2] Figures secured from the Finance and Investment Division, United States Department of Commerce.

eral acquired an unsavory reputation. Since the crisis of 1920-1921, and the world-wide deflation which only the large, established commission houses successfully weathered, American export methods have vastly improved, and trade has settled down to a safe and sane basis. But some of the old complaints are still occasionally heard, and it behooves American manufacturers and exporters for the reputation and interest of the country to walk with circumspection. Lack of dignity in commercial correspondence, the substitution of other goods for those ordered, failure to furnish service after goods are sold, the use of Spanish in correspondence with Brazil or the inability of American representatives to use either Spanish or Portuguese, the failure to deal openly and squarely with native agents—such are still the reputed shortcomings of some American firms ambitious to enter the foreign field.

It has been truly said that "the South American market is one of the most highly contested in the world. Every known device of propaganda and persuasion is used there." And in so far as European commercial rivalry is concerned, North Americans are in the hands of their competitors, who lose no opportunity to advance their own goods and interests at the expense of those of the United States. British residents are very loyal to British products and to British banks, and will generally patronize them even when price or quality favor competing services from other countries. There is no doubt considerable propaganda *viva voce* against American trade, and it occasionally crops up in the

foreign language press.[3] Publications controlled by our competitors are prone to attract public attention to anything that may work harm to the sale of American goods. Small mishaps, for example, to American shipping are exaggerated into major structural defects, and the libel is copied in the native papers. American machinery, airplanes and other products come in for similar attention. It is also true that most of the general import and export business, and a large part of the wholesale and retail trade, are in the hands of nationals of European countries, especially the British and the Germans. And while their trading houses are international in scope so far as source of supply is concerned, it is only natural that preference be given to the products of British or of German industry, other things being equal. British merchants were the first to introduce American agricultural implements, tools, lumber and other products, and still retain the distribution of a large share of this business; but the American manufacturer who confides the sale of his product to a British importer, while he generally has adequate representation, enjoys it only so long as no competing British product is available at the price. Whether such discrimination is fair or unfair is best left to the reader's judgment. On the east coast there are virtually no American merchants permanently identified with the commercial life of the country and engaged in the purchase and sale of American commodities,

[3] A new German weekly of Buenos Aires, the *Deutsche Zeitung am Montag*, pure propaganda for everything German from ingots to ideas, makes no concealment of its anti-American bias.

either as wholesalers or retailers. Since the World War direct sales branches of American manufacturers have been established in increasing numbers, and branches of American factories in a few important centers like Buenos Aires, Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. But for the smaller manufacturer, lack of control over the distribution of his product after it leaves the factory is a serious obstacle.

Sharp commercial practices between American and European competitors are not unknown, but they are probably not more frequent or more heinous than seems to be normal in business everywhere, and responsibility is very likely about evenly divided. Price cutting, secret discounts, gifts or other inducements to purchasers, doubtless occur. So also does commercial bribery in the way of the use of money or its equivalent by foreign merchants and manufacturers to obtain government orders or influence government officials in securing trade concessions or unfair advantage. The tendency to extend unduly long credits, for which German competition before the World War was chiefly responsible, seems in recent years to have considerably abated, due largely to increasing American influence in the import market. But it is also clear that with the revival of German export trade since 1920, several large German industrials are extending their commercial facilities in South American countries and quietly gaining control of certain local enterprises with funds obtained by the parent houses in Germany from loans floated in the United States.[4]

[4] Notably the Krupp organization and Siemens-Schuckert.

Of more reprehensible methods in international competition, an instance occurred in one of the republics a few years ago. In the process of choosing a new rifle to be supplied to the national army, the preliminary trials left two competitors, one British and one American. At the final tests the American rifle refused to work, and the contract was awarded to the British. On examination afterward, it was found that the mechanism of the American gun had been tampered with. As another example may be cited the tactics recently used by German manufacturers of underquoting British and American prices in order to shut out competition and delay the actual purchase until such time as German factories might be able to deliver. The same policy was followed in public tenders, in which attractive prices were quoted without any idea of ever making delivery. For instance, the Argentine State Railways in 1922 placed an order for 10,000 rolled forged car wheels with a German mill at $27.25 per wheel, the successful bidder promising delivery within a certain period. The lowest American bid was $38.00. At the expiration of the time limit, late in the same year, the agent of the German mill informed the State Railways that because of the unusual conditions in the Ruhr Valley delivery at the price quoted was impossible. New bids were called for, and the contract was again awarded to the same mill at a quotation still considerably below the best American bid. The German manufacturers subsequently offered to deliver only 5,500 wheels within the time specified, alleging again the untoward conditions in Germany.

The balance of 4,500 wheels was given to the Baldwin Locomotive Works.

Cut-throat methods of this sort, however, seem to be the exception rather than the rule in South American trade, and there is no evidence that their use by the nationals of any country is increasing. On the contrary, Americans probably suffer less from the effects of such unfair or questionable tactics than before and during the World War, due to the large increase of their own commercial facilities. With more than a dozen branches of American banks established in South America, American steamship lines to both coasts,[5] and an efficient cable service, they are no longer at the mercy of their European rivals. British banks today are much less likely to place difficulties in the way of financing British companies if the latter handle American merchandise; and much more inclined to give to American firms the same service they would extend to a British house, in the way of favorable rates of exchange, commissions, credit information, etc. In fact, American business men often complain that they can obtain better rates of dollar exchange by patronizing the British banks. British steamship companies, too, at least on the routes between South American ports and the United States, are no longer in a position to discriminate in favor of British shippers in the matter of freight rates, promptness of delivery, or in loading and other types of service. Competition today is too keen. And British trade associations or Chambers of Commerce now face in all the more important cities

[5] Except to northeastern Brazil.

similar American organizations alert to protect American economic interests.

Consideration of the practices of our European competitors in South American trade is of importance in so far as they influence the attitude of South American merchants and government officials toward American products and American methods, and incidentally color their political reaction to the United States as well. That the influence upon American commerce is very considerable seems to the writer to be doubtful. It is true that the native merchant is affected by many intangible factors: habit or custom; the reputation of old established mercantile houses of proved integrity and long experience; the social prestige of a large foreign colony like that of the British in Argentina. But in the end he is moved by more grossly economic considerations, such as price, quality, service, and terms of sale. He buys in the best market, and that market is wide open to honest merchandise and fair dealing.

Vastly more important are the charges of economic exploitation and veiled political imperialism which are constantly made in South America against American "big business." They are aired in the native press and they are openly or secretly encouraged by our European rivals. In Brazil as in Argentina the complaint is often heard, ridiculous as it may sound, that American banking interests are responsible for the depreciation of the national currency in foreign exchange, and sometimes one sniffs a suspicious odor of British or French propaganda. *La Argentina Económica,* a bi-weekly publication of Buenos Aires, has

numerous times attacked the "insatiable traffickers in money" who menace the economic and political future of the country.[6] Speculation in foreign exchange is a favorite source of profit in all international banking circles, but the situation of the peso and the milreis in recent years has been due to other and deeper causes. The decline of Europe's production and consumption, the lack of demand for nitrates, sugar, cotton, hides, cacao, and other South American products, combined with an excessive volume of after-war imports and (in Brazil) large issues of unsecured paper money—these afford a sufficient explanation of exchange difficulties.[7]

The intrusion of American capital into the continent, however, in the form of government loans or for the development of mines, oil wells and other industries, is the chief cause for misgiving on the part of often well-meaning but generally ill-informed South Americans. The Caribbean countries of course are considered to be beyond hope of recovery. There "this horrible octopus . . . already has some of its tentacles fastened upon weak nations which by themselves never will be able to shake off the pressure that is suffocating them."

[6] "Estos insaciables traficantos del dinero, a quienes, con tal de atesorar como quiera que sea, no miden ni les importa un comino, de que con su avaricia incalificable, produzcan el aniquilamiento y la ruina de la 'mansa' nacion, donde han sentado sus reales, para comodamente desenvolver sus delictuosas y funestas maniobras." *La Argentina Económica,* October 15, 1925.

[7] It is also sometimes charged that the American high protective tariff is deliberately designed, by restricting importations, to consolidate the supremacy of the dollar in the exchange markets of the world.

Farther south it is Peru and Bolivia which unscrupulous American capitalists are said to have by the throat. An anti-American article printed in *La Razón* of Buenos Aires in March, 1926, accusing the United States of using the Tacna-Arica quarrel to gain a territorial interest in that region, stated that "It is notorious that the principal Peruvian enterprises are in the hands of the Yankees. The railroads, the tramways, the banks, even the school system, have been delivered by President Leguia to the North American capitalists."

As the *American Weekly* (Buenos Aires) very properly replied, "The railways of Peru are owned by British capital, the tramways are owned by Italian capital, and of the twelve banks in Peru, only one is American. As regards the American teachers who were unfortunate enough to join the American school mission to Peru, many of them were left penniless in the wilds of interior Peru for months and had to live on the charity of the parents of the children they were teaching." [8] The only American capital invested in Peru is represented by three mining companies which "pay huge export taxes to the government for the privilege of developing the country's neglected natural resources," and two other corporations whose capital is invested in local industries such as sugar and cotton mills, cement works and a packing plant.

Distrust of the politico-financial aims of the United States most frequently finds expression in radical and socialist circles, and is very likely in part a reflection of

[8] *American Weekly*, March 27, 1926.

communist hatred of the United States in Europe. Owing to the prevalence of extremist views among the laboring classes of south European countries, and the close relations of these countries with Latin America through immigration, communist propaganda has met with considerable success, especially in Argentina, Uruguay and Chile, the countries most exposed to European influence. Foreign agitators have played an important rôle in the numerous labor troubles of Argentina and other republics since the end of the World War, and South American labor is likewise in close sympathy with the radical labor elements in Mexico. For every "crisis" in the diplomatic relations between the latter country and the United States there are socialist meetings, protests and broadsides in Buenos Aires, Montevideo and Santiago. This happened, for example, at the time of the Kellogg manifesto to Mexico in June, 1925, and again on the occasion of American military intervention in Nicaragua in December, 1926. In each instance North American policy was severely condemned, and formal protest was made by various socialist groups against allowing the government to seek further loans from United States bankers. *La Argentina Económica,* in reporting the meetings of 1925, expressed the fear that Argentina is slowly permitting herself to be caught as a debtor nation with every danger to her sovereignty because of North American policies toward such nations.[9]

Even in friendly Brazil the fear of American financial domination sometimes rises to the surface. As is

[9] Issue of June 30, 1925.

well known, the United States, a debtor to Europe until 1914, became in the course of the World War a creditor, and in order to regulate the international financial situation and prevent European exchange from suffering too severely, the Allies were forced to pass over to the United States their current securities in payment for their merchandise. It was in the course of such transactions that the United States was offered the securities of the Brazilian national debt held in London and Paris, which the American Government accepted in payment of a portion of the debt of its wartime allies. This transfer caused a momentary display of irritation and alarm in the Brazilian press and a few critics sought to find ulterior motives in its acceptance.

The much-debated São Paulo "coffee loan" of 1926 was in certain quarters the occasion for similar misgivings. In the substantial *O Estado de São Paulo* appeared several very malicious articles attacking the commercial policy of the United States Government. One ingenious charge was to the effect that the high price of Cuban sugar during the World War was part of a deliberate plot by American capitalists to enable them, when the deflation of 1921 occurred, to buy up the sugar estates, railways and principal commercial enterprises of the island and make it an "economic colony" of the United States. Presumably the United States was harboring similar designs against the coffee industry of São Paulo.

One may properly inquire why the enormous investments of British, French and German capital in South

American countries do not cause similar concern. One answer is that occasionally they do. On the other hand, Latin Americans have been accustomed to rest secure in the protection extended to them by the Monroe Doctrine, while against the United States itself the Doctrine affords no protection, but may even serve as a camouflage for American encroachments upon their independence. Moreover, the past record of the United States in the western hemisphere, its despoiling of Mexico and Colombia, and its interventions in Haiti, Santo Domingo and Central America, does not seem to them to be very reassuring. British bankers were the first to loan money to South American governments immediately after their independence, and the first to come to the rescue in financial crises since; and British investments chiefly have made possible the remarkable development of some of these countries in the past fifty years. Great Britain has not used its tremendous financial interest as a means of creating a special political interest, and has often rendered yeoman service in helping to settle dangerous disputes between South American countries. Its past political record in Latin America seems clear; ours does not. Whatever may be the present policy of the State Department at Washington, we suffer from the inheritance of an unfortunate reputation. And however free of blame may be the history of our financial penetration in the West Indies and adjacent regions, the development of something like a political hegemony in that area at the same time is a coincidence too striking to escape the attention of South American observers.

To be sure, British capital has not flowed into South America under the inspiration of the purest altruism. It has often driven sharp bargains, and directly or indirectly reaped large profits. And the natives, although refusing themselves to risk capital in new developments in their own country, preferring to let the foreigner assume all the risk, are apt to resent the latter's success if dividends are withdrawn abroad. Public utilities, such as railroads, tramways, light and power companies, become the favorite butt of the sensational local press, which in South America as elsewhere is apt to play up anti-foreign prejudice. And as these utilities are usually British-controlled, what anti-foreign feeling there is sometimes appears to be anti-British. This is the situation for the moment, for instance, in southern Brazil, because the railways and the power companies belong largely to British capital.

Moreover, during the World War and since it has become somewhat the fashion to scent economic imperialisms in all corners of the world, even where they may be least suspected of lodging. In January, 1926, several newspapers of Rio de Janeiro called attention to "the conflict of economic imperialisms" which was being "unloosed" about their heads: on the one hand British ascendency in the rubber market opposed by the United States; on the other the preponderance of the United States in the production of cotton which Great Britain would like to see diminished. Each looks to Brazil, one to the São Francisco valley, the other to the valley of the Amazon, for the accomplishment of its designs, toward which the initial steps have

already been taken. The editors therefore inquire: "Is it not right that Brazil maintain a certain reserve, and avoid surrendering itself wholly to capitalistic interests, which are always absorbing and dangerous, as pioneers of political imperialism?" [10]

It must be admitted that in general this suspicion of, or attack upon, foreign, and especially American capital, does not always proceed from the most responsible or enlightened quarters. "The Yankee Peril in South America" is chiefly the resort of demagogues and sensational newspapers, or of propagandists with a special axe to grind.[11] If capital invested in South America is handled well it should lead to peace, not to conflict; "Men cannot undertake and conduct mutually profitable business on equitable terms and become enemies." In some sections of South America, however, there is also a feeling that American promoters come down expecting to get something for nothing, concessions which will make them rich overnight. They do not seek genuine investment, nor show a desire to contribute in brains and work to the healthy upbuilding of the country. This sentiment is probably justified by the activities of some concession-hunters, who have no intention of carrying out their concessions, but simply dispose of them to some one else responsible or

[10] Editorial comment in the *Jornal do Brasil,* January 23, 1926.

[11] The *American Weekly* of Buenos Aires (March 27, 1926) however, becomes rather flamboyant when it refers to the Yankee Peril as a "theme which unites South American republics when threatened by civil war, gives South American dictators a new lease on life when threatened with overthrow, and keeps a host of professional politicians in money-making jobs when there is nothing else with which to fan the popular prejudice."

not—frequently not—, the concessions ultimately failing altogether.

A criticism of the economic policy of the United States frequently heard, although it is not peculiar to South America, has to do with the American protectionist régime. It appears oftenest in Argentina where the grievance is most felt. North American tariff barriers undoubtedly stand in the way of the free development of trade between the Argentine and the United States in so far as they shut the American market to the former's typical exports such as meat, butter and other agricultural and pastoral products. The lack of reciprocity in trade also tends to hinder American imports by depressing the value of the peso in relation to the dollar,[12] while the lack of freights to New York forces the steamship companies to impose disproportionately high rates on American merchandise shipped to Buenos Aires. It thus draws Argentina into closer relations with European markets, whose competition with American manufactures is becoming a factor of ever increasing importance with the economic recovery of the Old World.

An unfavorable trade balance between Argentina and the United States will probably be for a long time inevitable, for even though we begin to experience difficulty in supplying all our own needs in essential foodstuffs, it is a question if the market for Argentine meats and dairy products will soon be very considerable. Other products, such as wool, the United States has

[12] To that extent the charge that the United States is responsible for the depreciation of the Argentine peso finds a slight justification.

purchased in larger quantities since duties were increased under the present tariff than before. If the United States needs raw materials it will buy—it is the American consumer who suffers—while large importations of American merchandise into Argentina will continue possible by means of a three-cornered trade with Europe. Nevertheless, while the United States tariff may in reality have no serious effect in crippling trade relations between the two countries, the Argentine believes that it does, and even the friendly Buenos Aires newspaper, *La Nación,* has gone so far as to suggest reprisals. In other words a policy of high protection sets a limit to the Pan-American ideal.

On the whole it seems that financial operations and loans to Latin-American governments by United States bankers are more apt to cause friction between governments or between peoples than the investment of money by industrial concerns or for the development of commercial enterprise.[13] As the Monroe Doctrine operates today, American loans, at least when made to smaller and weaker states, tend to political control, and the people become increasingly suspicious of an American hand in their affairs. This is not only true of the tiny Caribbean states, but, as has already been intimated, may easily become the situation in some parts of South America, as in Bolivia today. Venezuela,

[13] Victor M. Cutter, President of the United Fruit Co., in an address at the Williamstown Institute of Politics in 1925, suggested that for this reason industrial corporations doing business in Latin America should not combine a banking business with their commercial operations.

which owes the United States no money, is at this moment perhaps the least distrustful of our political ambitions and the friendliest to Americans as individuals.

It should be a cardinal principle of all companies, industrial or financial, entering South America to keep out of politics. That is a thesis supported by long and often bitter experience both in the New World and in the Orient. Likewise in South America there should be no extension of governmental responsibility to private or public loans, or the sort of semi-political, semi-financial engagements we have been drawn into in some of the Caribbean states. Our traditional diplomatic policy in regard to disputes between South American governments and American citizens arising out of foreign loans has in general been one of non-intervention. It should be made clear that this is, and will continue to be, our norm of conduct. Considerations of justice of course require that legitimate American interests receive the measure of diplomatic support expected of any self-respecting government. So much was assured in an official utterance of the Department of State of July 29, 1918, on the occasion of our joining the Four-Power consortium in China. It reads in part: "The American Government will be willing to aid in every way possible and to make prompt and vigorous representations and to take every possible step to insure the execution of equitable contracts made in good faith by its citizens in foreign lands." But as a corollary to it is the recently initiated custom of supervising loans and financial transactions between American citizens and

foreign countries to secure conformity to our policy and to commercial treaties, and to ensure fair treatment for weaker nations. It is commonly known that for many years European bankers making loans to foreign governments have generally worked in cooperation with their Foreign Offices. The Department of State, too, has requested American financial interests to inform it of proposed loans and contracts "to the end that there may be opportunity to consider, in the light of public policy, the possible national interest that may be involved . . . [although the Department] will not pass upon the merits of foreign loans as business propositions, nor assume any responsibility whatever in connection with loan transactions."

Nevertheless (to quote the words of Professor Feis) "it seems clear that the results of the arrangement will be determined entirely by the way in which it is used . . . it may be used in such a way as really to safeguard the country against future misunderstandings and political controversies. But it may be used in a way to produce far different results. Some manner must be found of controlling this practice so as to make it impossible for any governmental department to commit us morally, even if not officially, to the support of foreign ventures or arrangements without legislative consent." [14]

It has also been suggested that the terms of loans and other financial contracts include a provision for some form of arbitral or judicial settlement in case of controversy, for which there are precedents in recent

[14] *Foreign Affairs*, July, 1925, p. 685.

loans made to Central American states. The so-called Drago Doctrine, adopted in amended form as the Porter Resolution by the Second Hague Conference, points the way to an international agreement along similar lines. The convention in which the resolution was embodied provided that armed intervention "for the recovery of contract debts claimed from the government of one country by the government of another country as being due to its nationals" might be resorted to only when the debtor state declined an offer of arbitration, or refused to comply with an arbitral award, or made a compromise impossible. It was approved by most of the Latin-American delegations, though some made reservations about its interpretation. Expanded so as to cover private as well as public international debts, a general inter-American convention of this sort would serve to relieve the growing apprehensions of some of our South American neighbors. Adequate arrangements for arbitral or judicial settlement must also be provided for. Will the "World Court" at Geneva prove acceptable?

The Department of State at Washington might well publish in some suitable way a definite statement of policy for the guidance of American citizens;[15] at any

[15] Arthur N. Young, economic advisor in the Department of State, in an address before the League of Women Voters at Radcliffe College in January, 1925, made a statement of the principles which guide the Department's action in regard to Latin-American trade and investment, as follows:

(1) The Department seeks to maintain the "Open Door."

(2) It does not seek special advantages, inconsistent with the "Open Door."

rate the formulation of a policy to govern political action in regard to investments in South America is essential to our diplomacy in that part of the world. In the words of Professor Feis, "As the stronger state —as the creditor state—we must be prepared to be suspected and hated in many South American circles even if we behave well. If we behave unfairly, these feelings, finding justification, will strengthen and spread."

(3) It does not sponsor particular American interests, or urge them to engage in particular undertakings.

(4) It neither gives nor receives special favors in customs matters (except in the case of Cuba).

(5) It does not seek to promote American trade or investment as a means of establishing political control.

(6) It desires to assist, where assistance is needed, by methods that are consistent with these general principles.

CHAPTER VI

THE MONROE DOCTRINE AND PAN-AMERICANISM

ABOUT the Monroe Doctrine there has been as much confusion of thought and utterance in South America as there is in the United States. There is no question but that it is regarded by great numbers in these southern countries as a sinister menace to their national sovereignty and dignity. First promulgated as a warning against the extension of monarchical institutions and of further European colonization in the western hemisphere, they believe that it has come to imply paramount interest and hegemony. It has been unpopular among citizens of the stronger states because it seems to spell for them political inferiority. It is disliked in the weaker because of our assumed responsibility for their good behavior. Although for a century a protective shield against the ambition of European governments, it has not been a force making for solidarity of sentiment in the two American continents.

Misunderstanding of the Monroe Doctrine is largely due to the fact that, in the words of Charles E. Hughes, "it has often been treated as though it were our sole policy in this hemisphere, and as though every

action bearing upon our relation to our sister Republics must be referred to it." [1] Its meaning is clear as it was originally enunciated by President Monroe, and it is equally clear as re-stated by Secretary Hughes and his immediate predecessors in office. But it has not always been so in our Department of State, and it is not so with the majority of American citizens. Many, including senators and newspaper editors, seem to have the vaguest notion as to what the Doctrine really signifies, although they cling to it as to a fetish and can readily be led into a war with the cry that it is imperilled.

There has been a mass of contradictory opinions, official as well as private. To many, still eager to "bear the white man's burden," the Doctrine is a sort of international gospel which proclaims the United States master in this hemisphere, with unlimited right of intervention in the domestic concerns of its neighbors. Such ideas were evidently responsible for certain editorials appearing in American newspapers during the winter and spring of 1925-26, to the effect that the United States should conduct the plebiscite in Arica whether Chile showed any willingness to cooperate or not (presumably by force as Chile is in possession), and then impose the decision upon both parties (evidently again by force, i.e., war). The effect of such editorials upon sentiment in South America can easily be surmised. Again, when in the early part of 1926 news dispatches announced that a British syndicate was

[1] Address delivered before the American Academy of Political and Social Science at Philadelphia, November 30, 1923.

negotiating in Bolivia for a concession of 130,000 square miles for the exploitation of rubber, cotton, petroleum and mines, and with extensive plans for European colonization, the question was raised in the United States Senate whether this constituted a violation of the Monroe Doctrine. The Doctrine has never been interpreted to limit European immigration or economic enterprises in South America, and neither Bolivia nor any other Latin republic is likely to cede political rights to a private capitalistic enterprise. This senatorial *jeu d'esprit* merely served to make us appear ridiculous to many South Americans, and to strengthen their suspicion of our purpose to dictate to the entire hemisphere.

It is scarcely more than thirty years ago that Secretary Richard Olney made the celebrated assertion that "today the United States is practically sovereign on this continent and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition." Although this statement becomes less startling when read in its context, it is still remembered in Latin America and is the source of much resentment and alarm. It is fortunately true "that not everything said or written by secretaries of state or even by presidents constitutes a national policy or can amplify or diminish a national policy;" [2] and it is also true that American statesmen since Olney's time have gone out of their way to reiterate our friendliness and good will. Nevertheless, the interpretation of the Doctrine to mean that no ter-

[2] Address of Elihu Root before the American Society of International Law, Washington, D. C., April 22, 1914.

ritory on this continent may be regarded as subject to transfer to a non-American state even with the consent of the parties interested, and the declarations of President Roosevelt justifying the exercise of an international police power by the United States over backward nations, are causes of general disquietude. If the Doctrine is further amplified to exclude acts of aggression between Latin-American countries, as seems implied in some public pronouncements of recent years, the nations not only of the Caribbean but of South America may see their liberty of action as free and independent sovereign states seriously impaired.[8]

In view of our interventions in the West Indies and Central America, it is not therefore surprising that Latin Americans confuse Monroe's declaration with "imperialism," "hegemony," "dollar diplomacy," and analogous concepts. Without question a very large part of the apprehension and misunderstanding regarding the foreign policy of the United States is due to this false idea of the Monroe Doctrine and of its relation to that foreign policy. There is a widespread belief that all the events that have determined the growth of this country at the expense of the independence or territorial integrity of other nations, whether European or American, from the annexation of Texas to the military occupation of Haiti and Santo Do-

[8] It is said that several years ago, when there was talk of Chilean military activities near the Peruvian frontier, the United States in a secret note to Chile indicated that it would not tolerate a violation of peace in South America.

mingo, have their direct cause in this American diplomatic principle. That the Doctrine is only one phase of our policy in this hemisphere, and that most of the events just referred to were the result of circumstances entirely extraneous to the principle it embodies—would indeed have occurred had the message of December 2, 1823, never been delivered—is not generally clear to our Latin neighbors. Few South American writers are possessed of a profound knowledge of the history of the United States, but that does not hinder their writing copiously about the Monroe Doctrine and American continental policy in general. The consequence is great confusion of ideas, an attitude of mind often greatly biassed, with resultant distrust, suspicion and misplaced hatred. The rapprochement obvious among the Latin-American peoples today, and natural and desirable from many points of view, too often has a basis in fear of the Colossus of the North. And the organization of something like a league of American nations, which is a general aspiration to the southward, to many seems more expedient as an Ibero-American league than as a Pan-American league dominated by the United States.

If the Latin-American mentality is disturbed by what it considers the disparity of criterions appearing in the United States itself concerning our foreign policy in general and the application of the Monroe Doctrine in particular, it is important that citizens of the United States know their own mind and come to some general agreement as to what the Doctrine means. Charles E. Hughes in his public pronouncements as Secretary

of State has given us an admirable re-statement of the Doctrine as it stands today.

"In all that has been said or done since the declaration of Monroe it can be regarded as modified in only two particulars. What was said with Europe exclusively in view must be deemed applicable to all non-American Powers; and the opposition to the extension of colonization was not dependent upon the particular mode of securing territorial control, and, at least since Polk's time, may be deemed to embrace opposition to acquisition of additional territory through transfer of dominion or sovereignty. Neither of these modifications changes the Doctrine in its essentials and it may thus be summarized . . . as being opposed (1) to any non-American action encroaching upon the political independence of American states under any guise, and (2) to the acquisition in any manner of the control of additional territory in this hemisphere by any non-American Power . . . but it does not attempt to define in other respects our policies within this hemisphere. Our affirmative policies relating to our own conduct in relation to other American states . . . should be clearly envisaged. Those affirmative policies, while distinct from the mere principle of exclusion set forth in the Monroe Doctrine, are not inconsistent with that Doctrine but rather constitute its fitting complement."[4]

And Mr. Hughes, like Wilson, Root and Roosevelt before him, while affirming that the Doctrine is distinctly a policy of the United States maintained for its own security, invites the other American republics to set up and apply the same or similar principles in the conduct of their international relations. Thus it would have the support of all the republics without sacrifice by any American state of its particular interests.

[4] Address delivered before the American Academy of Political and Social Science at Philadelphia, November 30, 1923.

The policies of the United States Government touching its relations with other American nations Mr. Hughes states as nine in number. The United States recognizes the equality of the American republics; it respects their territorial integrity; it requires the recognition of international obligations; it offers friendly assistance to promote stability in republics afflicted with disturbed conditions involving their own peace and that of their neighbors; it aims to facilitate the peaceful settlement of difficulties between American governments; it encourages the making of agreements for the limitation of armament; it invites cooperation in the promotion of education, public health, commerce and other mutual interests; it seeks unconditional most-favored nation treatment in customs matters; and it must under all circumstances safeguard the Panama Canal as essential to its peace and security. It is just in the practical application of some of these principles, however, that our neighbors find cause for apprehension and mistrust.

Some have suggested that the Monroe Doctrine be abolished, arguing that by so doing we would clarify our Caribbean policy, quiet the justifiable irritation of other first-class American powers, and relieve ourselves of the charge of hypocrisy. They maintain that the Doctrine is really obsolete as applied south of Panama, and that in the Caribbean it has become merely a convenient peg upon which to hang our policy of permanent interest. If we allowed it to fall into oblivion, or broadened it into a Pan-American doctrine based on a joint guarantee, we would gain more than we lost.

Such arguments, however, can at present have little more than academic interest. This principle of diplomatic action we will probably continue always to keep by us. Whether wise or unwise, its abolition would scarcely today satisfy the temper of the American people. It has become too venerable, too deeply imbedded among the political axioms of our citizens, many of whom retain a sincere belief in its universal efficacy. And conceivably it may prove useful, provided that it does not carry as a corollary domination by any one country, and that it be completely separated from any trace of economic imperialism.

It is difficult to eradicate what has existed for a century. "Men repose comfortably in the lap of custom, and a mental sloth prevents their freeing themselves from acquired ideas." Yet, in the words of Theodore Roosevelt,

> "There are certain republics to the south of us which have already reached such a point of stability, order and prosperity that they themselves are guarantors of the Monroe Doctrine. If all the republics to the south of us will only grow as those to which I allude have already grown, all need for us to be the especial champions of the doctrine will disappear . . ."[3]

The time foreseen by Roosevelt is perhaps not far distant—when the doctrine of Monroe, though not discarded, will come to be regarded more as a matter of historical interest than as a source of international disquiet. With the increasing political and economic

[3] *Congressional Record,* 59th Congress, 1st session, Vol. XL, p. 97, Washington, 1906.

stability observable in every part of Latin America today, with the growth of commercial and intellectual relations between the United States and its southern neighbors, with the efforts of jurists and publicists and centres of education to enlighten public opinion and advance the cause of international justice, it is not unreasonable to expect that occasions for American intervention in Latin-American affairs will gradually cease to appear.[6] The principles enunciated in 1823 will then be accepted at their face value, and a principal source of inter-American misunderstanding will be removed.[7]

The watchword of those who labor in the cause of inter-continental solidarity is Pan-Americanism. This expression, so often used, is not easily defined, although a definition was attempted in an earlier chapter. Pan-Americanism has been to some extent the substance of things hoped for, in a measure the evidence of things unseen. In the words of Dr. Alejandro Álvarez, it rests upon the conviction that "there are, among the nations of the New World, besides the continental solidarity implied in the Monroe Doctrine and its amplifications, common interests and problems, political and economic, derived from their situation on the same continent, which is different in its political and

[6] Address of Dr. Ricardo J. Alfaro before the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia, November 30, 1923.

[7] So much has been said and written about the Monroe Doctrine, especially during the past thirty years, that it is virtually impossible to contribute anything new in the way of facts or opinions that have not been expressed before. The remarks appearing above constitute merely the writer's reaction to a year's residence in South America.

economic conditions from the continent of Europe." [8] But there are those, especially in Latin America, who deny that these primary and mutual interests exist, and who stress rather the barrier of language, and the differences of culture, race, and legal and intellectual traditions that keep north and south apart. Or they assert that these "common interests" are conjured up by the United States merely as a cloak for its political and economic ambitions in the western hemisphere, to cover a policy of *paramount* interest which is inconsistent with the basic Pan-American principle of the equality of states. In short our sincerity is impugned. There is also no agreement as to the kind or the degree of collaboration that is necessary or possible. Some ardent Pan-Americanists desire a political league of American states, analogous to the League in Europe, and operating within or in harmony with the larger organization. Others are content with the strengthening of commercial bonds and with cooperation along social and intellectual lines.

Lucio M. Moreno Quintana, a vigorous though somewhat superficial young Argentine writer, judge and university professor, and an active critic of the Pan-American movement, is perhaps fairly representative of the point of view of those of his persuasion. In the concept of Pan-Americanism as it prevails in the United States, he believes, "the only ideal that has been exalted is based on the economic aggrandizement of that country, even at the cost of the other Ameri-

[8] Álvarez, Alejandro: *Le droit international americain,* Paris, 1910, p. 210.

can republics." [9] And he recalls the crude imperialism of Blaine and Olney and the "fraternal formulas" of Root and Wilson, to show how contradictory have been the utterances of our statesmen. He says of the Pan American Union that it "has periodically supplied to the policy and commerce of the United States the data and information necessary to their expansion"; and he brands the Pan-American Conferences as ineffective to solve the international political problems of the New World. "The social community that subsists among the nations of Spanish America does not extend," he believes, "either to Brazil or to the United States." Yet he hesitates to affirm the absolute uselessness of Pan-American efforts; and of their more practical aspects, in the application of the Pan-American idea to the uniform solution of the many technical and economic problems of the New World, he is hopeful of productive results.

Dr. Moreno has no illusions concerning the purpose of Secretary Blaine in inviting all the republics to the first Pan-American Conference in 1889. It was to secure for the United States, after seventy years of isolation from the other American nations, "an advantageous commercial field by the absorption of the whole of Iberian America. . . . From this Congress would spring an American Zollverein . . . for the essential benefit of the United States." These commercial

[9] "Pan-Americanism and the Pan-American Conferences," in *Inter America*, June, 1925. See also, by the same writer, *Política Americana, Refutación a la conferencia del Dr. Baltasar Brum*, Buenos Aires, 1920.

aspirations Blaine "concealed . . . under the apparent purpose of 'considering and discussing the methods of preventing war between the nations of America.'" And had Blaine's program been adopted "all the commerce [of America] would have fallen into the hands of a single power, which, by reason of its importance, would have dominated the entire world." [10]

Not all Latin Americans show the skepticism of Dr. Moreno. As already remarked, there runs in the Spanish-speaking countries a strong current in favor of the creation of a league of American nations with attributes analogous to those of the league whose seat is at Geneva. In South America Uruguay has taken the lead in the advocacy of such an organization, in Central America the republic of Salvador.

Whether a genuine league is practical or not is perhaps open to question. It seems that either the United States, Argentina and the few other first-class American powers must expect to find themselves overruled and outvoted by a majority of the smaller, backward states, or be prepared themselves to dictate the policy of the league. The former alternative is unthinkable, especially in view of the fact that many of the smaller states are governed by dictators or irresponsible oligarchs; the latter would violate what has always been held to be a fundamental principle of Pan-Americanism, the legal equality of nations. Experience has shown, as at the Fifth Pan-American Conference held at Santiago in 1923, that the nine small republics of

[10] Quoted by Moreno from Alejandro Álvarez: *Le droit international americain*, p. 212.

Central America and the West Indies, to which on occasion Mexico, Colombia and Venezuela may be joined — i.e., the states lying within the zone of paramount interest of the United States—are apt to form a *bloc* which in voting power can control a congress of American nations. Of course the problem of uniting the divergent interests and ambitions of large and small states in an international league is not absent from the organization centered at Geneva. It constitutes one of the major political questions of the twentieth century.

As we have seen in other connections, the chief obstacle to a happy cooperation between Latin and English America is just this question of our relations with the Caribbean republics. The less friendly South American newspapers watch our movements with the intensest jealousy, ready to take offense at any act that seems to be a slight to the dignity of the Latin-American peoples. Our continued military occupation of Haiti does not attract so much comment, perhaps because Haiti being negro and French does not stand in so "fraternal" a relationship with the South American states. But the protectorate over Cuba, benevolent though it may be, and our policing of the more erratic republics of Central America, expose us to endless criticism. The interventions of American marines and diplomatic agents in Nicaragua and Honduras are pictured as the cause rather than the consequence of the political inquietude—"alterations of the public order" —in these countries. And our interminable quarrel with the Mexican government over the recent land and petroleum legislation of that republic is the occasion

for bitter and often malicious attacks upon the United States. "Yankee imperialism" is accused of driving Mexico to the wall, of deliberately aiming to subvert her independence and integrity. Only a few of the more friendly and conservative newspapers express regret that certain Latin states should still recur to political methods discredited elsewhere, and while remarking the increased influence of the United States within such countries, admit that under the circumstances it is inevitable and can be eliminated only by the social, political and economic progress of the peoples concerned.

In the most recent of Pan-American Congresses, that held at Panama in June, 1926, to commemorate the centenary of the Panama Congress convened by Bolívar in 1826, two tendencies among the Latin-American delegates, for and against a Pan-American League, were clearly discernible. The desire for international organization seemed strongest among the delegates from the smaller nations. If the United States could be brought within the orbit of a Pan-American covenant, danger from aggressive tactics on the part of the Washington Government would be minimized. Projects for an association of American states were presented in papers emanating from the delegates of Bolivia, Ecuador, Salvador and Cuba, none of them unfriendly in spirit to the United States; and they were embodied in a series of resolutions empowering Panama to take steps to bring about a congress of plenipotentiaries to draw up an inter-American covenant. The larger states generally abstained from dis-

cussion and some of the delegates refrained from voting, although the resolutions were passed by a large majority. The only opposition was voiced by one delegate from Bolivia who feared that diversity of races, languages and mentality would make association extremely difficult, and that the weaker states would always be subordinated to the stronger. At the next plenary session the chief of the American delegation informed the assembly that as his Government understood the Congress to be merely commemorative in character, his delegation had refrained from voting on the measures of a political nature there introduced, but that in view of the importance of these measures his delegation would be pleased to make them known to their government. The effect of this declaration was interesting to observe, and the president of the Congress immediately took up the challenge by inquiring which were the recommendations of a political nature acted upon which were outside the scope of the topics on the program. The American delegate said that he would decline to answer, but that in any event his attitude did not imply a vote of censure. Later in the day a statement signed by the delegates of Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico was handed to the secretary of the Congress aligning these four major powers with the United States, and declaring that they had voted for the league resolutions merely in their personal capacity and not as official delegates.[11]

The writer received the distinct impression that the

[11] The delegates of Venezuela and Cuba also informed the American delegation privately of their approval of the American declaration.

Congress was in reality a purely Latin-American gathering, the United States being tolerated because of its bigness and the political and economic power it wielded, but rather as a spectator than as a participant. References to *la augusta Madre Patria* and to *los destinos de nuestra raza* were too frequent to be mere coincidence. The American delegation, it may be said, made no effort to exercise any sort of leadership in the deliberations, while on the other hand an undercurrent, not of unfriendliness, but of mistrust, was easily perceptible. When, at the formal inauguration of the Congress, where the chief of each official delegation made a short address of adhesion, the delegate from Honduras declared that this assembly would serve to put to a proof the fraternal sentiments of the "Colossus of the North," he was greeted with a storm of applause throughout the house such as was vouchsafed to no other delegation. This same delegate in the first plenary session introduced a resolution to the effect that the United States as a measure of its nobility of heart grant independence to Porto Rico, a suggestion which was smothered in the Executive Committee. A resolution offered by the representative of Uruguay,[12] recommending to the American nations that they adopt the principle that every act directed against one of them which violates the universally recognized precepts of international law shall constitute an offense against all and provoke among them a uniform and common action, was unanimously adopted. But the Honduran delegate rose to ask if this common action was to be

[12] Sr. Harmodio Arias, a Panamanian.

limited to newspaper articles.[13] In a later session an Ecuadorian lawyer [14] submitted a resolution to the effect that since the American continent owes to the republic of Panama the innumerable benefits derived from the construction of the Canal, America expects to see in the treaty negotiations between Panama and the United States the most perfect expression of American fraternity, and hopes that the new Canal Treaty will be above all a demonstration of the altruistic spirit with which the strong nations of our America obtain the cooperation of the weak. This too died in committee. Finally one of the delegates from Nicaragua [15] presented a resolution that the Pan American Union be moved from Washington to the City of Panama. Dr. Ricardo Alfaro, minister of Panama at Washington and representing the Union at the Congress, in opposing the resolution on the score of expense and inconvenience and because it implied an affront to the United States, intimated that there was a spirit of unfriendliness to the United States abroad in the Congress. The Nicaraguan delegate replied with some heat, that the resolution was not aimed against the United States. It was in fact probably no more than a blundering gesture of friendliness to Panama, the host of the Congress, or of concern for the independence of a potential American league of nations. It is natural that there should be mis-

[13] The Honduran delegate, Sr. Trejo Castillo, before the close of the Congress was disavowed by telegraph by his own government for his anti-American attitude during the sessions.

[14] Sr. Carlos Puig V.

[15] Sr. Gutiérrez Navas, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Nicaragua.

givings regarding the location of the Pan American Union in Washington, far from the geographical centre of the hemisphere and obviously and inevitably under North American influence. At the request of the Panamanian delegation, the resolution was withdrawn.

No doubt the lack of cordiality in some quarters toward the United States was inspired by Pan-Hispanic sentiments among the delegates. At the first session the Mexican delegate proposed that Alfonso XIII be elected honorary president of the Congress—a congress commemorating the culminating episode in the revolt of the Spanish colonies against their sovereign! And the motion, with another to include the sovereigns of Great Britain and the Netherlands, passed amid great applause. But these were at once followed by a motion from the delegate of Colombia proposing a salutation or *voto de confianza* to Alfonso "as representative of the nation which is the mother of the American countries." In such a form it apparently offended the republican susceptibilities of some of the delegates, and as ultimately passed it became a salutation to the Spanish people conveyed through their sovereign.[16] The Spanish Government made the most of the occasion, offering to contribute as a homage to Panama an allegorical figure to the monument of Bolívar unveiled during the Congress; and the Spanish delegate (the chargé d'affaires at Panama) seemed to

[16] The impression was received from some private remarks made at the time, that these resolutions were inspired chiefly by the desire for foreign decorations.

figure more prominently in the assembly than the representatives of the United States.

Not that the United States was wholly ignored. A resolution was adopted honoring the memory of Clay, Jefferson, Monroe and Adams,[17] and at the special commemorative session one of the Colombian delegates paid warm tribute to the present-day friendliness of the Anglo-Saxon republic, linking the name of Wilson with that of Bolívar. Yet one could not escape the feeling that all was not as it should be within the bosom of the Pan-American family. At this same session a Panamanian speaker stressed the growth of respect for international law as the only defense of weak peoples against the strong, making especial reference to the United States; and at the banquet tendered by the President of Panama to the chiefs of the visiting delegations, President Chiari felt it necessary to state that the United States does not seek to oppress Panama, but is "a noble friend disposed to serve and cooperate with us." There is no doubt that a current of anti-American feeling runs strong in the republic of Panama itself, and is fed and maintained by the influence of intellectual and student elements in the nearby republics of Mexico and Cuba. The *Diario de Panamá,* an afternoon Spanish-language daily, is probably the most persistently critical newspaper south of Mexico. The writer knows of no South American newspaper that in this respect can be classed with it.

"In the last analysis, the Pan-American policy has

[17] Presented by Dr. Ricardo Alfaro.

not yet won its way with the spirit of the people of the United States or of the sister republics, and its life is artificial." These words of Estanislao Zeballos, spoken in an address at the Williamstown Institute of Politics in August, 1923, express the conviction of the foes of the Pan-American movement. For it they would substitute Latin-Americanism, or Pan-Hispanism. America, they contend, includes two entities very different in origin, in subsequent development, in ideals, and in economic interests diametrically opposed. A Pan-American league would redound to the exclusive benefit of the United States, "a bastard brother of the other American countries," which does not regard them as its equals, and is not disposed to treat them as equals. The real danger no longer resides in Europe, it resides within the western hemisphere. They advocate therefore a Latin-American league, which would present a defensive *bloc* to our imperialistic democracy, and which would likewise counterbalance within the larger League of Nations the predominant influence we pretend to exercise in American affairs. Outside the vague and ill-defined "Pan-American solidarity" exists a real identity of interests and aspirations among the peoples of Iberian origin. This is already partially realized in the annual Assemblies at Geneva where the delegates of the Latin-American republics frequently vote alike in matters of world interest. As the United States insists that the Monroe Doctrine is purely unilateral, a policy exclusively Yankee, consulting only North American interests; as it has opposed all efforts

to give the Doctrine a collective character and convert it into an international formula, notably at Santiago in 1923, the other states must find a policy and an organization consulting their own especial interests.[18]

Such is the credo of many South American intellectuals today. And, in fact, a rapprochement among the Latin-American nations has been in progress during the past generation. It is not as yet a political approximation so much as a growing sense of solidarity among writers, university students and diplomats, the last in their personal capacity as the ambassadors of one people to another rather than as official agents. It was perfectly evident at the Bolivarian Congress at Panama. If we are to retain or increase the friendship

[18] The *Diario de Panamá* (June 19, 1926) during the sessions of the Bolivarian Congress inquires: "Since Pan-American congresses have been meeting, have they discussed, among the many themes on their programs, any way of guaranteeing the territorial integrity of the nations that attend these congresses with the pompous title of 'brothers'? Have they proposed for the consideration of these congresses the creation of any means so that no nation of the earth may infringe the sovereignty of another? Have they tried to bring it about (ver la forma de que) that the political existence of no nation of the continent may be menaced by another nation under the pretext of vital necessity or of defense of the interests of citizens of the intervening country? It is painful to say so, but nothing of this nature that is vital for the American cause has been considered by the Pan-American congresses. They have been occupied with matters previously indicated in the schedules drawn up in Washington, and meantime the fundamental problems, the efficacious remedies which tend to restrain the aggressiveness of imperialistic tendencies developing in the world, both within and outside the Continent, pass unperceived in these congresses, and America entirely lacks a system of guarantees which, in the phrase of Bolívar, 'shall be the shield of its destiny.'"

of South American peoples, we must carefully watch our step, not only in our relations with Mexico and the smaller republics, but in our conduct at Pan-American conferences,[19] whether they be political, economic, or scientific, in our negotiation of international loans, and in our efforts at the mediation of South American disputes. American consular and diplomatic representatives in Latin America must possess tact and understanding, speak the Spanish language (except in Brazil), and have a reasonable appreciation of the racial sensibilities and cultural achievements of Latin-American countries. Political appointments in the past have frequently been disastrous from the point of view of inter-American relations, and our representation to-

[19] The Good Roads Conference held at Buenos Aires in October, 1925, was criticized in some quarters as merely a gigantic advertising scheme for United States manufacturers of road machinery and road materials.

In December, 1925, as reported in the Argentine press, John Barrett at a Pan-American Commercial Congress in New York City stated that European commercial and political organizations were recurring to all the methods of modern war in their propaganda against North American trade and the influence of the United States in Latin America, and that political demagogues of the latter add their voices to the rest because they count on the powerful support of the anti-Americans and the bolsheviks. Such loose and exaggerated statements do much harm, and are the more regrettable as coming from one who has had many connections, diplomatic and otherwise, with the Latin-American countries and is therefore supposed to be well equipped to judge of these matters. The friendly *La Nación* of Buenos Aires made the correct rejoinder that North American producers are feeling the effects, not of bolshevik or British or demagogic propaganda, but of free and legitimate competition, and that they cannot expect to retain forever the privileged position assured them by the circumstances of the World War. (Editorial, December 14, 1925.)

day in some South American countries might conceivably be improved.

The South American newspaper press reveals a much greater interest in European news and politics than in those of the United States. The principal dailies devote considerable space to European cables every day, sometimes several pages, and certainly more than is given in most metropolitan newspapers of this country. The general attitude toward the League of Nations is one of friendliness and a desire to cooperate. Surprise and regret are expressed that the United States, with its vaunted altruism in the World War, should not see fit to join, and sometimes there is mild criticism. When the American Senate in January, 1926, passed the measure providing for the adhesion of the United States to the International Court of Justice, South American papers applauded this tardy step, but a few editors censured the Senate for its presumption in trying to dictate to the world what the organization and regulation of the International Tribunal should be.[20]

There can be no doubt but that the creation of a world league centred in Europe has influenced radically the relations of the United States with the Latin-American republics. The latter accepted the League idea with great enthusiasm, as the harbinger of a new era of peace and international conciliation. Most of them joined the League, and some have taken an active

[20] On the other hand, in Argentina and Brazil there has always been criticism of the undemocratic organization of the League with respect to its executive Council.

part in its deliberations. They have furnished two presidents to the Assembly,[21] two judges to the Permanent Court of International Justice,[22] and have had a considerable share in the work of its numerous commissions and committees. The article of the Covenant which excludes from the League's jurisdiction questions related to regional understandings like the Monroe Doctrine is not popular with South Americans. States like Bolivia which would submit their international problems to the League for solution find their way blocked by the disinclination of the latter to incur Washington's displeasure by meddling in American affairs. Dr. José León Suárez, Argentine member of the Commission on the Codification of International Law, has intimated that what keeps Argentina from participation in the League is just this article, which requires a new interpretation. If the League of Nations may not mediate juridically in disputes between American states, there is little reason for belonging to it.

The members of the League, moreover, in agreeing to sacrifice part of their "independence" by submitting their international disputes to the judgment of a World Court, have taken a long step toward compulsory arbitration, a principle which the United States has consistently refused to entertain.[23] The League, there-

[21] Agustin Edwards, of Chile, in 1922, and Cosme de la Torriente y Peraza, of Cuba, in 1924.

[22] Epitacio da Silva Pessoa, of Brazil, and Antonio Sanchez de Bustamente, of Cuba.

[23] The so-called "Argentine formula" of the compulsory arbitration of all international disputes when ordinary diplomatic methods fail, has at Santiago and earlier Pan-American Conferences generally encountered the opposition or indifference of the United States.

fore, in spite of its weakness, offers to South America a protection which the United States is unwilling to concede. And there is no doubt that those who fear the imperialism of the United States see in the League a possible support against the encroachments of the northern republic. If the Pan-American movement is "an attempt to develop a Continental system based on cooperation and community of interest, a system from which fear of aggression has been eliminated and in which physical power is not the dominating influence," [24] then why North American distrust of Geneva, and why the refusal of the United States to support the efforts to organize an American League at Santiago in 1923? The answer of the South American critics is that Washington clings to its policy of aggressive imperialism, and is therefore disinclined to submit its conduct to the judgment of the world.

The upshot of the above is that our aloofness from the League has not served to decrease Latin-American distrust of the United States. Whatever good reasons may exist for our policy regarding Geneva, it is not to be expected that they would be generally understood in South America where adequate political information about the United States is not widely diffused.

It is true that the effects of our abstention may easily be exaggerated. Not altogether without significance is the fact that of the two largest South American powers, Brazil has stepped out of the League and Argen-

[24] Dr. Leo S. Rowe at the Institute of Politics, Williamstown, Mass., August 6, 1925, as reported in *The New York Times*.

tina, although nominally a member, has taken no part in its deliberations since the first meeting of the Geneva Assembly in 1920. Whether, now that Brazil is out, Argentina will resume her seat in the League and seek the vacant rôle of spokesman for Latin America, it will be interesting to observe. Of the other South American governments, most of them seem to be interested largely because of the international standing in world affairs which membership implies, rather than because of any vital concern in the League's problems. Their real international interests are much nearer home, in the American continent.

It is of course conceivable that if the sixteen Latin-American members of the League of Nations succeed in sinking their mutual jealousies and acting as a unit in the Geneva assemblies, the circumstance might endanger the position of influence held by the United States in the western hemisphere. On the other hand, anything like a genuine union of political ideas and purposes among the Latin-American governments is still far from realization. Distances are great and communications between the American states are in most cases slow, meagre and inconvenient. Guatemala or Venezuela are far removed from Argentina or Chile in more ways than one, and with Portuguese Brazil they seem to have little or nothing in common. When Brazil sought to force the hand of the League and secure a permanent seat in the Council, the sister American republics, while recognizing the desirability or the necessity of permanent American representation,

displayed no enthusiasm to delegate it exclusively to Brazil.[25]

Even among contiguous states conflict rather than community of interests seems often the more evident. Chile and Peru are as much alienated as ever by the controversy over Tacna-Arica; Colombia and Ecuador are estranged by a simple question of conflict of opinion; Panama and Costa Rica, Mexico and Venezuela have at present no diplomatic relations with one another. The suggestion made in some quarters early in 1926, while the Plebiscitary Commission was sitting at Arica, that certain neighboring powers be called in to provide a solution of the quarrel, was for these very reasons ill-advised. Probably none of them would have been capable of rendering an impartial and disinterested verdict. Instead the issue would have been complicated by the injection into it of extraneous private and political considerations. Take for instance the desire of Bolivia for territorial access to the Pacific. Could she expect an unbiased consideration of her claims from Brazil, which has plans to provide a railway outlet for Bolivia through São Paulo or Santa Catharina eastward to the Atlantic? Or from Uruguay, which is developing at Colonia a free port for traffic with the interior of the continent? Or from Argentina, whose transportation interests hope to re-

[25] Editorials in *La Nación* (Buenos Aires), March 12, 1926; *La Prensa* (Buenos Aires), March 17, 1926; *El Dia* (Montevideo), March 23, 1926. *O Jornal* of Rio de Janeiro, the only independent Rio daily, also took the position that Brazil had no claim as "the most representative American nation" to a permanent place in the Council.

route Bolivia's exports by way of La Quiaca to Buenos Aires?

The likelihood of a Latin-American *bloc* in the League of Nations inimical to the United States is therefore under present circumstances remote. As already remarked, Brazil, till recently the leader of the American group at Geneva, in spite of her active share in the organization and functioning of the League is withdrawing altogether. Argentina, less cordial than Brazil to the United States, may possibly return to step into Brazil's place. But Argentina has never inspired a consuming affection on the part of her sister republics. Without Brazil and Argentina, Latin-American solidarity remains a pious aspiration.

Nevertheless, as has been pointed out by others, the time may come when the League will have vastly increased in strength and prestige. It may then no longer avoid assuming jurisdiction in controversies between American member states which do not, in a strict sense, involve the Monroe Doctrine. Some of the Latin republics may themselves demand fulfillment by the League of its obligations under the Covenant, for they are required as signatories of this treaty to submit all disputes of a non-justiciable nature to the League Council. Such a development may seriously undermine the very bases of Pan-Americanism, and destroy the leadership of the United States in this part of the world.[26]

[26] See Blakeslee, *op. cit.*, pp. 176-179, for a fuller discussion of this question.

Although South America as reflected in its public press seems closer to Europe than to the United States, its governments, apart from participation in the activities of the League of Nations, pursue the same policy as that of Washington—isolation from the domestic quarrels and rivalries and the political combinations of the European states group. Indeed any other policy would scarcely be credible given their lack of prestige and of power in world affairs. With regard to problems of the Pacific, the nations on the eastern seaboard of South America are not at all concerned. There has been considerable Japanese immigration into southern Brazil, especially in the state of São Paulo, where some 20,000 Orientals are resident today. But their presence has so far evoked no questions of a political nature. Opinion as to their desirability is divided, and in São Paulo is becoming less favorable. It is asserted that they will not mix with the rest of the population, and as a source of labor for the coffee planters they are a disappointment. They soon drift away to become independent farmers.[27]

[27] The Brazilian authorities, however, both federal and state, continue to encourage Japanese immigration. At the end of March, 1926, the *Times* correspondent at Tokio reported that the Brazilian government had offered to throw open to Japanese colonization six million hectares of land in Amazonia, and that one of the largest Japanese steamship companies had appropriated 80,000 yen to send a commission to examine conditions on the spot. The land, it was thought, after being cleared would be suitable for the production of cotton and rubber. A few weeks later the Japanese ambassador at Rio de Janeiro departed for Amazonia to study the prospects for Oriental immigrants there, and in May a Japanese mission was expected at Para. At about the same time a United Press dispatch

On the west coast the Japanese government seems to be making especial efforts to cultivate the friendship of the Latin nations, particularly Chile, Peru and Mexico. At Santiago Japan has not only a minister resident, but naval, military and commercial attachés, and she would doubtless like to count upon the sympathy of Chile in case of a conflict in the Pacific. The Japanese minister at Lima, it has been noted, entertains more lavishly and more frequently than any other member of the diplomatic corps. In reality, however, Japan does not seem to be much discussed or thought about in either country. Neither Chile nor Peru can be said to have a Pacific policy. They are engrossed in their own immediate questions, and have little occasion for envisaging world problems. With regard to Japanese immigration Chileans hold about the same views as are held in the United States. They want Chile to be considered a white man's country, and do not desire an influx of Orientals.[28] Chilean naval and military officers under normal circumstances frankly declare that in event of a conflict between Japan and the United States, their country would side with the latter.

In Peru Orientals are more numerous, both Japanese and Chinese. Chinese were first imported into Peru about seventy years ago to work on the coastal plantations. But they rapidly drifted to the towns to become

from Tokio announced that the Emigration Office expected to send five thousand Japanese to São Paulo during the following year, and that the Diet had voted 800,000 yen for that object.

[28] There are very few Japanese in Chile, but Chinese are numerous in the northern, nitrate, ports.

small traders, and very few are on plantations today except on those owned and managed by Chinese. The number in Peru is said to be less today than formerly, perhaps fifteen thousand at most, and the law practically prohibits their immigration, though some are introduced by bribery and falsification of passports. In Lima they possess a few large general stores, and are represented by several import and export houses though none of the first rank. They also own a few fine plantations on the coast. Japanese have been coming in only during the last eighteen or twenty years —sometimes brought in as contract labor for the plantations—but they are of increasing importance and today number seven or eight thousand. In the towns they are chiefly small shopkeepers. The writer could not discover that feeling against them was very strong. But in a crisis in Pacific affairs, there can be little doubt that Peru would stand with the United States against Japan. Only those with an economic interest in the question, i.e., employers of labor, favor continued Oriental immigration.

CHAPTER VII

PROPAGANDA AND LATIN-AMERICAN RAPPROCHEMENT

So far the barriers of race and culture, the factor of increasing commercial and financial penetration, and the political policies of the American republics toward one another, have been discussed in relation to the problem of South American distrust of the United States. Other sources of suspicion and misunderstanding, some of them already referred to in passing, need also to be briefly reviewed. Many of them take the form of unfriendly propaganda: propaganda of European origin whether political or commercial or intellectual, propaganda in favor of a cultural and political union exclusively Latin in America, and propaganda emanating from hostile or ill-informed critics residing within the United States.

A prolific source of misrepresentation of the United States is in newspaper articles written by Latin Americans resident permanently or temporarily in this country. Generally the articles are contributed to Latin-American newspapers and periodicals; sometimes they appear in Spanish-language magazines published in New York for distribution in Latin America. The writers frequently are students in American colleges or technical schools, but occasionally they are men of more

mature years and experience. The latter are sometimes professional "Hispanists," but more often journalists who undertake to interpret American customs or tendencies from their own Latin angle without an understanding of the deeper currents of American life and thought. Their criticisms are frequently worthy of serious consideration, although unfortunately addressed to audiences unable to make the necessary corrections of perspective. In any case, having but a scant historical background, judging all of the United States by what they see or hear in New York or Chicago, often with little opportunity to become acquainted with better-class Americans as individuals, and possessed of the journalistic craving for the sensational rather than for what is normal and characteristic, they do much damage. In other words, what is "news" for the average American paper is also "news" for the South American correspondent in this country, and it conveys a very misleading picture of the United States.

The amount of misinformation in this way diffused throughout the South American countries is remarkable both for quantity and for variety. The Yankee is generally pictured as lacking in subtlety, sentiment or *esprit,* rude, pugnacious, a boaster with whom brawn obtains preference over brain, and for whom everything is "made to order" in a mechanical civilization. His public schools are a failure, and his "most formidable industry" is the purveyance of "bluff." The eccentricities of an occasional individual are represented as *à la mode.* The granddaughter of the world's richest

man is pictured as brought up in the midst of indigence and mediocrity, and murder in New York is reported to be priced at ten dollars per head. That every sort of idiosyncrasy is possible in a nation of 120 millions, and that analogous things happen in other civilized countries, does not impinge upon the consciousness of these aspiring journalists.

"Prohibition" of course supplies an endless theme for the Latin critic of the United States, and divorce and the Ku Klux Klan have come in for their due share of attention. Latterly the question of the war debts owed to the United States by Europe, and especially by France, has enabled hostile correspondents on both sides of the Atlantic to represent Uncle Sam as a heartless Shylock. The motives and the results of prohibition are always to the discredit of the country. Rarely is anything but the debit side of the ledger revealed. Indeed even in a Sunday edition of the friendly *La Nación* of Buenos Aires [1] an article (contributed significantly enough by a Frenchman) to the effect that an attempt was being made to prohibit music without words because pure melody was morally enervating, was made the vehicle for a bitter attack upon the United States. The final paragraph of the article discloses its motive: "A people which thinks of proscribing the most consoling of the muses should be regarded with horror by all mankind. If the sacrilegious thesis of the moralists should triumph in the United States, North Americans will have taken a great step backward toward barbarism, and all the Latin races ought

[1] November 22, 1925.

to unite in denouncing to the universe this Anglo-Saxon infamy." Apparently a sense of humor is not without its uses in achieving an international understanding.

The ease and frequency of divorce in the United States is another favorite topic of the Latin correspondent: divorce as a thermometer of the general unhappiness of married life in this country and of the levity with which the institution is commonly regarded by Americans. An article published in *Cine-Mundial*[2] of June, 1926, entitled *"Casarse es facil . . ."* (Getting Married is Easy . . .) reflects the common reaction of the Latin mind, mistaken though it may be: "To a Latin, marriage is a sacrament that holds for life. To a Saxon, marriage is generally nothing more than a corsairing commission: one marries because it is the easiest and cheapest thing to do. What matter if it is not also the most moral?" As for the Ku Klux Klan, this curious society is represented as typical of the American mentality, the manifestation of a hatred of foreigners which has always been characteristic of the United States. This xenophobia, we are told, has its roots in the Protestantism of the majority of Americans and in the race pride of the Anglo-Saxon. The two combined produce a "social and political pharisaism" which has been evident in American history since the Alien and Sedition Act of 1798. To American Protestants the Catholic is an "undesirable," and when he is also a Latin he is "doubly an inferior."[3]

[2] A motion-picture magazine published in Spanish in New York City.

[3] Article by "Omar Emeth" in *El Mercurio*, Santiago, Chile, April 25, 1926.

Misrepresentation of the United States, however, is not confined to news articles from this country or Europe supplied by Latin-American correspondents. Our own news agencies, although their entrance into the South American field has on the whole been of advantage to the United States, are also much inclined to "jazz up" the news reports they send out to the southern continent. When the Associated Press circulates a story of a New York divorce lawyer who presented to the court a brief stating that paint, powder and petting parties are universally accepted features of present day social life, and that for a married woman to have two paramours is entirely conventional, and therefore no just ground for a divorce action, we cannot be surprised if the South American reader is "under the impression that a man in the United States can have ten or twelve wives in a year and that every American school girl is either a courtesan or a bobbed hair bandit." [4]

The defense offered by the news agencies is that they contribute what South American editors want. In any case they (or at least the United Press, the most important of the American press organizations [5]) contract to supply so many words *per diem* of certain kinds of news. And from this daily allowance the local editor prints what he thinks will interest his public. The agencies are mere merchants, distributors, whose success is governed by their ability to establish a reasonable relationship between supply and demand. But they do not retail scandal for scandal's sake.

[4] *American Weekly*, Buenos Aires, March 27, 1926.

[5] It supplies over eighty of the principal South American newspapers.

This *apologia* is eminently just, as far as it goes. The most misleading news is supplied by special, usually Latin-American, contributors.[6] Yet given the low standards of the most widely read American metropolitan dailies, the preponderance of news of a sensational or morbid character, it is not remarkable that the point of view of the Latin correspondent becomes jaundiced, or that American news-gathering and news-selecting agencies in this country supply similar material to their South American journalistic customers. It is fortunate for the United States that in general the daily press of South America is not so sensational as that of this country. At least with regard to the selection and presentation of news, the former is as yet on a higher plane. Most North American newspapers are interested in profits rather than in policy. Profits come from advertisements, and advertisements go to the paper that sells. Therefore the news is printed that sells, regardless of any other consideration. By the same token it is possibly fortunate for the good

[6] The most mischievous articles about the United States seen by the writer in the Buenos Aires press were special features appearing periodically in the Sunday issues of *La Prensa,* and emanating from the pen of a journalist of British birth in New York City. He uses themes such as "The Career of Mr. Bryan," "New York Opera," etc., upon which to hang the usual superficial and commonplace foreign criticism of the United States. The gross materialism of American life, its provincial egotism and the immodesty of its women, are the current coin of his articles. Such statements as that "the United States has for some years back arrived at a state of immorality . . . which has not been surpassed in the history of the modern world" give the measure of the man.

cause of inter-American relations that there is not more demand for Latin-American news in the North American press. What little is published is not the most trustworthy or impartial. Witness the wild and exaggerated accounts sent out from Mexico City by our best news agencies in 1926 concerning the troubles there between Church and State. The "crazy Yankee" is a popular figure in the South American mind, as is the irresponsible Latin in the mind of the average citizen of the United States, and that American press agencies should pander to these popular impressions is a source of irreparable mischief.

Propaganda against the United States originating in South America itself takes various forms, and is variously inspired. In part it is the expression of a commendable race pride, a desire to maintain and develop the heritage of Latin civilization bequeathed by Mediterranean Europe, a fear that unless Latin Americans bestir themselves they may be absorbed, if not politically, at least in a cultural sense, by the vigorous, expanding Anglo-Saxon power to the northward. Latin-American intellectuals and men of letters have therefore been trying to draw together in a common effort and aspiration, by educational, literary and moral bonds to unite their peoples in defense of the collective patrimony.

Anti-American propaganda in part also derives its inspiration from Europe, especially from France and Spain. There is no doubt that Spain and the Spaniards constitute our bitterest and most active foe in Latin

America. Spain is keenly desirous to recover her former ascendency among the younger American communities which she herself established four centuries ago. Her ambitions are political, to create a Pan-Hispanic entente in which she will be *primus inter pares;* they are also intellectual, social and scientific, to develop an Hispanic cultural union which will compete with and supersede the Pan American union in course of evolution today. Her ultimate goal is by these means to recover the position she once held as a great world power. But there also exists a Pan-Latin ideal, for which France especially is sponsor. The literary and artistic standards of the more progressive South American nations have long ago been set by France, and her influence upon law and jurisprudence has been considerable. Every good South American, if he can, goes to Paris before he dies. France, too, therefore, would like to consolidate her position both political and economic in the world by drawing together the Latin peoples of America under her protecting wing. And the Pan-Latins and the Pan-Hispanists do not always see eye to eye. The latter resent the formers' intrusion, and charge them with trying to filch away the Hispanic birthright.

On top of all this is the propaganda emanating from Mexico, and to a lesser degree from others of our Latin neighbors which sometimes feel the heavy hand of Uncle Sam. In Mexico the latter at this moment is not a popular figure. Mexico City is a centre of the movement for the cultural approximation of Latin America. And Mexico calls loudest for relief from

what it considers the incubus of North American imperialism. During the Carranza administration diplomatic intrigue against the United States was very active,[7] and Mexico seems to have acquired the services of a number of South Americans of moderate prominence as propagandists against this country. When General Obregón became president this hostility somewhat abated, but the Calles government has shown an inclination to return to former ways. Mexican legations and consulates in South America regularly furnish copy to the local newspapers, dispatches which are generally dated from Mexico City and obviously inspired, and which often supply the text for editorial articles. The Mexican minister or ambassador can generally be counted upon as a prominent guest at meetings and banquets associated in any way with pro-Latin or anti-American purposes. There is good reason to believe that a Mexican theatrical company touring the west coast of South America in 1925-26 received a subsidy from the Mexican Government. One play in particular, "El Petrolero," holding the Yankee up to ridicule, was the cause of some comment. And it is known that the diplomatic mission sent by the Government of Mexico to the inauguration of President Figueroa of Chile in

[7] As an example of Mexican official propaganda, see *"El Ideal Latino-Americano." Colección de documentos raros, protocolos de diversos Congresos, memorias de eminentes pensadores y otras materias de muy vivo interés que se refieren a la projectada UNION Y CONFEDERACION de los paises Centro y Suramericanos.* Imprenta de la Secretaría de Gobernación. Mexico, D. F., 1919. It involved no exhausting editorial labors, being merely a reprint of a Chilean publication of 1862.

December, 1925, had as an ulterior object the proposal of a Latin-American entente directed against the United States, with the former A.B.C. understanding as a basis.

The principal focus in South America of the movement for a literary and intellectual rapprochement of Latin-American peoples is in Buenos Aires. Buenos Aires is the largest and wealthiest Latin city on the continent, it is in closer and more constant intellectual and commercial relations with Latin Europe—France, Italy and Spain—than is any other city, and as a publishing and educational centre it has no rival in South America. A visible organ of the movement is the monthly literary review *Nosotros;* and another is the society called the *Unión Latino-Americana.* This organization was founded at the end of 1922 or beginning of 1923 by the late José Ingenieros and about a dozen associates, and its inspiration in part was received from Mexico. José Ingenieros, who died in December, 1925, was one of the outstanding personalities in the intellectual life of Argentina. Physician, poet, sociologist, moving spirit behind *Nosotros,* he has had a large and loyal following among younger *littérateurs* and students, not only in Argentina but in all the Latin countries. While there are many who believe that his scientific attainments were somewhat overrated, his magnetic individuality made him a natural teacher and leader of youth, and his influence on the whole was doubtless a beneficent one. Like many others, he admired the achievements of the United States but feared its power and ambition, and he was in close relations

with intellectual and anti-American elements in Mexico.[8]

The *Unión Latino-Americana* grew out of a visit to Buenos Aires of José Vasconcelos, minister of public instruction in Mexico under President Obregón. As one of the Mexican envoys to the centenary celebration of Brazilian independence in September, 1922, he later journeyed to the River Plate countries where he was much fêted by the younger intelligentsia. At a banquet tendered to him by a group of Argentine writers on October 11, Ingenieros made a celebrated address[9] in which is found the germ of the society he soon after established. He bitterly attacked the political and economic aggressiveness of the United States in Latin America, and the "disloyalty" of Pan-Americanism. "If during the past century the Monroe Doctrine appeared to be a guarantee for the 'principle of nationalities' against the 'right of intervention,' today we perceive that this doctrine, in its present interpretation, expresses the 'right of intervention' of the United States against the 'principle of Latin-American nationalities.' A hypothetical guarantee has been converted into a very present danger." Ingenieros therefore called upon the youth and the intellectuals to initiate a movement of moral resistance to foreign imperialistic capitalism. Distinguished writers, he said, in the past had uttered cries of alarm which had had no echo or continuity for lack of cohesion in Latin America.

[8] His death in Buenos Aires occurred just after his return from a visit to Mexico, it is said as the guest of the Mexican Government.

[9] Printed in *Nosotros*, October, 1922.

They must escape from their isolation and organize a moral union. A program of political, ethical and social regeneration in each country, and a new consciousness of racial and cultural solidarity, would be the securest bases for later juridical, economic and even political confederation.

The *Unión Latino-Americana* is of much less significance than its members would fain believe. Most of the rank and file are university students, to whose vagrant enthusiasms a "cause" such as this would be expected to appeal. It does not seem generally, however, to reflect the feeling of the majority of the student body. Of the principals, who number a dozen or more, "a few are doubtless genuine and sincere, some are moved by a private grievance against the United States, the leaders use the organization chiefly as a means of personal advertisement." [10] None of them are persons of real importance, and the group does not seem to be taken seriously by the community at large. How numerous the membership is the writer does not know—probably several hundred.

As the vehicle of its ideas the *Unión* publishes a monthly review called *Renovación,* which of course is strongly anti-American in tone, and in so far as relations with the United States are concerned shows a distinct Mexican influence. Indeed Ingenieros is believed to have received an offer of assistance from the Mexican Government when *Renovación* was founded, if he would use the periodical for Mexican propaganda

[10] Quoted from a conversation with an Argentine closely associated with the group.

directed against the United States. If a subsidy was received it must later have been withdrawn, for in 1925 the review was greatly embarrassed by lack of funds. It is decidedly socialistic in tendency, and reflects the views of the left wing of the Argentine democracy.

The *Unión* is five years old, but has been visibly declining in numbers and influence; although the recent strained relations between the United States and Mexico and the imbroglio in Nicaragua may have given it a new lease upon life. After its founder's death it seemed to be splitting into two factions, one of which refused to sponsor any longer the egotistic vagaries and spectacular methods of its president, Dr. Alfredo Palacios.[11] One of the most recent examples was in January, 1926, when he refused an invitation from the Government of Panama to attend the Bolivarian Congress of the following June. His stated reason was his disapproval of Panama's recent appeal to the United States for armed assistance in quelling a disturbance of the public order. But he made it the occasion for a long letter to the daily press [12] in which was dragged out the time-honored comparison between the "materialistic, mechanical and quantitative civiliza-

[11] Dr. Palacios is professor of political economy at the Universities of Buenos Aires and La Plata, and is a picturesque figure in university circles in Argentina. He was always unfriendly to the United States, but on a visit to New York in 1922 he felt that his presence was not taken with sufficient seriousness by Americans, and he returned, via Mexico (which he visited it seems by special invitation), a violent Yankee-baiter. But even at home his propaganda is discounted.

[12] Published in *El Dia,* Montevideo, January 17, 1926.

tion" of the United States and the "spiritual idealism" of Latin America. Although negligible as a political factor, the *Unión* is interesting as an example of the kind of appeal being made to the younger generation to bestir itself against the "Colossus of the North." And its members serve as missionaries of the Latin-American idea wherever they go—across the river to Uruguay, over the Cordillera to Chile, or as far north as Central America and Mexico.[13]

In Montevideo there is a similar organization of university students called the *Centro Ariel,* which takes its name and inspiration from the little book of José Enrique Rodó. Although it has no official connection with the *Unión Latino-Americana,* its rank and file also consists of the younger students, serious-minded and reputed rather radical, but not representative of the opinions of the bulk of their fellows. In July, 1925, both the *Centro* in Montevideo and the *Unión* in Buenos Aires issued public protests against Secretary Kellogg's Mexican manifesto of the previous month. The Argentine statement, over the signature of Dr. Palacios, declared that the American Secretary of State showed

". . . that want of respect for the sovereignty of our peoples, which is characteristic of the White House, whatsoever be the 'Pan-American' principles which it pretends to support regarding the legal equality of nations.

[13] One of the minor members of the group, a young lawyer from Córdoba, was reported in the press of 1925 as making an eloquent anti-American appeal to the university students in Mexico City, at a meeting at which the Mexican Minister of Education was present.

"The Argentine people cannot remain indifferent to the outrage inflicted upon a brother country. If we admitted without murmur that a foreign Power could dictate to the Government of a Latin-American country the manner in which its domestic problems should be resolved and the political tendency which should prevail in its public functions, threatening to provoke a revolution if it did not accept the orders received, we could not complain if tomorrow, in any situation equally grave to Argentina's national dignity, no brother people expressed its solidarity with us.

"The Latin-American Union, whose fundamental norm is the political solidarity of our peoples, extends to General Calles its fervent sympathy. In energetically defending the outraged sovereignty of his country, he defends at the same time the independence of Latin America, now threatened by the insolent imperialism of Wall Street."[14]

The *Centro* in Montevideo at the same time placarded the city with a declaration to much the same effect. A meeting of "intellectuals" was called, at which the Mexican minister presided, but although there was much debate no anti-American resolutions were passed, due, it is said, to the fact that the law and medical students failed to send representatives.[15]

A similar agitation was stirred up by the more recent misfortunes of Nicaragua, not only in Argentina and Uruguay, but in student and press circles of Peru, Chile and other neighboring republics.[16] In Buenos Aires the Latin-American Union sprang to the fore, as

[14] Statement as reported in *The New York Times*, June 19, 1925.

[15] Some of the student organizations refused to respond on the advice of ex-president Brum to whom they appealed before taking action.

[16] A correspondent in Peru wrote in January, 1927: "The papers devote pages to Nicaragua and Mexico. Borah is the newly-arrived Messiah. Buenos Aires and Madrid are swinging the cat by the tail and the air whistles!"

usual, with a broadside, protesting in the most vigorous terms against this "cynical violation of the prescriptions of international law," repudiating the imperialistic policy of the United States and the "unspeakable attitude" of the "adventurer Diaz," calling upon the continent to present a united front to "the plutocracy of Wall Street," and urging official recognition of the "constitutional" government of Dr. Sacasa.

At the same time the somewhat more staid *Ateneo Hispano-Americano* of Buenos Aires, under the presidency of Dr. José León Suárez, issued a manifesto of solidarity with Nicaragua; while the association of medical students proposed to the University Federation of Argentina an appeal to all the student federations of the world to protest in Nicaragua's behalf.[17] The Argentine Senate, immediately after voting the annual quota for the support of the League of Nations, debated whether it should continue contributing to the Pan American Union at Washington. Further payments were vigorously opposed in certain quarters on the ground that membership in the Union was a sign of vassalage to the United States. No formal action was then taken, but the socialist Senator Justo announced that if Washington's action in Nicaragua proved to be as atrocious as was commonly reported, he would move for the omission of the item for the Pan American Union from the budget. In Chile the demonstrations bore a more obviously socialistic com-

[17] In this instance, the views of the university students were echoed in the editorials of most of the Buenos Aires newspapers.

plexion. While radicals in the Chamber of Deputies introduced a motion placing the Chamber on record as denouncing "United States imperialism generally and intervention in Nicaragua specifically," [18] representatives of students and labor unions constituted themselves into a "committee for the defense of the rights of Latin Americans" to agitate against capitalism and oligarchy everywhere.

It is among the university students in Latin America that propaganda against the United States is always active and secures a ready audience. And it is among them that the new consciousness of racial and spiritual solidarity finds most frequent expression. In all the Latin republics exist student associations, generally federated into a national organization, and accustomed to meet in national and international congresses. Such international gatherings have been held at Montevideo in 1908, at Buenos Aires in 1910, at Lima in 1912, in Guatemala in 1921, and at Mexico City in the same year.[19] These associations interest themselves in politics much more than do students in the United States, and as in the case of other organizations just discussed, they freely express themselves upon international questions. When President Solórzano of Nicaragua in September, 1925, requested the armed intervention of the United States to maintain peace in his country, the Association of Students of Law and the Social Sciences in the University of Buenos Aires drew up an

[18] As reported in *The New York Times*, January 13, 1927.

[19] Students from the United States attended the congresses at Buenos Aires, Lima and Guatemala City.

energetic protest and sent a "vote of adhesion" to the youth of Nicaragua. It declared that thenceforward it supported every act of protest against the intervention of foreign powers in Latin-American republics, and summoned the young liberals to the defense of the sacred rights of American democracy.[20] Conversely, when a few months later some Panamanian students were imprisoned for participation in riots connected with a rent-payers' strike at Panama, disorders which American soldiers were summoned from the Canal Zone to repress, the prisoners sent a fervent appeal to Dr. Palacios and the Latin-American Union at Buenos Aires denouncing the use of United States armed forces to oppress the youth of America.

In Mexico within the past decade, under the inspiration of the distinguished educator, José Vasconcelos, has been created the *Unión Juventud Hispano-América*. With headquarters in the Mexican capital, it has corresponding "centres" in all the Central American republics, as well as in Colombia, Ecuador and Peru; and in the summer of 1925 two delegates spent several months in Spain organizing branches in the universities and secondary schools of the peninsula. They did more than that, they conducted a spectacular program of propaganda, holding literary soirées in each university town, fashionable teas, illustrated lectures on Mexico, or a "civic demonstration" in which a floral crown was offered to the local poet or the chief literary figure in the community. At Valladolid the formal organization of a *centro* was staged in the *sala de actos* of the

[20] *La Prensa*, Buenos Aires, September 16, 1925.

University, in the presence of the rector, captain-general, archbishop, alcalde, civil governor, etc. The purpose of the movement is to create a vast Hispanic-American University Confederation which will unite the youth of all the Hispanic countries in a common effort for social and political regeneration. That the organization is representative of the university student body in Mexico, is open to question. But one wonders, given the political relations past and present between Mexico and the United States, what its political objectives may be.

The writer would not leave the impression that all student associations are hostile in sentiment toward the United States. Young Latin Americans, while easily moved to protest against what they conceive to be an international injustice, have generally taken the initiative in such efforts as have been made toward fraternization between students of the two Americas. The recent greeting from the *Centro de Estudiantes* of the Engineering Faculty in Buenos Aires to the engineering students at Harvard is a case in point. Nevertheless, student opinion in the southern countries is a factor to be considered in any effort to foster good relations with these republics.

Older leaders of the Latin-American movement, men like Ingenieros in Argentina, Edwin Elmore in Peru, and José Vasconcelos in Mexico, have preached the need of congresses of Latin-American intellectuals as foci of discussion and propaganda, "to study and resolve questions . . . for which neither the Pan American Union nor the League of Nations are ade-

quate," "to define and clarify the consciousness of the historical and cultural mission of Latin America," "to proclaim and maintain the right and the will which is within [them] to cultivate [their] independence and collective personality." They have also urged the establishment of permanent institutes of political, social and international studies, whose orientation would be Latin rather than Pan-American. But none of these "forums of the race" have come into being, unless it be in the embryo Bolivarian University inaugurated at Panama on the occasion of the centenary celebration in 1926. One explanation doubtless lies in the fact that South American millionaires have not yet acquired the habit of devoting their surplus wealth to the endowment of such philanthropic institutions. The Latin in America has inherited the European Latin's natural disposition "to let the government do it," to expect the State to foster and finance many things which the Anglo-American does by private initiative. As for congresses, an attempt seems to have been made to convert the Third Pan-American Scientific Congress at Lima in 1924 into a purely Ibero-American event, and as has already been suggested, something of the same spirit was abroad in the Commemorative Congress at Panama in June, 1926. But no exclusively Latin-American "intellectual" congresses have as yet been assembled, except the international meetings of university students.

Since the nineties of the last century, and coincident with the development of the Pan-American movement,

the current of antipathy to the United States in the writings of Latin-American authors has also been running strong. The feeling of suspicion and resentment of course goes much farther back, to the beginnings of political independence in Latin America, and was especially bitter after the Mexican War. Since the last decade of the century, however, a group of sociological writers has appeared which attempts to analyze the political, moral and social disorders afflicting the Latin republics and suggest ways of amendment. And some of them, alarmed by the advance of the United States into the Caribbean, have used the spectre of the "Yankee peril" to rouse the nations to a sense of their shortcomings and stir them to the defense of their integrity and independence. The "Baltimore incident" with Chile at the beginning of that decade, and the Spanish-American War near its close unquestionably helped to create this new apprehension about the designs of the United States.

Some of these writers of the sociological school have produced works of outstanding merit, and their diagnoses of the domestic problems confronting the Latin-American peoples are keen and penetrating. Geographically they are widely distributed. Argentina is represented by such men as Carlos Bunge,[21] Agustín Álvarez,[22] Manuel Ugarte,[23] and Alfredo Colmo;[24]

[21] *Nuestra América,* Barcelona, 1903.

[22] *Adonde Vamos?* Buenos Aires, 1904; *South America: Ensayo de psycología política,* Buenos Aires, 1894.

[23] *El porvenir de la América latina,* Valencia, 1911; *El destino de un continente,* Madrid, 1923; *La patria grande,* Madrid, 1924.

[24] *Los paises de la América latina,* Madrid, 1915.

Bolivia by Alcides Arguedas;[25] Brazil by Manoel José do Bomfim,[26] and Monteiro Lobato;[27] Mexico by Francisco Bulnes;[28] Uruguay by José Enrique Rodó;[29] and Venezuela by César Zumeta,[30] Rufino Blanco-Fombona,[31] and Julio C. Salas.[32] Several, such as Rodó and Blanco-Fombona, are distinguished also as men of letters, poets, essayists and novelists. In the works of most of them the danger of North American aggression is rather implied than expressed; but some, such as Ugarte and Blanco-Fombona, are more apprehensive and frankly hostile.

Fear of the United States appears not only in writings of a sociological character. It may be observed in the works of poets like the Nicaraguan Rubén Darío and José Santos Chocano of Peru, in the voluminous writings of the Mexican historian Carlos Pereyra, in the literary works of the Peruvian diplomat, Francisco García Calderón, and in the journalistic productions of men like Isidro Tabela and Gonzalo Travesí (Mexicans), Eduardo Prado and Medeiros e Albuquerque (Brazilians), and the hysterical Vargas Vila (Colombian).

One of the earliest and most malicious literary on-

[25] *El pueblo enfermo,* Barcelona, 1909.
[26] *A America latina, Males de origem,* Rio de Janeiro, 1903.
[27] *Problema vital,* São Paulo, 1921.
[28] *El porvenir de las naciones hispano-americanas,* Mexico, 1899.
[29] *Ariel,* Montevideo, 1900.
[30] *El continente enfermo,* Caracas, [date ?]
[31] *La evolución política y social de Hispano-América,* Madrid, 1911.
[32] *Civilización y barbarie,* Barcelona, 1919.

slaughts upon the United States was made, curiously enough, by a Brazilian. In December, 1893, Eduardo Prado published in São Paulo a book entitled "The American Delusion" (*A illusão americana*). Within an hour of its appearance, we are told, it caused a tremendous sensation and nearly every copy was sold. The police next day confiscated the rest, arrested persons found with the volume in their possession, and placed an armed guard about the publishing house.[33] This occurred during the naval revolt in Rio Bay against the government of President Floriano Peixoto, when the country was under martial law. Prado was a monarchist, an ardent supporter of the Braganza dynasty recently overthrown, and his book was an attack upon the republic, upon Pan-Americanism, and upon the United States in particular. It reflected therefore the writer's bitter resentment against the other American republics, whether Latin or Anglo-Saxon, whose example had helped to put an end to monarchy in Brazil; and especially against the United States for its friendliness to the republican régime in its hours of trial in 1893-94. Unlike other anti-American books it was inspired less by fear than by contempt.

A new edition was published by the author in 1895, and a third appeared in São Paulo in 1902 just after Prado's death; but Brazil was then living under a happier, civilian government and the book was sold without interference. A fourth edition, edited by Leopoldo de Freitas, lawyer and man of letters, was a

[33] *A illusão americana*, 3rd edition, appendix.

few years ago still on the market, and circulated in Argentina, but today copies are difficult to obtain. Prado's book traverses the whole history of American relations with other peoples, invariably to the discredit of the United States. It is stylistically excellent, but otherwise the most unblushing and unscrupulous kind of propaganda.

Three of our most eloquent and persistent critics today are Rufino Blanco-Fombona, Carlos Pereyra and Manuel Ugarte. Of the trio, the Venezuelan, Blanco-Fombona, is the most distinguished and influential. One of the most versatile and original writers of contemporary Latin America, poet, critic, novelist, editor, essayist, historian, his proud and vehement temperament has carried him through a varied and dramatic career. He has been a revolutionary soldier, a duelling journalist in Paris, governor of the Amazonas Territory in Venezuela, several times cast into prison by the notorious dictator Cipriano Castro, and during the past sixteen years an exile in Madrid because he refuses to bow the knee to the present dictator-president, Juan Vicente Gómez. Twice in early life he sojourned in the United States. His experiences were not altogether happy ones, and he conceived an antipathy for the country which has colored all his later work. But to ascribe his anti-Americanism to this alone would be to belittle the man. Blanco-Fombona has been always and everywhere the passionate foe of hypocrisy and injustice as he sees it; and judging the United States to be "a gigantic octopus extending its sinuous tentacles toward the small republics of the south and strangling them

one by one," [34] he omits no opportunity to arouse his compatriots to a sense of their common danger. Texas and California, Panama and Nicaragua, Haiti and Santo Domingo, are but parts of the same piece, a diabolic game behind the camouflage of the Monroe Doctrine to seize control of the entire hemisphere. His writings are permeated with insult that reveals more heat than reason. As a nation we have never done anything generous or good for Latin America, and as individuals we are a race of vulgar, ostentatious money-getters.

"The most venal press in the world is that of the Yankees. The most corrupt courts in the world are those of the Yankees. The most dishonest business in the world is that of the Yankees. The most manipulated elections in the world, those of the Yankees. There is equality, yes, there is equality: the equality of slavery to the policeman, who is the tyrant of the North American cities; the liberty to hunt negroes with sticks, stones and rifles; the liberty to treat these citizens of the United States, these men whose lives are guaranteed by the Constitution of the Model Republic, as wild beasts who will dispute with white men the possession of the earth." [35]

Blanco-Fombona's counsel in the face of this moral plague is the spiritual union of Latin America.

Carlos Pereyra, like Blanco-Fombona, is a more familiar figure in the literary circles of Madrid than he is in his own country. The burden of his song is much the same, but his medium is that of Latin-American

[34] Quoted from H. B. MacDonald, *Rufino Blanco-Fombona,* New York, 1925, p. 67.

[35] *La lámpara de Aladino,* Madrid, 1915, p. 421.

history and politics. The titles of a few of his works clearly reveal the general trend of his thought: *La Doctrina de Monroe, el destino manifiesto y el imperialismo* (Mexico, 1908); *Bolívar y Washington; un paralelo imposible* (Madrid, 1915); *La constitución de los Estados Unidos como instrumento de dominación plutocrática* (Madrid, 1917); *El crimen de Woodrow Wilson* (Madrid, 1917). Pereya writes with an elegance and facility that comes more easily to the Latin than to the Anglo-Saxon, and he escapes the exuberance of eloquence which often proves wearisome to Anglo-Saxon ears. His essays in Latin-American history supply a much needed corrective to the American history generally taught in schools in the United States, and some of them might profitably be translated into English.[36]

Manuel Ugarte has attracted perhaps more attention in both Americas by his tireless propaganda against the United States than have either Pereyra or Blanco-Fombona. He is the son of a wealthy Argentine *estanciero,* and like Blanco-Fombona, a novelist, poet and critic of no mean ability; but his chief preoccupation seems to have been his campaign of twenty-five years against what he conceives to be the North American peril. When barely out of his teens he left Buenos Aires for France, and has lived most of his life there since. Just after the close of the Spanish American War he made an extended visit to the United States and Mexico, "and became convinced that Latin America was in danger of being absorbed or dominated

[36] For instance, *La obra de España en América,* Madrid, [1920?].

by the United States." [37] Thence began his "apostolate," first in the journals of France, Spain and Italy, and later (1912-14) on the lecture platform in various countries south of the Rio Grande. He has visited Mexico in all three times, the last as the guest of the government of President Carranza. He has published a series of four volumes dealing with American questions. In 1911 appeared in Spain *El porvenir de América latina,* in which he studies "in synthesis the primordial problems of our republics from the domestic and international points of view," and sketches "the main outlines of a policy applicable to all the former Spanish and Portuguese colonies." [38] Two others followed in 1922 and 1923: *Mi campaña hispanoamericana* and *El destino de un continente,* in which he gives an account of his observations on his propaganda tours and the best of his more important addresses. *La patria grande,* a volume of selected articles, manifestos, etc., completed the series in 1926.

Ugarte does not fear military conquest so much as the more "subtle penetration of the American dollar," and of the "inferior" cultural standards which increasing American influence brings with it. He stresses the essential dualism in race, culture and temperament between the two Americas, and denies that there are any grounds for union between the north and the south. Like some other writers of his class he contrasts the "idealism" of the United States a hundred years ago,

[37] Prof. Rippy's Introduction to *The Destiny of a Continent,* New York, 1925, p. VII.

[38] *La patria grande,* introd., p. 7.

when the Monroe Doctrine was formulated, with its selfish imperialism today. He is fully conscious, however, of the shortcomings of his own people, and preaches a gospel of social regeneration, the cultivation of industry, thrift, order and domestic peace. Pan-Americanism, he believes, is a fraud, and in its place he urges Latin-American solidarity, and approximation with Europe where Latin-American affinities really lie. Like García Calderón he would rather welcome increased unfriendliness between the United States and Japan, since it might serve to divert from Latin America the former's ubiquitous attentions.

Ugarte is perhaps the ablest of all the Latin-American critics of the United States. He is much less personal and more discriminating in his judgments than is Blanco-Fombona. But as in the case of so many South American publicists his "history" is weak and his knowledge at best superficial. He is frequently content with the hearsay evidence of journalists, and the *argumentum ad hominem* he as often resorts to. He fails to remember that many of the things he criticizes are phenomena familiar in all modern countries of European origin. His writings, therefore, present a curious mixture of truth and fiction, and sometimes involve him in contradiction. He still believes that the revolution of Francisco Madero in Mexico was fomented by the United States which had become hostile to the government of President Diaz, and he makes good use of Woodrow Wilson's policy toward Victoriano Huerta. Although as a sociological observer he deplores the political frivolity of the more backward

American states, his propaganda inevitably makes him appear the protagonist of such adventurers as Huerta, José Zelaya and Cipriano Castro. He apparently thinks that Mexico can live in isolation from the United States, and should. As a patriotic Argentine he believes that his own country is destined, because of its greater material progress, to initiate the movement of coordination among its sister republics and to lead in the opposition to foreign encroachment.

Several circumstances may be noted as common to a number of these Latin-American propagandists. The best of them, while alive to the shortcomings of Anglo-Saxon civilization as exemplified in the United States, are not oblivious to the defects in the social and political life of their own countries. And although some would prefer revolution and anarchy rather than submit to the intrusion of a foreign power in their domestic concerns, they do not acquiesce in or condone their own defects, but preach social regeneration and an increased sense of political responsibility as the best means of withstanding the economic and political imperialism of the north. Many of them, too, try to distinguish between the friendliness and good intentions of the majority of United States citizens and what they conceive to be the sinister designs of American capitalists. That a number seem to spend most of their time in Paris or Madrid, and publish their books through editorial houses in Spain or France may or may not have significance; but it is probably fair to conclude that several at least owe their initial anti-

Americanism to unfortunate personal experiences while resident in the United States.

It is also noteworthy that the suspicion or apprehension of some of these writers has perceptibly modified in more recent years. This is true of the writings of the brilliant Peruvian publicist, García Calderón, who seems more inclined to see something good in Pan-Americanism.[39] And it may also be observed in the latest volume of Manuel Ugarte, *La patria grande,* in which the more recent essays are milder in tone than those which appeared between 1900 and 1910. It has more than once been remarked that the great Nicaraguan poet, Rubén Darío, after the hostility to the United States revealed in the Ode to Roosevelt, in the later Salutation to the Eagle [40] expresses some confidence in the Anglo-Saxon republic, contrasts its constancy, strength and character with the rhetoric and ostentation of the Latin, and anticipates a fraternal union of the two races.[41]

The rapprochement among the Latin-American peoples is not confined to intellectual or literary circles, although there the movement is most intense. It is apparent in commercial and journalistic, in military and diplomatic ranks as well. The republic of Colombia, instead of sending its student officers, as has generally been the practice, exclusively to European countries

[39] "Literary Yankeephobia in Hispanic America," by J. F. Rippy, in *Journal of International Relations,* XII, 360-61.

[40] Written in 1907.

[41] Goldberg, J.—*Studies in Spanish American Literature,* New York, 1920, pp. 175-177.

for advanced instruction, is placing them instead in the military academies of Argentina and Chile. Early in 1926 two Colombian officers entered the School of Military Aviation in Argentina, the government of which also offered three additional places in the Military College. At about the same time arrived two other Colombians in Santiago to be enrolled in the Cavalry School of the Chilean army. Prominent economists and industrial leaders of Brazil, Argentina and Chile are advocating a closer economic union among the states of South America. "The development of our countries demands the inauguration of a South American policy of concord and coordination of effort," said the wealthy Brazilian capitalist and shipowner, Enrique Lage, in a statement to the public press of Buenos Aires. "We must nationalize our financial organization . . . without lending ear to the advice of foreigners which may very well be somewhat interested. . . . Our duty is to make ourselves as far as possible independent industrially and economically as we already are politically. We must therefore endeavor to know one another, draw our bonds closer together, aid one another mutually without suspicion and without rancor, forming a true union of all the states of Spanish and Portuguese speech . . . presenting a common front to all dangers that threaten us, all for one and one for all." [42]

Guillermo Subercaseaux, the most distinguished economist in Chile, advocates using the Tacna-Arica controversy as a lever for bringing about an economic

[42] Reported in *La Nación* of Buenos Aires.

union of his country with Bolivia and Peru; not exactly a *Zollverein,* but entire equality of property rights and economic privileges among the citizens of the three states, and complete freedom of trade between them. As the Latin republics in isolation are not able to attain to a large commercial and industrial development, economic groupings of this sort, especially if they include both tropical and temperate areas, would enable them to surmount many of their individual limitations. With such a nucleus created, Subercaseaux would aim at the union of all the Pacific republics, trusting that from economic unity would ultimately flow a degree of political unity as well. This of course is the Chilean side of the Hispanic-American medal. It would place Chile at the head of a Pacific league, and leave Brazil and Argentina in isolated grandeur on the east coast. It is the patriotic Chilean's reply to the Argentine's claim to leadership on the southern continent.[43]

Subercaseaux is not the only Chilean who has raised his voice amid the welter of political and economic interests that confuse the policies of South American states. A somewhat less considerable writer, Joaquín Edwards Bello, urges the abolition of custom houses between Chile and Argentina, a commercial reciprocity which would greatly enlarge the markets for Chile's incipient industries and enable her to purchase her beef and grain to advantage on the eastern plains. Such a step would set a brilliant precedent for the rest of the continent about to be overwhelmed by the rising

[43] *La Prensa* of Buenos Aires has advocated a *Zollverein* of all the Spanish-American states.

flood of foreign capital and commercial enterprise. "Tropical America has sold even the banana and the aguacate to the United Fruit Company. Chile has alienated the lobster and the oyster. If the condor were edible, it would already be handed over to a Syndicate." [44] And like other writers, Edwards calls upon his compatriots to put away pride, national vanity, personal interest and ambition, and cultivate a collective spirit and a civic conscience. He however looks especially to Argentina, because of her stability, industriousness and material progress, to take the initiative and place herself in the van of Latin-American peoples.

The urge to something like a continental consciousness, a spiritual and intellectual union of Latin America, finds expression also in the ranks of journalism. We find it so, for instance, in Argentina in the columns of important and influential newspapers such as *La Prensa* and *La Razón*. It may possibly help to explain why the Pan-American Press Conference held at Washington in the spring of 1926 was not attended by a more representative group of Latin-American journalists. And it is interesting to observe that the talented Guatemalan writer who represented *La Prensa* at the Washington meeting later visited Mexico and Central America on a special mission from his newspaper to advocate, not a Pan-American, but a Latin-American, newspaper union. In Mexico City he had the enthusiastic support of the Guatemalan ambassador and the Mexican minister of foreign affairs. His objective apparently was the development of a

[44] *La Nación*, Santiago, May 5, 1926.

common set of journalistic principles in regard to Latin-American problems, to the end that campaigns of a "practical character" might be carried on simultaneously in all Latin countries, and a general public opinion created which would have "practical and material results." [45]

In Latin-American states it is much more the custom than with us to appoint writers, intellectuals, to diplomatic posts abroad. Whether on this account or not, it happens that among Latin-American diplomats a hostile aloofness with respect to the United States and a desire to substitute Ibero-Americanism for Pan-Americanism is surprisingly frequent. This is not only true for diplomats of countries about the Caribbean Sea; it appears among the representatives of more distant and less "exposed" republics like Argentina and Chile. It was stated recently that with two possible exceptions the entire Latin-American diplomatic corps at Madrid is anti-American.

This aloofness, this lack of cordiality, is sometimes of a kind more felt than expressed; but it was apparent at the Scientific Congress at Lima in 1924, as it was at the Bolivarian Commemorative Congress assembled at Panama eighteen months later. Lack of positive information about the United States and its present policies, however, is as great among many of these literary diplomats as it is among the literary propagandists already discussed. Inspired by generous illusions, they show a disregard of the inevitable realities of the situation which we do not commonly asso-

[45] As reported in the newspapers of Panama, June, 1926.

ciate with the diplomatic mentality. To the development of the indispensable elements of Ibero-American union, such as communications, commercial interchange, industrial correlation, they do not generally address themselves. Yet, as the Argentine littérateur, Leopoldo Lugones, has rightly said, here is a problem "not to be studied or solved by the heroic discourse or the flaming ode." [46]

[46] "Política americana," in *Repertorio Americano,* San José, Costa Rica, March 30, 1925.

CHAPTER VIII

PAN-HISPANISM AND PAN-LATINISM

THE Latin countries of Europe are today seeking a place of dominant influence in the political, economic and intellectual life of the South American republics, generally in frank opposition to the influence claimed by the United States. And they enter the contest with the initial advantages of racial sympathy, and similarity in tradition, manners and customs, that are denied to us. In Spain some years ago was conceived the vast idea of a "spiritual reconquest" of its lost colonies, the creation of a political *bloc* of all the nations of Latin America under Spanish leadership, a Pan-Hispanic union which would revive, under new forms as imposed by the circumstances of the times, something like the wide empire of the Hapsburgs.[1] It is a movement for intellectual interpenetration, diplomatic solidarity, economic cooperation, a sort of international federalism of the former colonies and their mother country, perhaps ultimately approaching in organization the Federation of British Commonwealths.

Its champions are naturally peninsular Spaniards. King Alfonso himself openly patronizes it, men of let-

[1] "Uruguay y sus relaciones internacionales," by Pedro Manini Rios, in *La Prensa*, Buenos Aires, August 23, 1925.

ters preach it, and the Spaniards resident in American countries are its fervent advocates. It also has its supporters among Latin Americans, who proclaim the new doctrine with great enthusiasm. But it is interesting to observe that Ugarte, Blanco-Fombona, Pereyra and similar writers do not emphasize the idea of union with the mother country so much as union among the American states. The new gospel yields most abundant harvest in countries like Mexico,[2] Colombia and Peru, which have been least affected by immigration other than Spanish and least exposed to the intellectual and artistic influences of modern France.

This ideal is pursued in a somewhat exclusive and combative manner, and many of its protagonists wage war on similar concepts such as Pan-Americanism and Pan-Latinism, which they rightly regard as inimical to the political ambitions of Spain concealed behind it. They aim to exclude the influence, not only of the United States, as do the exponents of Latin-American cooperation, but also of France and of Italy. Even an Ibero-Americanism which would include Portugal and Brazil they look upon askance.[3]

The propaganda is varied and persistent both in Spain and in America. Interviews with Spanish political leaders and men of letters are featured in the weekly publications of Buenos Aires, Santiago and Montevideo, extolling the Pan-Hispanic idea and ex-

[2] The present régime in Mexico, however, is not popular in Spain because of its expropriation of the property of Spanish subjects, its socialistic tendencies, and its fanatical anti-clericalism.

[3] Article by Manini Rios cited above.

patiating upon the affection of Castile for her daughter republics—in Buenos Aires generally seasoned with a sauce of flattery to Argentina as the most progressive and enlightened nation of the western hemisphere, the centre of art and intellectual activity. Special articles to the same effect are written for, or reproduced in, the South American newspaper press. The Spanish Club to be found in nearly every South American city, generally a prominent local institution because of the size and importance of the Spanish residential colony, is a natural focus of propaganda against the United States. And visiting Spaniards, journalists, poets and professors, find there a convenient forum and an enthusiastic audience. Columbus Day—Race Day (*dia de la raza*) as it is called in Spanish America—is more and more becoming an occasion for celebrating the reunion of the Hispanic nations of the world.

In Spain important dailies like *El Sol* of Madrid print editorials attacking the sinister designs of the United States upon Latin America, and warning the latter of the tragic consequences of placing loans in the North American market. *El Sol* urged the government to send a representative to the Pan-American Congress at Panama in June, 1926, who would play a rôle appropriate to Spain's position as the *madre patria;* and it has more than once insisted that Spain should give to the congresses of American nations a new orientation as reunions of a single race and a single culture exclusive of North American influences.[4]

[4] See *El Sol,* June 4, 1926. It has been observed that its editorials dealing with foreign affairs seem many of them to be translations or

This anti-American propaganda is the work of a group of well-known professional writers,[5] and from their pens issue with great regularity attacks on our administration of the Philippines, Porto Rico and the Virgin Islands, on the American attitude in regard to the Mexican land laws, on the American conduct of the Tacna-Arica plebiscite, and on our policy generally in Central America and the Caribbean. The Pan-American Federation of Labor is also played up as an evidence of the "absorbing" policy of the United States.

One of the bitterest attacks is in a book by Luis Araquistain entitled *El peligro yanqui* (Madrid, 1921), a second edition of which was issued in 1924. It is the work of a Spanish socialist who in 1919 spent several weeks in the United States to attend the convention of the American Federation of Labor at Washington. It seems to be addressed very largely to the peoples of Latin America, and endeavors to show that the United States is grossly materialistic, has lost all ideals or never possessed them, and is therefore a danger to the world and to itself. The press a tool of "big interests," the Federation of Labor sold to capitalism, the White House the servile

adaptations of those of the *London Times*. And it may also be noted that *El Sol's* founder and owner, Señor Urgoiti, is one of two or three Spaniards of the professional class who have been honored with a British knighthood.

[5] Among them Luis Araquistain, Rufino Blanco-Fombona, Camilo Barcia Trelles, Luis Olariaga ("Sancho Quijano"), César Falcón, Luis López Ballesteros, Cristóbal de Castro, Enrique Deschamps, A. Fabra Rivas.

instrument of Wall Street, American women altogether erotic and divorced from home life and interests, the nation a bitter rival of England and the foe of Japan, preparing to annex Mexico and engulf the Caribbean—such is the familiar story. Needless to add, the book reveals the crassest ignorance of fact. Unlike the propaganda of Spanish Americans like Ugarte, it is poorly written as well, but it is a sample of the pabulum on which is fed the Spaniard's hostility to the United States.[6]

Intellectual and university organizations also have their share in this gigantic drive. Several years ago was founded the Hispanic-American Universities Federation, for the purpose of bringing about an exchange of professors and students, the reciprocal recognition of university degrees, and the formation of a League of Hispanic Nations. It is endeavoring to create a great Hispanic-American Library at Madrid, with which writers, publicists and societies in America are urged to cooperate by sending their books, reviews and other publications. Its official organ is a review entitled *Patria Grande*. Conversely, in June, 1924, more than sixty Academicians and literary men of Spain addressed to General Primo de Rivera a petition to have

[6] Among recent books extolling the Pan-Hispanic ideal the following may be noted:

Ednesor, Suil—*Apuntes para el hispano-americanismo,* Montevideo, 1925.

Vergara, Máximo—*Por la España grande,* Madrid, 1925.

García Caminero, Colonel—*El problema ibero-americano,* Cadiz, 1926.

Zurano Muñoz, Emilio—*Alianza hispano-americana,* Madrid, 1926.

distributed between five and six million Spanish publications among two hundred and fifty thousand libraries, schools, editorial rooms, clubs and other cultural centres in Hispanic countries overseas, including Porto Rico and the Philippine Islands.[7] There has also been for many years in Spain an Ibero-American Society devoted to similar objects, which publishes a periodical called *Unión Ibero-Americana,* and under whose auspices lecture courses are conducted in various parts of Spain, especially at the universities. The latter are offering scholarships to Latin-American students, although the number of Americans studying in Spain is as yet not very considerable. At present there are about two hundred, most of them coming from Peru and Argentina.[8]

What was formerly left more or less to private initiative, has in recent years become a matter for methodic action by the state. Especially under the Directorate of General Primo de Rivera the Spanish government's interest in Latin America has received a new impetus, and as recently as February, 1926, it was publicly reaffirmed by the head of the present régime. The development of this official Pan-Hispanic policy has assumed various forms, cultural, political and eco-

[7] A branch of the Spanish Academy was established at Manila seven years ago.

[8] In 1926 it was reported that there were eighty students in Spain from Peru, forty from Argentina, twelve from Paraguay, eight from Mexico, four each from Cuba, Costa Rica and Venezuela, three each from Uruguay and Salvador, and two each from Ecuador, Honduras and the Dominican Republic. Most of them apparently are studying medicine or allied subjects, and nearly all are at Madrid or Barcelona.

nomic. Steps have been taken to secure legislation providing not only for the reciprocal validity of university degrees but for literary and artistic copyright common to all Spanish-speaking countries. The foundation at Seville of a Hispanic-American University, first proposed in 1904,[9] was ordered by royal decree of May 17, 1924, the King's birthday. In October of the same year under royal auspices a Hispanic-American Medical Congress was convened at Madrid, and in the same month the several Spanish Academies offered prizes to be awarded annually to Spanish Americans for the best competitive theses on South American history, the part played by Spanish Americans in science, and other subjects of interest to Latin Americans. A Royal Hispanic-American Academy has also been created in Madrid for the special benefit of distinguished Latin-American scholars, jurists, men of letters and statesmen whom the *madre patria* delights to honor. Very recently, on October 24, 1926, a Hispanic-American Aviation Congress was opened in Madrid, with the diplomatic representatives of Portugal and all the Latin-American countries in attendance, and with special delegates from the Argentine Republic and Uruguay. The formation of an Ibero-American aeronautic agreement was discussed, as well as the negotiation of commercial treaties in which special favored-nation treatment would be accorded to the Latin-American republics, Portugal and the Moroccan Zone. The temper of the Congress was thoroughly governmental, virtually all the work of organization

[9] Altamira, Rafael—*España en América,* Valencia, 1908, pp. 40-54.

being assigned to military or civil members of the Ministry of State.

Even the Eucharistic Congress held in Chicago in June, 1926, was made the occasion for propaganda in the interest of Pan-Hispanic solidarity. Special meetings were arranged of ecclesiastics of Spanish speech from the two hemispheres, and a banquet was given by Cardinal Reig y Casanova, Archbishop of Toledo and Primate of Spain, to fifty of the most distinguished prelates representing in the Congress the various Latin-American countries. At one of these meetings the Cardinal transmitted a special greeting from King Alfonso "to the daughter, or better said, to the brother states, best beloved of Spain." And at another he pleaded for the closest union among peoples of Iberian origin. "Spain," he said, "planted the Catholic Faith in the western half of the world, and the inhabitants of those countries in whose veins runs the blood of the old nation should reverence their Mother Country, and be united to her in spirit." The Archbishop of Lima spoke vehemently against "the political protectorate exercised by other countries," and demanded that the Catholic Spanish-American countries unite in a defensive league. "We wish," he said, "a society consecrated by Catholics, because we Catholics dominate in Spanish-American countries. We do not need the protection of other nations. We are sufficiently strong to protect ourselves if we constitute ourselves into a society for the conservation of peace." The reference to the Monroe Doctrine was obvious, and was so understood by his audience.

When civil rule was substituted for a military dictatorship under the present Directorate in Spain, the Minister of Foreign Affairs organized at the Foreign Office a "Bureau of American Policies and Cultural Relations," to coordinate more effectively the various phases of Pan-Hispanic activity. It is the intention, apparently, to raise the Spanish diplomatic representatives in America to the highest rank enjoyed by representatives of other countries. And the League of Nations will doubtless continue to be used, as it has been in the past, to thrust Spain upon the world in the capacity of spokesman for all the Spanish-speaking peoples. At the Geneva Assemblies the Spanish delegates constantly stress this ideal—a return to the spiritual bosom of the mother country—and Spain's efforts since 1921 to obtain a permanent seat in the Council of the League have been put upon the ground, privately invoked, that she would represent the New World as well as the Old. A visit by King Alfonso to South America has been discussed and anticipated for a number of years, but is probably prevented by the uncertainties of the political future in the Peninsula.[10] If the King cannot go, however, the Ministries of Foreign Relations and Public Instruction are planning to send commissions of professors to the Latin-American republics for the diffusion of Spanish art and letters abroad.

[10] The visit of an Infante of Spain to Chile in 1920, on the occasion of the four hundredth anniversary of the voyage of Magellan, was effectively used by the prince and his suite in the interest of Pan-Hispanism.

"El Yanki: he ahí el enemigo." In other words the chief obstacle in the path of Pan-Hispanism is Pan-Americanism. Official Spain admits as much, and responds with the flattery of imitation. In March, 1926, a committee was assembled in Madrid under the presidency of the Infante Don Fernando to consider plans for the construction there of a Palace of America—to be a rival of the Pan American Union in Washington, and to serve analogous purposes. Within the past few years commemorative tablets have been unveiled by the King to several distinguished Latin Americans, including Rubén Darío and the Colombian botanist, Francisco José de Caldas; and it is now proposed to erect in Barcelona a monument to the union of Spain and America, adorned with sculptural groups or figures each representing a Spanish-speaking country.

The Pan-Hispanic program of the Spanish government has its commercial as well as its intellectual and political aspects. The policy is taking shape of applying the principle of preferential customs treatment to the countries of Latin America. In the Austro-Spanish Commercial Treaty of February 3, 1925, and in the Hispano-Belgian Commercial Treaty of May 1, 1925, Austria and Belgium renounce any claims to the benefit of preferential treatment which Spain has accorded or may accord to imports from Spanish Morocco and the Latin-American republics. Much attention is also being paid to the improvement of trans-Atlantic communications. Spain hopes some day to control an all-Spanish cable to Buenos Aires, and another to Vera Cruz. But her special interest at this moment is in

aviation. The airways between Spain and the River Plate must be kept in Spanish hands. The trans-Atlantic flight of Major Franco to Brazil and the Argentine Republic in February, 1926, and the flight of two other Spanish aviators to the Philippines in April and May, had in them all the elements of propaganda. The former event was widely heralded in official utterances and in the press as the voyage of a second Columbus. Franco took to the air from Palos, today a wholly insignificant village which four centuries ago was the seaport from which the Great Discoverer sailed, and as far as the Canaries his route was the same. "My flight is a work of patriotism," said the aviator to a correspondent of *O Jornal* of Rio de Janeiro. "I go to South America to carry to our brothers who live there and to the nations descended from the Iberian Peninsula testimony of the love of a distant Mother, and to tell them that she does not forget but holds them ever present in her heart. I am very hopeful because I feel that the same God that inspired in Christopher Columbus the voyage to the New World cannot fail to uphold me."

Besides control of communications, other more vague projects of an economic nature are included in the official program: the establishment of export credit banks, parcels post and money order services, export of motion pictures, etc. The most recent gesture is the Ibero-American Exposition at Seville now scheduled for 1928. Spanish writers have been sent to South America to advertise the fair by means of illustrated lectures, and newspaper directors are suborned

by gifts and other marks of attention from the Royal Commission which has the matter in charge. The whole is cleverly planned as a gigantic bid for the closer approximation of the Hispanic nations.

The political aims of the Pan-Hispanic program remain as yet somewhat obscure and undefined. Many of its votaries doubtless dream of a league of states presided over by the strongest (i.e. Spain), while others prefer to avoid the insinuation of a formal political alliance and propose only the strengthening of cultural and economic bonds.[11] The suggestion has been made that the Spanish Cortes be authorized to exchange one or more deputies with the congress of each of the Spanish-American republics; also that Spanish citizenship be extended, for legal purposes, to all Spanish Americans. Occasionally a voice is raised in advocacy of the reconstitution of the old empire of the 18th century.[12] But such zeal is the outcome of a tropical enthusiasm which does not meet with serious consideration.

This Hispanic movement is not of very recent origin, although only within a few years has it met with general acceptance. It may be traced back to the last decade of the 19th century, if not earlier. Its precursor, and in fact its creator, was Rafael M. de Labra, champion in the last century of autonomy for Spain's former colonies in the West Indies, and for many

[11] See Berenguer, Fernando—*El Hispano-Americanismo,* Havana, 1918.

[12] Silva, J. Francisco V.—*Reparto de América española y Pan-Hispanismo,* Madrid, 1918.

years almost the sole expounder, in parliament and in the press, of the idea of approximation of Spain with the kindred nations overseas.[13] In 1892, on the occasion of the celebration of the fourth centenary of the discovery of America, the idea was first really given currency, and three years later was founded a *Revista de historia y literatura españolas, portuguesas e hispanoamericanas,* to pave the way to closer intellectual relations between the peoples concerned. At a Hispanic-American Congress held in Madrid in 1900 public attention was again focussed on the movement, and a group of professors of the University of Oviedo presented a well-known memorial embracing nine "propositions" in regard to literary, economic, social and pedagogical relations with the Latin-American nations. They covered most aspects of the program elaborated since, except that political objectives were specifically disclaimed.[14] No results of a practical nature emerged at the time, but when nine years later the same university sent Professor Rafael Altamira as intellectual ambassador to the universities of Argentina, Uruguay, Chile, Peru, Mexico and Cuba, one of the most important movements in the Pan-Hispanic campaign may be said to have got fairly under way.[15] The historian

[13] See Labra, Rafael Maria de—*España y las repúblicas sud-americanas,* Madrid, 1895; *La orientación internacional de España,* Madrid, 1910.

[14] See Altamira, Rafael—*España en América,* Appendix I. At the same time the University of Oviedo sent out to America appeals for the exchange of literary and scientific publications, and for funds to resuscitate the already moribund *Revista* of 1895.

[15] See Altamira, Rafael—*Mi viaje en América,* Madrid, 1911.

Altamira is one of the most distinguished, although by no means the most radical, advocates of the Pan-Hispanic idea. For over twenty-five years he has labored in print and on the lecture platform to rouse his people from their lethargy, inspire them to move abreast of the more progressive nations of Europe, and bid for the leadership of the Spanish-speaking world.[16]

Pan-Hispanism is a perfectly comprehensible sentiment. It differs in no essential from the efforts made to strengthen the intellectual and moral ties that bind together the English-speaking peoples of the world. Cordial relations between Spain and the eighteen Spanish republics of America are based "on the solid ground of community of language, and of the life in common of a numerous Hispanic population united by the mental predisposition to the pursuit of similar ideals." This population includes an immense number of peninsular Spaniards resident in America, many of whom have acquired wealth and constitute the vanguard of the Pan-Hispanic movement. Nevertheless, however commendable in sentiment the movement may be, it scarcely belongs to the domain of practical politics, and it would contribute little to fortify the Latin-American nations against the power of the United States.

Pan-Hispanism, indeed, has had severe critics on

[16] See, in addition to the volumes by Altamira already mentioned:
Cuestiones hispano-americanas, Madrid, 1900;
España y el programa americanista, Madrid, 1917;
Política de España en América, Valencia, 1921;
La huella de España en América, Madrid, 1924.

both sides of the Atlantic. Some Spaniards find fault with it for being too theoretical in its approach, too "ideal," too historical, restricted to an endless flow of patriotic rhetoric. "It has been an error, from the Spanish point of view, to try and attract the spiritual adhesion of the South American republics by speaking always of the 'past' instead of looking toward the future." [17] Fervid hymns to the race, to the common tie of Hispanic blood, to the language of Cervantes, to the "Mother Country which has given birth to so many daughters across the Atlantic," must be exchanged for a practical policy of political approximation. Other Spaniards, however, assert quite the contrary, that "the Hispanic race is not a reality but an idea, a route or mould of the spirit which aspires to guide or fashion in its suprasensible, inpalpable form the inheritance of history." [18] It is a dream, like primitive Christianity, but possessing the possibilities of an immense future. In any case sentimental exaggeration reaches its culminating effort in the project to erect in the Peninsula statues of Simón Bolívar, whose acknowledged greatness was achieved at the cost of Spain. As well, writes one cooler-headed Spaniard, might a monument to Napoleon be raised in the same Paseo del Prado where were shot down the martyrs of the Second of May.

The Pan-Hispanic idea also has its critics among

[17] "Hispanoamericanismo," by Alvaro Alcalá Galiano, in *La Nación,* Buenos Aires, December, 1925.

[18] "La raza como ideal de cultura," by Luis Araquistain, in *La Nación,* Buenos Aires, October 11, 1925.

Latin Americans—Leopoldo Lugones in Argentina, Pedro Manini Rios in Uruguay, Roque E. Garrigó in Cuba, etc. Some limit themselves to asking for deeds, not words; or to demanding that Spain show cause in political, scientific and commercial achievement why she should arrogate to herself the rôle of leader in Hispanic affairs. Others emphasize the cosmopolitanism of American culture as against the narrower Hispanic conception.[19] According to Manini Rios, the error or exaggeration of Pan-Hispanism consists in attempting to give it political scope or international design, "an effective capacity which it does not possess and for which there are no motives in the international political realm. . . . It is unjustifiable that countries of one continent . . . should subordinate their action to a country of another continent, which does not even occupy a preponderating position that presupposes for the adherents the benefit of her influence." In the economic realm, he contends, the nations of Spanish America feel themselves to be more closely united with other European countries than with Spain. England, France and Germany have extended credit and supplied capital, and they constitute the great markets for the disposal of American products. In the realm of culture much the same is true. Spanish Americans utilize the ideas of all the most advanced nations and study their institutions and scientific and literary productions. The race, it is true, is historically and linguistically

[19] "La cultura europea en América. Guerra de culturas o fusión cultural?" by Alberto Palcos, in *El Hogar,* Buenos Aires, October 11, 1925.

Spanish, but it is a question whether in the River Plate countries the Hispanic ethnic element predominates over other European races, Italian, English, German, French, Slavic and Scandinavian, or in Andean countries over the aboriginal Indian. From the fusion arises a quality of mind and a national temperament differentiating it from that of the ethnic groups of the Old World. Pan-Hispanism, therefore, remains a tradition, a sentiment, a purely historical conception.[20]

Leopoldo Lugones concludes that the attempt to constitute an Ibero-American system exclusive of the United States is unfeasible "even as an idealistic purpose." Latin-American political institutions are generally modelled on those of the United States, and Latin America trades more and more with the northern republic. Spain cannot be head of an American concert, for she is herself not an autonomous power. She already plays a part in the concert of the Mediterranean, from which she cannot break away, and which in itself is a European system with which America has nothing to do. Countries like Argentina, for instance, "would be assuming, on the ground of a suspicion, outside risks and taking up the cudgel for offenses that are far from being supported by evidence that renders them obligatory; and, as the Latin-American nations lack the effective power to make of such an Ibero-Americanism an instrument applicable even to the mere safeguarding of the participants, it would constitute, in the last analysis, a sum total of weaknesses and

[20] "Uruguay y sus relaciones internacionales," by Pedro Manini Rios, in *La Prensa*, Buenos Aires, August 23, 1925.

disquietudes; the worst of all elements from which to construct an international policy." [21]

Spain feels that her ambitions in America are thwarted not only by the concept of Pan-Americanism, but also by the kindred propaganda called Pan-Latinism, of which France would be the chief beneficiary. Spaniards even accuse France of inventing the term "Latin America" in order to confirm the rupture between the former Spanish colonies and the mother country and substitute herself "as an affectionate stepmother." The Latin Press Congress which met at Liège in July, 1926, and which may have been an answer to the Pan-American Press Conference at Washington earlier in the year, brought small comfort to the newspaper writers of Spain. They were filled with suspicion of the "permanent committee" in Paris, convinced that its political policy was directed against Hispano-Americanism, and that it would try to unite the press of Latin America to the neglect of Spain.

[21] Política Americana," by Leopoldo Lugones, in *Repertorio Americano,* San José, Costa Rica, March 30, 1925.

América para los Americanos, a well-known book written by a Cuban, Roque E. Garrigó, as a counter-blast to Altamira's tour of propaganda to the Spanish American universities in 1910, makes much the same points as do the writers quoted above: that in the political order America finds nothing to imitate in present-day Spain; that in the economic order, it is Spain that needs the products of America without being able to give in exchange anything which the latter does not itself produce; and that in intellectual things Spain is no more advanced than America, while in one respect she is inferior, in that most American nations have made their methods of instruction more liberal, more rational and more progressive, but Spain clings to the old order under "the corrupting influence" of the Church. *Op. cit.,* p. 11.

That the Spanish viewpoint is just as "exclusive" need scarcely be remarked.[22]

Rousseau and the encyclopædists were a source of inspiration for Simón Bolívar and other leaders of the Wars of Independence, and when the bond of union with Spain was broken, it is not strange that the new republics saw in France their guide and mistress. French thought and French literature of the 19th century moulded the South American mentality as they had already, "with the very important collaboration of their cooks and their modistes," formed the taste of Europe. Intellectuals, bohemians, exiled politicians and newly rich find in the enchantment of Paris "the Mecca of their aspirations." For every South American Paris is the true terrestrial paradise. "Elegant señoritas of Buenos Aires and of Montevideo, who know scarcely a single verse in Spanish, recite in French with impeccable accent, talk and dress à la Française and read only French authors. Of Buenos Aires itself . . . many Argentines speak with pride as today 'a new Paris'." [23]

It is true that more recently Italy too has sought to share in the "Latin sentiment" among South Americans, for Italian immigration to the southern continent has in the past two generations been very extensive,

[22] Similarly the proposal to hold the 1927 Latin Press Congress at Madrid has met with violent opposition from *El Sol* and certain other Spanish dailies, as giving Spanish sanction to an organization "which disingenuously constitutes a manœuvre against the influence of Spain in America."

[23] "Francia y la América Latina," by Alvaro Alcalá Galiano, in *La Nación*, Buenos Aires, March, 20, 1926.

especially to Argentina where Italians outnumber Spaniards two to one.[24] And in spite of the recent treaty with Italy, Spain watches Italian activities in this regard with the minutest care. Italian ambitions are both economic and cultural. In 1924 the steamship *Italia,* a floating exposition of Italian products, visited all the principal seaports of South America. And recently there has been created at Rome the *Istituto Cristoforo Colombo,* "established to promote cultural relations between Italy, Spain, Portugal and Latin-American countries and a reciprocal knowledge of these states." It is divided into twenty-one sections, covering as many Iberian countries; but it is interesting to note that the Spanish section is number nineteen, being preceded by those of the Ibero-American republics, and that France and French-speaking Haiti are altogether excluded.

France, meantime, strives to retain her social and intellectual hegemony. She sends forth a host of propagandists, from Anatole France and Mgr. Baudrillart, director of the Catholic Institute of Paris, to the radical politicians, Clemenceau, Viviani and Caillaux, generals of the World War, and "stars" of the French stage. In Paris a *Comité Franco-Amérique,* presided over by Gabriel Hanotaux, seeks to develop economic, intellectual and artistic relations with South America, to attract students and travelers, and to encourage every means of bringing the peoples together. There also exists an active *Groupement des Universités et Grandes Écoles de France pour les relations*

[24] There are 500,000 Italians in the city of Buenos Aires alone.

avec l'Amérique latine, whose bulletin circulates freely in the southern republics. The *Alliance Française,* subsidized by the government, contributes to the maintenance of dozens of schools where the language, literature and history of France are taught, and French books and periodicals are firmly established in the Latin-American market.

Pan-Latinism is in a measure a revival of the ambitions for which Napoleon III sought scope in Mexico. France, arbiter in art and letters and science, would be the political leader of the Latin peoples, and incidentally hope to establish a commercial and industrial ascendency as well. She would thus set bounds to the formidable expansion of the United States. The French press therefore is apt to dilate upon the shortcomings and inconsistencies of Pan-Americanism, and to see grave dangers in the suggested separate League of American Nations. Pan-Americanism, they contend, may deprive the present League at Geneva of its universal character, and leave the Latin world divided and defenceless against Anglo-Saxon preponderance both in America and in Europe.[25]

The United States thus faces a formidable array of hostile or competing European interests in South America. All of them act upon the belief that a sure basis for the extension of commercial and political influence lies in the establishment of cultural contacts or exchanges. To this end the French have established in Argentina an *Instituto de la Universidad de Paris en Buenos Aires,* and the Spaniards an *Asociación*

[25] See editorial in *Le Temps,* June 27, 1926.

Cultural Española. The Italians support an *Instituto Argentino de Cultura Itálica,* and the Germans an *Institución Cultural Argentino-Alemana.* Each of these associations brings one or more distinguished lecturers each year to Buenos Aires, who also generally address audiences at Córdoba, Rosario and Montevideo. In some cases the idea of exchange of lecturers is involved, but as yet little has been done in the way of reciprocity. The French institute is financed by subventions in part from the University of Buenos Aires, in part from the Jockey Club of that city, and in part from the Government of France. The other societies are supported by the respective colonies, Spanish, Italian and German, in Argentina. All of them, so far as the writer is aware, have been established since the World War, the most recent being the German institute.[26]

At Rio de Janeiro there is likewise now an *Instituto Franco-Brasileiro de Alta Cultura,* and in due time doubtless similar organizations will be created at other strategic centres in the South American continent.[27] The Brazilian institute has recently sent a professor of the Faculty of Medicine in Rio to give a series of

[26] Its first lecture cycle was very successfully inaugurated in September, 1925, by Prof. Ernst Kühnel, director of the Kaiser Friedrich Museum in Berlin.

[27] In Mexico there are two such societies: the *Instituto de las Universidades de Paris y Mexico,* established five years ago and financed mostly by the French Government; and the more recent *Instituto Hispanoamericano de Intercambio Universitario,* which owes its foundation to Mexican initiative, but is supported wholly by Spanish residents.

lectures in Paris, and it plans to erect a building in Rio where the courses offered by visiting French scholars may be appropriately housed.

The most active and distinguished of these various associations is probably the Institute of the University of Paris at Buenos Aires. Founded in 1922, within three years it invited fifteen eminent professors from the universities and higher schools of France, who gave courses on literature, ancient and medieval art and civilization, finance, sociology, medicine, law, philosophy and education. Recently a corresponding "Institute of the Argentine Universities" has been created in the French capital under the auspices of the university authorities there.

If the present cultural isolation of the United States from South America is an obstacle to the Pan-American idea, as seems unquestionable, it behooves us to follow in the path blazed by our European competitors. Frequent exchanges of university professors; scholarships to North American universities such as those so abundantly provided for European students by the Commonwealth Trust and the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Foundation; more direct acquaintance with South American countries and their people by North American citizens of public prominence or intellectual distinction; American weeklies or monthlies in important South American cities, to which intelligent and friendly Latin Americans living in the United States might contribute,—such are the obvious ways of approach. Not a week passes that does not bring to Buenos Aires a distinguished visitor from Europe, a professor of the

Sorbonne or the chairman of the board of a British railway, bank or petroleum company. Only during the past few years have American visitors of prominence gone to South America. Their influence is indirect, but none the less important in improving relations between the two Americas.

Whether or not opinion hostile to the United States is gaining ground in South America is perhaps a debatable question. Beneath the opposition to North American imperialism, or to Pan-Americanism under the leadership of the United States, there is a sincere and widespread desire for harmony and cordial intercourse. There is, however, also a real fear that the northern republic, or at least an influential part of its citizens, does not reciprocate this friendly feeling, but is ever ready to sacrifice the independence or integrity of the Latin-American nations to its own selfish and material ends. And the recent policy of the American Government in Nicaragua has not been calculated to allay these fears. Yet despite the fact that past misdeeds seem to speak louder than an occasional gesture of friendship, despite our abstention from the League of Nations, the writer feels that confidence in the United States during the past decade has probably increased rather than diminished. As before remarked, this country has many warm and loyal admirers among South Americans—even in an occasional Spaniard such as the distinguished writer, Ramiro de Maeztu.[28] Given a reasoned and far-sighted diplomacy at Wash-

[28] See his articles in *La Prensa,* Buenos Aires, October 25 and December 13, 1925, and January 24, 1926.

ington, an intelligent and organized propaganda can easily increase their number, and serve to persuade our southern neighbors that the imperialistic spirit is not a dominating one in this country, but rather a spirit of cooperation and community of interest.

CHAPTER IX

THE A. B. C. POWERS AND URUGUAY

When we come to examine in detail the feeling in the several South American republics toward the United States, we find that underneath a certain resemblance there are sometimes considerable differences. These differences are occasioned by disparity of national temperament, by diversity of national ambitions, and by the fact that some countries in the past have had diplomatic experiences with the United States which leave a sense of suspicion or rancor. Public sentiment therefore is not uniform. It varies from one state to another, and it varies among the social and political groups within each state.

In most of the southern nations the attitude of the population generally toward this country seems to be one of indifference, except when momentarily stirred by some international incident that involves their patriotic interests or racial sympathies. Such generalization may be applied to the citizens of all countries. The vast majority remain unconcerned about foreign questions or relationships unless their attention is specially focussed upon them. It is true of Argentina, Brazil and Chile, the three most important of the South American states, whether judged by size, population,

or political and economic progress. And it applies to the adjacent and closely identified republic of Uruguay. Together they include about two-thirds of the area of the continent, nearly three-fourths of its people, and an even larger proportion of the white blood. They are the most intelligent, and in international affairs the most ambitious. But real anti-American feeling is rare, except among small groups of professional agitators, or in individuals with a personal grievance, few of whom are regarded seriously by responsible citizens or by the community at large. As elsewhere remarked, these republics have emerged from the early period of political instability and international obscurity; since the Second Hague Peace Conference in 1907 they have been admitted on terms of equality into the councils of international society; Brazil at the Peace Conference at Versailles, Brazil and Chile in the Council and in the Assembly of the League of Nations, have played no mean rôle. Any thought of European aggression against these states is today untenable. Their citizens feel that they are quite as good as North Americans, can meet them on equal terms, and have little to fear from the United States—by no means an unhealthy attitude.

This sentiment of national self-sufficiency is peculiarly strong in Argentina, where it sometimes expresses itself in an arrogance and a rather sensitive, thin-skinned egotism which foreigners in the past have also remarked in citizens of the United States. Nor is it confined to these two nationalities; it represents a normal and perhaps inevitable stage in the evolution of

a young and vigorous people. Pride in her rapid development and economic importance leads Argentina to believe that she is able to exist and progress without foreign aid or interference. She is therefore pro-Argentine, spiritedly independent, and does not favor entangling alliances, an attitude which any North American can fully understand. The feeling finds extreme expression perhaps in the reported remarks of a distinguished Argentine citizen to the wife of a North American diplomatic official: that the western hemisphere is divided into four cultural areas, the United States and Canada, Mexico and Central America, the South American states except Argentina, and Argentina; and as the civilization of the United States is superior to that of Mexico and Central America, so is that of Argentina to the rest of South America; as compared with Argentina the rest of Latin America is of secondary importance.

This "superiority" of the Argentines, this exaggerated nationalism, in so far as it affects relations with the United States, presents aspects both favorable and the reverse. The Argentine's belief that his country and the United States represent the highest achievement in political and social progress in the western hemisphere should be a good augury for cooperation in international affairs, for a friendly rivalry for leadership in the solution of Pan-American problems. The traditional foreign policy of his country has been a pacific one, and he is justly proud of the rôle it has played in the establishment of the principle of compulsory arbitration of international disputes. If he

can be convinced that the United States harbors no imperialistic ambitions, he should be ready to meet us half-way, glad to be associated with the United States in political, social and intellectual endeavor.

Moreover, this superiority of Argentina is still something of a veneer. In spite of the extraordinary material wealth of the nation, its undeniable political and social progress, it is still in many respects behind the United States and the older countries of Europe. The intelligent Argentine, especially if travelled, recognizes as much, and betrays a respect, if not admiration, for the achievements of the northern republic. It is true that one dare not generalize too broadly. Many Argentines, usually of the older generation, may be inclined to regard the wealth and importance of the United States as due solely to the happy accident of great natural resources, and to extraordinary luck in its international relations—and to nothing else. They affect to despise our provincialism—the Dayton "evolution" trial,—and our hypocrisy—prohibition and the bootlegger,—and they refuse to believe that the Monroe Doctrine is anything more than a blind for selfish exploitation; while the sending of an American naval mission to their rival, Brazil, in 1922, they hold to be inconsistent with our protestations of concern for international peace and fraternity. But the majority of the thinking part of the nation were deeply impressed by the achievements of the United States in the World War, not merely in the training, transportation and maintenance overseas of millions of men, the construction of harbors, fleets, railways and munition

plants, but in the immediate acceptance of the universal draft law, in the self-discipline displayed, and in the immense contributions to Belgian Relief and to the Red Cross. They have had thrust upon their attention our progress in technical and university education, the hundreds of millions representing private endowment of education and social service, and the relative efficiency of our governmental departments. They send to the United States for experts in cotton, sugar, maize and poultry culture,[1] and their influential public press points to the northern republic as in most things an exemplar for the other nations of the New World.

The same strong nationalism of the Argentines, however, makes them resent the generally assumed hegemony of the United States in American affairs. They should, and to some extent apparently do, understand and appreciate our peculiar position with relation to the Caribbean Sea and the countries immediately about it.[2] But by the same token it is natural that, although like ourselves offering lip-service to the ideal of equality of all nations, they should aspire to exercise a hegemony of their own over the continent to the south of the Caribbean. Proximity, superior wealth and energy, a common inheritance of language and social traditions, all give them a claim to natural leadership over the other Spanish countries of South

[1] In 1925 nine American technical experts were being employed by the national or by provincial governments in Argentina.

[2] Their own relations with Paraguay should give them a sympathetic appreciation of the necessities of our national policy in the Caribbean.

America. The dominating idea of the government during the last years of the World War, under a president presumably pro-German in personal sympathies, seemed to be one of antagonism to the influence of the United States. Argentine diplomacy was apparently aimed to isolate this country, and possibly Brazil, from the rest of the American republics, and afford the Argentine president an opportunity to assert a dominant influence in the direction of Latin-American affairs. And although after the war the republic was quick to realize the disadvantages of this policy, she watches very closely the relations of the United States with South American countries, and is resentful of our mediation in their affairs.[8]

Argentina's inevitable and scarcely concealed rivalry with the great Portuguese republic of Brazil also makes her seek to draw the other nations to her side. In consequence of a miscalculated foreign policy in the last years of the World War, she lost at Versailles whatever claim she may have coveted to international leadership. Brazil became the spokesman for Latin America at the Peace Conference and in the Council of the newly created League of Nations. And Argentina's gesture of replevin at the first meeting of the League Assembly was not an especially happy one. She still remains affiliated with the League, contributes her annual quota, and sends delegates to the technical sections; but so far she has refrained

[8] Whether Argentina inspires confidence or a desire for cooperation in the other Spanish republics, notably Chile and Peru, is another question.

from participation in the deliberations at Geneva. Intelligent Argentines, however, are not satisfied with the diplomatic position of their country today, in European or in American councils, and her best friends hope that she will soon emerge from this ambiguity to resume her appropriate place in the Geneva assemblies.[4]

As Brazil stands in the light of Argentina in the League of Nations, so in the International Conferences of American States, the so-called Pan-American Conferences, the Argentine delegates, although outwardly friendly, seem to have been secretly impatient of the veiled tutelage of the United States. By some observers it was believed that Argentina largely inspired the "Central American bloc" which influenced so effectively the course of negotiations at the Conference at Santiago de Chile in the spring of 1923. And there is reason to think that more recently, in connection with the Tacna-Arica negotiations, the suggestion of a diplomatic settlement by a power or powers other than the United States may have been a clever move on the part of Argentina, jealous of American prestige, and of Chile, who feared that the plebiscite might go against her, to discredit the United States. Of such things of

[4] There was a common impression in Argentina after 1920, an impression perhaps encouraged by the administration of President Irigoyen, that the country's spectacular retirement from the Assembly produced consternation within that body, and that the League has ever since been hampered in its development by the absence of Argentina's representatives. Although in reality the attempted diplomatic *coup* occasioned only passing notice, the reaction at home is perhaps somewhat indicative of the national psychology.

course there can be only surmise, no certainty. But where there is much smoke, there may be some fire, and many in a position to observe are convinced that Argentina is ready, whenever opportunity offers, to pursue a diplomacy embarrassing to the Anglo-Saxon republic.

Whatever the truth may be, it must be admitted that, although formal relations between Argentina and the United States during the past decade have been excellent, there has existed what may at least be characterized as a lack of cordiality or of a spirit of cooperation, in contrast to the policy pursued by some other South American states. It is an elusive quality, more negative than positive. And it may possibly be explained by the circumstance that the Argentine government in the past has not always revealed a clearly defined and intelligible foreign policy. A certain provincialism, indefiniteness, obscurity has not been absent from the conduct of her international relations; an ignorance of the true motives of the United States, causing suspicion and hesitation; an unwillingness to play second fiddle to Brazil, which has followed more consistently a course of approximation with the northern republic: If there has been displayed, therefore, a want of cordiality toward this country, it may not always be due so much to active jealousy or fear, as to the absence of a group of accepted principles of any sort in the conduct of the Foreign Office at Buenos Aires. On the other hand, it is an interesting and perhaps significant fact that Argentine diplomatic representatives throughout Latin America are as a rule in-

clined to be anti-American in sentiment, as seems to have been recently the case at certain important strategic posts.

As already noted, French and Spanish propaganda are more open and persistent in Buenos Aires than anywhere else in the southern continent—naturally enough because in Argentina they find their largest and most influential audience. This propaganda inculcates the ideal of the cultural and political solidarity of the Latin, or more narrowly, of the Hispanic peoples of the world, and is hostile therefore to the influence of the United States as exerted in any union of nations exclusively American. It is spread about by articles in the daily press written by prominent French or Spanish writers or by special correspondents in Europe. It is propagated by public lectures under the auspices of the *Club Español,* the *Unión Latino-Americana,* or the *Ateneo Hispano-Americano.* It plays upon the young and untried enthusiasms of university students, and seeks to bind to itself the interest of newspaper editors. It leaves no stone unturned, no opportunity unutilized, directly or indirectly, openly or by innuendo, to malign the motives and good faith of the United States. The questions, for instance, pending between the United States and certain European countries regarding the war debts have been played up to the limit by the French in South American newspapers—and it may be added, by the French alone.

The newspaper press of Buenos Aires is the most independent, resourceful, and intelligently edited in

Latin America. The two great dailies, *La Nación* and *La Prensa,* compare favorably with the best that the United States can produce, both in their weekday and Sunday editions, and are much above the average of our metropolitan press. Some of the papers in the larger provincial cities also have an excellent foreign news service,[5] much better than in newspapers of corresponding importance in the United States. But generally the provincial press divides its space between social, judicial, sporting and political news, with large emphasis upon the last.

The Argentine press, especially since the death of Dr. Zeballos of *La Prensa,* has as a rule been fairly impartial, the exceptions being sensational "yellow" sheets like the afternoon papers, *La Crítica* and *La Argentina,* which, though widely read by the laboring classes, live on "chantage" and have no appreciable influence upon intelligent opinion or upon public policy. That responsible newspapers should sometimes adopt a critical attitude toward the United States is of course in itself no sign of unfriendliness—foreigners sometimes forget that an enlightened press largely exists for purposes of criticism. And criticism of European personalities and policies—the dictatorship of Mussolini, French action in Syria and Morocco, the "usury" of European bankers, etc.—has recently been more frequent and often more acid in tone. If the United States is misrepresented by Argentina's press, it is more often in articles contributed by correspondents in the

[5] *La Capital* and *La Acción* of Rosario, *Los Principios,* a clerical daily of Córdoba, and *El Orden* of Tucumán.

former country, or in news items supplied by the American press services.

Nevertheless, certain newspapers of Buenos Aires —*La Razón, La Acción,* and on occasion even *La Prensa*—if not anti-American, are notably lacking in knowledge, or in a sympathetic appreciation, of American problems and purposes, and are inclined to stress the ideal of Latin-American solidarity as a counterpoise to what they believe to be the dangerous material power and imperialistic ambitions of Uncle Sam.[6] This comes to the surface whenever American policy toward Mexico or the Caribbean countries is in question, and it must be confessed that it often seems justified by the editorial opinions quoted from United States newspapers. The depreciation of South American currencies in international exchange is sometimes ascribed to selfish manipulation by American banking interests, an idea that may possibly be traced to underground European propaganda. But only occasionally is a warning note sounded against the supposed danger to the country's independence from the invasion of foreign, especially American, capital.

Toward President Coolidge's award in the arbitration of the vexatious Tacna-Arica question, the Argentine press was generally friendly. Even the monthly review *Nosotros,* which has frequently printed articles hostile to the United States, in an editorial cordially approved the decision, declaring that "the whole of America has beheld with pleasure that the award, as

[6] *La Nación* of Buenos Aires is perhaps the most friendly of all the important Latin American newspapers toward the United States.

was to be expected, is just and impartial."[7] The intransigence, first of Peru and later of Chile, did not create a favorable impression in Argentina,[8] although the press was generally non-committal or conciliatory in comment. It stood loyally for the principle of arbitration, and expressed fervent hopes for the success of General Pershing in settling the ancient dispute.

On the other hand, in the spring of 1926, with the initiation of "good offices" by Secretary Kellogg as the failure of the plebiscitary proceedings at Arica became more and more apparent, opportunity was afforded to certain anti-American elements to spread their venom through the more radical newspapers. The United States was accused of favoring Peru because American capitalistic interests owned the banks and public utilities of that republic (a statement based upon either malice or ignorance), and Bolivia because by means of a loan for the purchase of the disputed provinces American bankers would gain control of all the mines of the country and make it politically and economically an American dependency. The suggestion emanating from Washington that Tacna-Arica be set up as a neutralized free state was met with the charge that the United States was scheming to get possession of that territory as a military and naval base, to serve as a key to the domination of the south

[7] *Nosotros,* Buenos Aires, March, 1925.

[8] Or indeed in Uruguay and Brazil. "Any comment, however intelligent it be, might be misinterpreted" (*Jornal do Brazil,* January 13, 1926). See also editorials in *La Nación,* Buenos Aires, November 27 and December 12, 1925.

Pacific.[9] *La Prensa,* the most influential of Argentine dailies, carried on a persistent editorial campaign in favor of a plebiscite at all costs, and against the resort to diplomatic negotiations, in a tone not over friendly to the United States. As ignorance of the real conditions at Arica can scarcely be charged against the editorial office of that great newspaper, its obvious pro-Chilean bias can perhaps best be explained by its close connections with *El Mercurio* of Santiago and *Mercurio's* proprietor, Señor Agustín Edwards.

Such are some of the more general factors affecting the relations of Argentina with the United States. Between the two countries there are no diplomatic questions pending, no serious grievances to ruffle the even tenor of international intercourse. In spite of an active Pan-Hispanic propaganda, the expression of anti-American feeling on the part of Argentines is rare. Generally, except when their attention is focussed on some particular episode, they do not think much about the United States. Their problems are nearer home, in Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay, Bolivia and Chile. Although there are some who are not well disposed toward us, a large number of distinguished Argentines are very friendly, and are striving toward greater mutual comprehension between the two republics. In short, Argentina and the United States, the two

[9] See *La Acción,* March 23 and 29, 1926; *La Razón,* May 21, 1926, etc. The distinguished Argentine man of letters, Leopoldo Lugones, made such charges in an article contributed to *La República* of La Paz, which was later distributed as a broadside in the streets of Buenos Aires.

wealthiest and in many respects most progressive of the western republics, have every reason to be on cordial terms with one another. In place of jealousy or suspicion, if they exist, there should be a wholesome rivalry in the paths of peace and international good will, and a desire for cooperation, on a basis of recognized equality.

In Brazil the situation as it affects relations with the United States is somewhat simpler than in the sister republic to the southward. The diplomatic policy of Brazil, owing to her relative isolation from the other Latin-American countries, has been traditionally one of friendship with the United States. This isolation has been the result in part of the fact that Brazil remained a monarchy so many years after the rest of independent America had become republican or at least affected republican ideals. In part it has been due to her difference in language and historic tradition from the other Latin-American countries. Brazil is Portuguese, the other nations except Haiti are Spanish. The monarchy disappeared nearly two generations ago, but the linguistic barrier remains. Brazil shares then this peculiarity with the United States: each speaks a language different from that common to the other republics,[10] and each finds the difference of idiom to some extent a hindrance to a closer understanding of and sympathy with the rest.

The temperamental dissimilarity between Latin and

[10] Canada, virtually independent, need scarcely be considered so long as she remains outside the Pan American Union.

Anglo-Saxon might be expected to be a disturbing factor also in the relations between the United States and Brazil. Brazilians are essentially a south-European people, modified by the influence of the Indian and the negro, and in large measure of a tropical environment. Yet it is a common observation that North Americans find the Brazilian more *simpático* than many other peoples in South America. And Brazilians seem to find some of the more blatant characteristics of the average Anglo-Saxon less unpleasant than do their Spanish neighbors.

The commanding position of the American press service in Brazil—even though the daily papers print astonishingly little news about the United States itself—and the virtual monopoly of the cinematograph field by American films, exert a large influence, as in the other republics, in acquainting the people with the things the United States stands for today. As in Argentina, admiration for the northern republic, its rôle in the World War and its material and scientific development at home, are factors writ large in any explanation of the Brazilian's attitude toward this country. Brazilians, too, like the Argentines, have a highly developed national consciousness, and would promptly resent any suggestion of foreign interference. And they consider that their occupation of half the territory of the southern continent and their large population entitle them to leadership in Latin-American affairs. They have, however, always supported a policy of Pan-American solidarity, and the enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine, not, it is true, by the United

States alone, but by the united action of all the American nations.

There is less evidence among responsible Brazilians than in some other quarters of a fear of North American economic imperialism; although in harmony with the nationalist feeling in the country there is a desire to encourage Brazilian rather than foreign capital, and to compel foreign firms doing business in Brazil to employ Brazilians and incorporate under Brazilian law. The Caribbean policy of the United States seems to produce little or no reaction in Brazil. Central American states have no diplomatic representation at Rio de Janeiro, and there are no trade relations between these two areas, for their products are the same. There are likewise no cultural relations or contacts. Brazil therefore does not seem to be in the least concerned. These suspicions of American motives in the Caribbean region are of Spanish, not of Portuguese, origin, and the Pan-Hispanic propaganda by which they are so sedulously nurtured finds no foothold in Brazil.

In so far, therefore, as there is less jealousy of the United States in Brazil than in Argentina, the spirit of inter-American cooperation is stronger and more apparent.[11] At the time when the Brazilian Government

[11] The *Jornal do Comercio*, commenting upon the Pan-American Newspaper Conference which met in Washington in April, 1926, said among other things: "Brazil approves this campaign for continental fraternity, the more so because we have been one of the peoples who have taken Pan-Americanism most seriously, for we have not only attended the international American conferences, we have done more: we have ratified all their conventions and acts, and were the first to ratify the agreements of Santiago, showing that we take seriously the engagements of our delegates and do not fail to redeem our pledges."

sought to obtain a permanent seat in the Council of the League of Nations, in the Brazilian press the ultimate right of the United States to Brazil's place in the Council as the first and most representative of American nations was freely conceded. And in discussion of the Tacna-Arica question, comment upon the American arbitration and subsequent "good offices" was usually friendly. It is true that in January, 1926, when Chile appealed to the President of the United States as arbitrator against the decisions of General Pershing, the newspapers of Rio de Janeiro were inclined to approve the Chilean contention that her sovereignty was being infringed.[12] But later, as the conditions reigning in Arica came to be more clearly apprehended, the press, while maintaining a judicial attitude, displayed a more obvious sympathy for the arbitrator in the insuperable difficulties in which he was involved.

Anti-American sentiments do occasionally appear in the Brazilian public press, but such scattered expressions of hostility are generally the opinions of individual journalists with a grievance, rather than a reflection of the feeling of the community at large.[13]

[12] *O Jornal,* perhaps the most intelligently edited of Rio's newspapers, rather resented the "brevity and dryness" of the President's reply. See "Boletim Internacional" in the issues of January 19 and 30, 1926.

[13] In an ephemeral daily, *O União,* on July 15, 1923, appeared a violent article against the United States Rubber Commission sent to the Amazon, warning against the colonization of north Brazil by American negroes, American capitalistic control of Amazonia, and Protestant propaganda among Brazil's colored population. Of similar bias was another newspaper article noted by the writer in February, 1926, which referred to a rumored separatist movement in western

Sometimes they are obviously inspired by foreign interests. One or two newspapers in recent years have followed a more consistent anti-American policy, but again they reflected chiefly the personal prejudice of the editorial directors.[14] *O Jornal,* the most independent and aggressive of Rio's newspapers, is inclined in its editorial columns to be rather critical of the United States. But it can scarcely be deemed unfriendly, and the privilege of friendly criticism is too freely exercised by the North American press to permit of taking umbrage. Journalistic ignorance and the itch for the sensational are responsible for much misrepresentation of American life in the news columns—the eccentric and the abnormal are featured as the normal processes of daily life. This, however, is a circumstance not peculiar to Brazil. The anti-American news served up in the daily press is probably much of it of Mexican origin; the Mexican embassy and consulates are zealous in furnishing copy, supplied from Mexico City and aimed to justify the Mexican Government in its numerous and more or less serious misunderstandings with the government at Washington.

Outside of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo few newspapers worthy of the name are published. Pernambuco has its *Diario de Pernambuco,* distinguished as the oldest surviving daily paper in South America,[15]

Venezuela as probably inspired by American oil interests 'such as had caused the Mexican revolution of the past decade.'

[14] Two cases were cited to the writer, in each of which the editor had got into trouble for trying to disembark in New York with a woman not his wife.

[15] It celebrated its centenary in October, 1925.

but in other cities of the republic the sheets published exist mostly as the propaganda organs of certain politicians or political groups. The foreign news they print is negligible. Owing to transportation problems, the newspapers of the capital have practically no circulation in the rest of the country, and because of the large amount of illiteracy among the people the circulations even in Rio are small for a city of over a million inhabitants. "Actual statistics show that Buenos Aires uses more print paper in a month than all Brazil does in a year."

Occasional flurries of excitement regarding the vagaries of American governmental policy are not unknown in Brazil. Secretary Hoover's warning to American capital in 1925 not to participate in the floating of the São Paulo loan of that year, which was intended to maintain the present scheme of "valorizing" or stabilizing coffee prices, produced an unfortunate impression upon all classes of Brazilians. Comments bitter or ironical were general in conversation and in the editorial columns of the daily press; and attention was called to the efforts of the United States Government to maintain a fair price for the wheat of the American farmer through the operations of a government-financed Credit Association. The effect was the more regrettable because the São Paulo bonds were readily accepted in the London market, and indirectly found their way to New York as well. In this connection the *Jornal do Brasil,* one of the most substantial of Rio's newspapers, on January 10, 1926, called attention to a speech of Secretary Kellogg before the

Pan American Union three days earlier which emphasized the increasing spirit of Pan-American cooperation. The editor cited Secretary Hoover's warning, as well as his attitude regarding the high price of rubber which was momentarily restoring a semblance of prosperity to Amazonia; and he inquired if these were practical manifestations of a Pan-American spirit. From the Brazilian point of view the rebuke was not without justification; and although Brazil's irritation is but a passing shadow upon the fundamentally good relations between the two countries, the episode illustrates the need in the United States of envisaging Pan-Americanism not as a mere platonic expression of international good will, but as a policy fostering Latin-American interests as well as those of the United States.[16]

On the whole, however, the Brazilian entertains little fear of the United States. Although he takes a keen interest in foreign affairs, he is not interested in American interventions in Central America and the West Indies, and although the news is reported in the papers of the day, there is little comment. Brazil, moreover, because of her climate and soil, is economically a supplement, not a competitor of the United

[16] Brazilian critics might have added that, if the United States refuses to lend money to the Paulistas to enable them to maintain the price of coffee sold to American consumers, why should it not also prohibit loans to German industrial organizations which enable them to compete in Brazilian markets to the disadvantage of American producers?

The writer saw only one editorial article, in the *Correio da Manhã* of February 5, 1926, which excused American policy as a reasonable defense of American domestic interests.

States. She is a producer of the commodities we need, tropical wares such as coffee, cacao and rubber, the importation of which into this country is vastly increasing, and the output of which in Brazil is limited only by the present lack of capital and competent labor. Conversely, with the largest population of any of the South American republics, a population with a low standard of living but habitually extravagant, Brazil furnishes a large consuming public for American manufactures.[17] From an economic as well as a political standpoint, therefore, the relations of the United States with Brazil must inevitably be closer than with a country like Argentina which exports chiefly beef and cereals, products we possess abundantly at home.

Uruguay, the smallest of the South American republics in area if not in population, but also one of the most progressive, has in recent years been consistently well-disposed toward the United States. At the same time it is no reflection upon the intelligence or good intentions of Uruguayans to add that, like other peoples, they are moved more by interest than by sentiment, whether that interest be political or economic. This small nation, like Paraguay, is wedged between two powerful neighbors, which in the past have not always been too mindful of its sovereign independence. Its relations with Argentina and with Brazil are at present cordial and friendly. Yet disagreements are in the natural course of events from time to time

[17] Lahee, Arnold W.—*Our Competitors and Markets,* New York, 1924, ch. 6.

inevitable, and Uruguay when such contingencies arise looks to the United States for sympathy and support. The masses, it is true, as elsewhere, are generally neutral or indifferent toward international questions, unless momentarily roused by some particular problem or incident. But the attitude of those high in the government has been distinctly conciliatory. When, for instance, in December, 1925, and again in the following January, Uruguay was approached by "other governments" regarding its policy should serious difficulties arise in connection with the application of the Tacna-Arica award, the Foreign Office appears to have taken the stand that it retained full confidence in the integrity of the American commission and in the benevolent intentions of the United States. And if a move was made to discredit the United States by the suggestion of a diplomatic settlement of the question by another power or powers, it apparently received no encouragement in Montevideo. At the time of the Pershing-Edwards imbroglio at Arica, the press of Montevideo almost unanimously supported Pershing and expressed approval of the position assumed by the arbitrator.[18]

Uruguay, however, situated just across the great River Plate from Argentina, is subject to much the same intellectual influences, whether native or foreign. Pan-Hispanic propaganda, active in Buenos Aires, finds a repercussion in Montevideo where the Spanish colony is numerous and influential. Communistic or socialistic

[18] The *Diario del Plata* was very strong in its criticism of Chilean policy.

tendencies among the proletariat, which generally assume an anti-American complexion, are common in both capitals. Socialist broadsides and manifestos may at any time be seen posted on house walls and at street corners. Propaganda emanating from the Mexican consulate or legation also finds ready acceptance in editorial offices and among the younger university students. Another element in the situation is of purely local significance. The forcible separation of Church and State by the national constitution as revised in 1917 has resulted in the appearance of a clerical or Catholic party in Uruguay, which, identifying American influence with Protestant missionary and educational activity, is not friendly to the "Yankees." [19]

In economic questions Uruguayans are swayed, as are we all, by what touches most closely the pocketbook. And there seems to be a good deal of feeling in the country against what they term American capitalistic domination, especially in connection with the meat-packing companies. Uruguay is of course almost altogether a cattle and sheep raising country, and in the meat industry the two American packing houses or *frigoríficos* have a virtual monopoly. The cattle raisers declare that the packers pay too low a price for beef, and make inordinate profits. They want more money for their animals. But they forget that the price of cattle to the *estancieros* is twice as high today

[19] The newspaper daily, *El Bien Público*, the journal of the Catholic party, is openly hostile to the United States, and incidentally also to France.

as it was before the packers came, and that prices are ultimately fixed, not in South America, but by the consumers in Europe. The result, however, is a project by the government for the building of a public *frigorífico* to compete with the American-controlled monopoly.[20]

Of course there is also a large amount of British capital invested in the industries of the republic, over three times as much as that coming from the United States. The capital of the British-owned railways alone reaches a figure as high as that of the total American investment in Uruguay. Yet there is no talk of British capitalistic control. This may possibly be explained by the fact that the British have been a long time established there, indeed since the very beginning of the republic, and are therefore an accepted feature of the country's economic life, while American capitalists are relatively newcomers. It is also possible that the British, through long residence and experience in the country, know better how to deal with the political classes in the state and eliminate sources of opposition or of hostile propaganda.

One would scarcely credit Chileans today with an excess of enthusiasm for the United States. They may conceive a genuine liking for some Americans as individuals, but it is rarely expanded to include the Yankees as a whole. What influence the United States

[20] The establishment of a government cement factory is also discussed, in opposition to the American owned factory built in Uruguay a few years ago.

exerts in Chile at this moment must be credited chiefly to the former's wealth and power, not to any traditional bonds of friendship such as the Chileans associate with Great Britain. There exists still the vague memory of certain disagreeable diplomatic incidents between the United States and Chile, notably during the War of the Pacific and after the Balmacedist War in 1891. The feeling of distrust thus engendered has not been lessened by the unfortunate outcome of the Tacna-Arica arbitration. Yet, as one Chilean expressed it to the writer, considering the overwhelming material power of the United States, a country so strong that a nation like Chile dare not wholly disregard its suggestions or desires, "of course we are friendly to the United States—we cannot well be otherwise." The international position of Chile today seems to be one of isolation. The Government is determined to maintain the navy on a basis of equality with Argentina and Brazil, and to maintain its present relative strength with reference to Peru. Otherwise it has no apparent "policies," toward the United States or toward other countries. On the other hand, among educated Chileans the United States has many genuine friends, men who have learned to know Americans by travel or by residence in this country, or who from a distance respect and admire the northern republic, and desire to see between the two countries a spirit of closer approximation and cooperation.

In recent years commercial and financial relations between the United States and Chile have become increasingly important. In 1925 an American financial

mission, at the invitation of the Chilean Government, reformed the banking and currency legislation of the republic, and put the country solidly on a gold basis. Since the World War Chile has found it generally more advantageous to borrow in New York than in London, where formerly all her loans were placed; and the country has also become attractive as a field for American investment, especially in mines and in the nitrate industry, which are chief sources of its exportable wealth. The great copper mines of Chile are altogether American-controlled. If the market for Chilean nitrate of soda, practically lost today in Germany and France, is properly developed in the United States, where the opportunities for its use are endless, our trade with Chile should vastly increase. Chile welcomes American capital, but at the same time fears it—fears that investment may be followed by too much paternalistic solicitude on the part of the Washington Government. This suspicion of American economic imperialism is pretty general, and is based, not so much on past experience, as by analogy on the history of American capitalistic expansion in the countries bordering the Caribbean. And to Chileans the attitude toward these matters of some American secretaries of state does not appear reassuring.

The idea that the United States is imperialistic, and American capital therefore dangerous, is of course ably promoted by our European rivals in Chile, *sub rosa* by the British, French and Germans, more openly by the ubiquitous Spaniard. Spaniards constitute the largest foreign element in the republic (24,755 in

1920[21]), and although Spain exercises little or no political influence upon the government, propaganda by Spanish residents is always present, centered in their various clubs and other social or beneficiary organizations. Articles by Spanish writers, written for or reproduced in the Chilean press, are less numerous than in the Argentine only because the former is less wealthy and enterprising.[22] Yet, apart from the nationalist feeling momentarily aroused by the vicissitudes of the Tacna-Arica arbitration, the Chilean daily press cannot be accused of unfriendliness toward the United States. It is true that in virtually all the newspapers appear from time to time articles generally harmful to the United States, tending to hold them up to ridicule, articles on such subjects as prohibition, divorce, the Ku Klux Klan, the selfish attitude of Americans regarding war debts, etc. Such matters easily lend themselves to the purposes of the foreign propagan-

[21] At the same time, Italians numbered 11,535, and French about 7,000. German political influence, formerly centered in the Army and the Church, is much less apparent than it was during the World War. In 1917-1918 General Jorge Boonen Rivera, chief-of-staff and inspector-general of the army, and a close friend of President Sanfuentes, was credited with influencing the president with the idea of German invincibility, which resulted in securing a certain laxness for Germans and for the Allies a certain indifference in neutrality questions. But in 1925 two British general officers were serving with the army of Chile, all the aviation instructors were British, student officers were being sent to schools of military instruction in several of the Allied countries, and a military commission was resident in France.

[22] The circulation of *La Nación* of Santiago, the largest in Chile, is less than a third of the circulation of the paper of the same name in Buenos Aires.

dist. *El Mercurio,* formerly friendly to the United States, as was its present editor-in-chief, has since Agustín Edwards' quarrel with General Pershing at Arica and his opposition to the policy of the Plebiscitary Commission, become violently hostile, indulging in every form of petty journalistic misrepresentation. But apart from this special issue, the attitude of the Chilean press has been judiciously impartial. The conservative *El Diario Ilustrado,* for instance, which is inclined to support the Pan-Hispanic movement, in an editorial of June, 1925, deprecated the action of a "Committee of Latin American Solidarity" in Paris in stirring up race hatreds in America by its violent attack on Secretary Kellogg's celebrated Mexican statement of June 12 of that year.[23] And an editorial in *La Nación* on June 18, referring to the same Mexican statement, expressed confidence in the friendly policy and aims of the United States government. Propaganda emanating from the Mexican legation, often of an anti-American complexion, is as alert and enterprising in Chile as elsewhere, but is not always cordially received in newspaper offices. In fact Mexico's tendency toward socialism, and its frequent violation of private property rights, are important factors in mould-

[23] The Mexican minister had given to the *Diario* an interview in which he said that the statement of Secretary Kellogg was evidently the announcement of a new policy toward Latin America which differed from that recently pursued. And the *Diario* in the form given its news reports and in its editorial comment was at first inclined to be unfriendly. The Mexican minister apparently also sent a statement to *El Mercurio,* from which he received the reply that the newspaper lacked space for its publication. But this of course was before the Edwards-Pershing imbroglio at Arica.

ing the attitude of Chilean newspapers and political leaders toward that republic and its relations with the United States. Chile is a country completely dominated until very recently by an old landowning aristocracy, a country therefore in which the sentiment of private property in the educated classes is peculiarly strong. One suspects too that Chileans are inclined to look upon Mexico as a country still only half civilized, which makes propaganda less effective than it might otherwise be. Certainly the campaign of the present government of Mexico against the Church meets with no hearty response in Chile. In May of 1926 several articles appeared in *El Diario Ilustrado* bitterly attacking the anti-clerical policy which has been pursued by Mexican liberal governments more or less consistently since the time of Benito Juárez.

The unfortunate international situation created by the failure of the plebiscite at Arica has of course brought to the surface whatever latent feeling of hostility toward the United States may exist in Chile. It has done more, it has blurred the genuine sentiments of Chileans, producing a current of national irritation, temporary perhaps but running deep in the national consciousness, which makes it difficult for the foreign observer to distinguish that which is of permanent significance from the merely ephemeral and transitory. South Americans generally find it hard to conceive of a genuine neutrality on the part of the United States, or indeed of any other country. They think that a mediator must always have some *arrière-pensée,* some hidden interests of his own to further. Chileans have

inherited from the days of the War of the Pacific the impression, then not ill-founded, that the United States is more friendly to Peru than to them; and this has been strengthened by the popular misconception, widespread in South America, that Peru is completely dominated by American capital and therefore an object of tender solicitude on the part of "Wall Street." It seemed to be confirmed also by the unfortunate circumstance that an American "expert on plebiscites" was attached to the Peruvian delegation at Arica and at the same time engaged in active anti-Chilean propaganda in the United States. The idea already referred to, that the United States is endeavoring to create a special interest in Tacna-Arica, a protectorate or a military and naval base, has been sedulously propagated by hostile critics in Chile as elsewhere, and has appeared not only in the editorial columns of *El Mercurio*,[24] but even in debates in the Chilean Congress. Of course the press campaign of 1926 insisting upon a plebiscitary solution of the Tacna-Arica question to the exclusion of any other formula, was not confined to *El Mercurio*. In it were included all the newspapers of the country. But the pace was set by Señor Edwards' daily, and the rest feared not to follow, for domestic political reasons and to avoid revealing to Peru any sign of weakness of which she might make capital in Washington or in Arica. Many prominent and intelli-

[24] The real sentiments of Señor Agustín Edwards, the proprietor of *El Mercurio* and the Chilean commissioner at Arica, it is perhaps impossible to fathom, but the bitter anti-American campaign of his newspaper made a strong appeal to the chauvinistic sentiments of his countrymen.

gent Chileans in private opinion have favored a solution which included a territorial outlet to the sea for Bolivia, as the only satisfactory and permanent one, and to the writer some deplored the fact that the public press made no effort to educate public opinion in that sense.[25] But events have also made it clear that what was desired was first of all a clear title for Chile, and then a bargain with Bolivia of which Chile would be the chief or sole beneficiary.

The Chilean and the North American should by all odds be on the best terms of friendship and mutual understanding. In spite of past difficulties, there is no ground for permanent estrangement. Less expansive and temperamental than most Latin Americans, cool, aggressive, self-reliant, the Chilean in national character has much in common with the Yankee from the north. And the latter, much as he may like the volatile and warm-hearted Brazilian, generally feels more at home in Chile than anywhere else in South America. Misunderstandings in the past have in large measure been due to the ineptitude of amateur American diplomats, the only kind formerly sent to South American capitals. But that fortunately is a condition now remedied, and there is every indication that Chile wants to be our friend. That the vagaries of Chilean domestic policies should have contributed so largely to the fiasco at Arica is a matter for deepest regret in both countries.

[25] While all daily papers in their news columns printed misleading articles emanating mostly from Arica, *El Diario Ilustrado* in its editorial section seems to have been the most intelligent and detached from local and transitory prejudices.

CHAPTER X

PARAGUAY AND THE ANDEAN REPUBLICS

THERE are certain general considerations touching sentiment in Argentina, Chile and Brazil toward the United States which apply to all the republics of South America. An appreciation of the desirability of close relations, economic and cultural, with the northern republic, into whose orbit they are drawn whether they will or no; a desire for financial assistance, yet a half-concealed fear that American loans and industrial investment will be followed by political influence and pressure, endangering their national independence; foreign, European interests, jealous of American hegemony in the western hemisphere, and ambitious to supplant it by an international grouping which may serve the political and economic purposes of certain Latin states in Europe; lack of mutual understanding due to ignorance or provincialism, to paucity of intercommunications, or to misrepresentation by irresponsible journalists; such are the problems to be solved or conditions to be combatted in all countries of Latin America if a genuine Pan-America is to be achieved.

Paraguay is geographically the most remote and isolated of the South American republics, and in a material and intellectual way the least considered.

Frequent revolutions, which have killed or driven from the country the young men, destroyed rural property, and discouraged the introduction of foreign capital and immigrants; the consequent dearth of man-power for agricultural expansion; the economic throttling of the country by Argentine interests which possess a monopolistic control of transportation to the outside world—such are the obstacles which have stood in the light of Paraguay's prosperity and well-being. In the words of President Ayala, in his message to Congress on April 1, 1926: "What we most need to give impulse to our moral and material progress can be obtained only by the generous benevolence of other countries . . . [we have] neither sufficient labor and capital, nor technical knowledge and habits of industry and saving, nor creative institutions or artistic creations. And to attract these elements it is necessary that Paraguay possess a credit which means literally confidence in its domestic peace, in the fulfillment of its foreign obligations, in its vigor, in its economic and financial vitality, and in the normalcy of its political life." [1] The present government seems to be stable, relatively honest, and public spirited; political discords have abated, and financial obligations are regularly met. But the country needs capital, and as yet the maintenance of domestic tranquillity is not sufficiently assured.

Yet even in distant Paraguay misgivings regarding the desirability of American investment are not unknown. An impression seems to be abroad that our State Department guarantees such investments, and in

[1] Quoted from *La Prensa,* Buenos Aires, April 3, 1926.

the hoped-for solution of the long-standing boundary dispute with Bolivia, Paraguay's most important international problem, prominent citizens, including members of the government, do not welcome the thought of American arbitration because of the influence of American capital in Bolivia. In the press of Asunción there is little comment on foreign affairs; the Spanish interest is not strong, and Pan-Latinism or Pan-Hispanism finds practically no echo in Paraguay, although the country does not escape the attention of our "friends" in Mexico and Colombia. The Mexican consul (a Paraguayan), who is also consul for Colombia, sometimes publishes in the quarterly bulletin of the students of the *Escuela de Comercio* anti-American notes inspired by articles in Colombian newspapers. And in September, 1926, a representative of the Mexican press appeared in Asunción to arrange with the local papers for an exchange of news. The effect was soon noticeable in the appearance of Mexican dispatches generally unfavorable to the United States; and one may expect to see reports of American activities in the Caribbean, which formerly scarcely reached Paraguay, faithfully reproduced in the daily press.

Bolivia, although like Paraguay a mediterranean country, and much given to government by revolution, has because of its wealth in minerals been forced into closer relations with the rest of the world,[2] and in recent years especially with the United States. The

[2] Of all the capital invested in Bolivian mines, about sixty per cent. is said to be foreign.

public external debt—about $32,000,000—is virtually all in American hands, and most of it has been incurred since the last revolution in 1920. The principal loan, contracted with a group of New York banking houses in 1922 for $33,000,000, of which $29,000,000 has been taken up, is secured by taxes on mines and other industries, and in its terms provides for the creation of a permanent fiscal commission attached to the Ministry of Finance. This commission consists of three members, two Americans approved by the bankers, and a Bolivian. Its duties are to supervise the collection of taxes set aside as security for the loan, insure that the bondholders receive their semi-annual interest, and advise the Minister of Finance regarding new legislation and improvements in the fiscal administration of the country. The commission, paid a salary by the Bolivian government, receives also two per cent. of all overdue taxes collected, and ten per cent. of taxes fraudulently withheld which it succeeds in extracting. The chairman, an American, has since been appointed also Inspector-General of Banks and Monopolies, and the other American member is Director-General of Customs.

We have here the only instance to date of the establishment in a South American republic of an American supervisory fiscal commission, such as has been a familiar phenomenon in the smaller republics bordering the Caribbean Sea. This, and the allied circumstance that most of the public debt is in American hands, have given a convenient weapon for attack by the political opposition upon the government; and it is

responsible for the widespread impression in other countries of South America that Bolivia has sold her political and economic birthright, and is a financial dependency of the United States. The liberal, opposition newspaper, *El Diario*, has made periodical attacks on the fiscal commission, and urged that every effort be made to rid the nation of this "dead weight upon the administrative machinery of the country," whose sole object is to "provide high salaries to incompetent foreigners who have been forced upon the country by the lenders of the Nicolaus loan." [3] The situation is not eased by the belief of many that President Bautista Saavedra, in whose administration the loan was effected, although he extended railways and introduced many public improvements into La Paz and Cochabamba—paving streets, constructing boulevards, water systems and public buildings—permitted a scandalous amount of corruption in the public service of the country. The fiscal commission has doubtless been of great benefit to Bolivia, by insuring regularity, order and relative honesty in the financial administration of the republic. It was probably necessary for the reasonable protection of American investors, while on the other hand it enabled Bolivia to borrow on much more favorable terms than would otherwise have been possible. But it furnishes an excellent example of the impression such expedients produce upon public opinion, and of their unfortunate influence upon relations between the Latin and Anglo-Saxon peoples of America. So long as the United States continues to

[3] *El Diario* of April 7, 1926.

produce most of the surplus capital, and some Latin-American nations continue to require that capital while failing to develop a fitting sense of responsibility in their manner of government, perhaps circumstances of the sort described will continue to be unavoidable.

Apart from the exigencies of domestic politics in Bolivia, the United States and its relations with Latin America do not loom large in the national consciousness. Most of the Americans in the country are miners or engineers, and feeling toward them seems to be cordial. Press news is very scanty, and the people at large, even among the small educated minority, are indifferent. They are much more concerned about relations with their immediate neighbors than about their "attitude" toward the United States. Such relations recently have revolved about the fateful Tacna-Arica dispute. When in April, 1926, Secretary Kellogg proposed that the claims of Bolivia be included in the diplomatic negotiations initiated by him with Chile and Peru at Washington, Bolivian enthusiasm for the United States of course rose momentarily to fever heat. On the afternoon of the twenty-seventh a popular demonstration was staged in the streets of La Paz and before the American legation, with many *vivas* for Kellogg, Coolidge, Wilson, and the "great American people." Representatives of the university students, chamber of commerce, labor organizations, and even of the *Centro Latino-Americano,* took part and made public addresses. When Bolivia failed to secure admission to the diplomatic conferences at Washington, and Secretary Kellogg suggested a neutralized free

state of Tacna-Arica, enthusiasm quickly cooled, and the unfriendly intimation appeared in the columns of *La República* of La Paz that the *"coloso norteamericano"* aimed to establish a protectorate and centre of expansion in that region.[4]

In Peru, two opposing currents of public sentiment are clearly perceptible. The dictator-president, Señor Augusto Leguia, one of the most intelligent, progressive and public-spirited statesmen in Latin America today, has during the past six or seven years, since he secured executive control of the state, pursued frankly a policy of approximation with the United States. This policy has doubtless had a political motive, to obtain the good will of the United States in the Tacna-Arica arbitration; but it is also based on the belief that from the United States Peru has most to learn in the way of material development, and the most to gain by friendly material cooperation. Under Leguia Peru has borrowed extensively in New York (but no more largely than in London[5]) to help finance his program of national rehabilitation:—irrigation works, road-building, municipal improvements, Indian education. And virtually all of the engineering contracts have been given to a single large American construction company.

The political opposition to President Leguia consists mostly of the old *Civilista* party of the wealthy

[4] *La República,* April 29, 1926.

[5] See *Peruvian Public Finance,* by Charles A. McQueen, U. S. Department of Commerce, Trade Promotion Series, No. 30, Washington, 1926.

hacendados or landowners; and as the president is obviously pro-American, the *Civilista* opposition is inclined to appear anti-American. It criticizes the "selling out" of the country to American capital and enterprise, and demands that native enterprise be accorded prior rights; an attitude that can scarcely be wholly sincere, since the native capitalist has never availed himself of the opportunities at his door, and native contractors today could not adequately fill the rôle played by a foreign engineering organization. But the pose is largely for a political purpose. On the other hand, many Peruvians of the old aristocracy—even some who have received part of their education in this country—feel that the United States represents a social system inimical to the patriarchal régime in which they possess a vested interest or for which they feel a deep, sentimental attachment, and whose survival is threatened by the increasing influence of American ideas. This current of feeling has a strong Hispanic flavor, due to the conservatism of the upper class, and of the professional and university elements that ally themselves with it; and it is perhaps the chief source of what Pan-Hispanic sentiment exists in the country. The Spanish colony itself is not numerous or commercially prominent, and there is little open propaganda such as we find in Argentina or Uruguay.[6] Spanish intellectuals rarely visit Peru, perhaps because of its seeming remoteness, and literary propaganda

[6] The Spanish minister is an old resident, extremely popular, well-connected, and politically influential. He does not allow after-dinner speeches!

emanating from Spain is rarely reproduced; although occasionally student articles in the principal newspapers of Lima, Arequipa and Cuzco attack the United States for its "materialism" and "imperialistic ambitions."

The only important newspapers are those of Lima, which circulate throughout the republic. They are the only real source of information for both foreign and domestic news, and practically the only ones which enjoy the benefit of cable and press services. Provincial papers, in Peru as in most other South American countries, contain chiefly local news and such foreign items as correspondents in the capital telegraph to them. They are given much to muck-raking, and nearly all can be bought, as was abundantly proved during the World War. The editors are generally ignorant and untravelled, but write with a free hand on any question, such as the Monroe Doctrine, war debts, etc. Yet on the whole there is surprisingly little reference in print to American political hegemony, Caribbean intervention, or similar topics, probably in part because of the present international situation in which Peru feels somewhat dependent on American esteem, but also because in Peru under President Leguia freedom of the press is but a pious aspiration.

In Ecuador the situation as it affects relations with the United States does not seem to differ materially from that in other parts of Andean South America. A small, educated, white or *mestizo* governing class, interested almost exclusively in the domestic struggle for place and power; an economic crisis since the close

of the World War and a depreciated currency, for which foreign financial interests are often conveniently and ignorantly blamed; a desire for the assistance of American capital and business enterprise, but a latent fear of its political consequences; a patriarchal, Roman Catholic, near-colonial society inclined to associate American civilization with the Protestant missionary, and while somewhat isolated from the direct influence of Spanish propaganda sympathetic with its ideals. Two factors in recent years have tended to put a damper upon the cordiality of relations with this country: disputes with the Guayaquil & Quito Railway, and a question of the recognition of a revolutionary government. Interest on the bonds of the railway, which was built two decades ago by American promoters with British capital, was guaranteed by the republic of Ecuador. The road has never been operated at a profit, while the financial difficulties of the government arising from the decline in customs receipts prevented the latter from meeting its obligations. The purchase of 57,069 shares of the company for $600,000 in 1925, however, added to the forty-nine per cent. of stock which the government already held, has now given Ecuador complete control of her only railway. In July, 1925, the constitutional government of the republic was overthrown by a bloodless military *coup d'état,* possibly inspired by similar events in Chile, and the American Department of State, pursuing its recent policy of withholding recognition from governments set up by force, has at present no direct diplomatic relations with the country.

Colombia and Venezuela are drawn much more into the orbit of American influence than are any of the countries farther south. They both border upon the Caribbean Sea, this American *mare nostrum,* over which the United States has during the past generation established a recognized sphere of influence. Both republics in recent years have been found to possess large quantities of petroleum, the exploitation of which has been principally the opportunity of American capital. And both by reason of their proximity to the United States find their best markets for coffee and other tropical products in this country. In both republics the policy of the government is one of encouragement to American enterprise and cooperation, at least in a commercial sense. In the matter of popular sentiment toward the United States, the two countries differ.

Colombia still retains the memory of the dubious rôle played by the United States in the secession of Panama, and this is a major factor to be kept in mind in any consideration of the relations between the two peoples. Strong suspicion of Americans and their government exists throughout the nation, and is even propagated in certain of the text-books used in the schools. Colombians, like Peruvians and Chileans, have a highly developed national consciousness, and there is a strong prejudice against outside influence among the ruling classes. They know that their country is potentially rich, and that foreign, and especially American, capital and technical assistance are needed for its exploitation; but Colombian society, isolated in

the interior valleys and plateaus of a peculiarly inaccessible region, is still extremely conservative and suspicious of the stranger. The republic for forty years has been ruled by a clerical party, and under the national constitution and laws the Church occupies a very privileged position of independence and power. Direct intervention by the bishops in political matters is openly practiced, and in many departments the local clergy apparently dominate completely the economic and political situation. Public education is organized and directed in conformity with the dogmas of the Roman Catholic religion, the practice of which is obligatory in the schools. Such circumstances are not conducive to the development of close educational and scientific relations with a country whose basic principle of social organization is religious and intellectual freedom.[7]

Nevertheless, there is evidence that anti-American feeling in Colombia, hitherto so pronounced, is gradually becoming less. This is especially so since the ratification in 1922 of a treaty with the United States by the provisions of which the latter agreed to pay to Colombia the sum of $25,000,000 in five annual instalments of $5,000,000 each, in full settlement of all claims in connection with the acquisition by the former

[7] The Church, however, serves an important, and perhaps indispensable, function as a moral force making for unity in a country where, owing to lack of communications, provincialism and particularism are still very strong. A citizen is always an *Antioqueño* or a *Bogotano* before he is a Colombian, and so invariably refers to himself.

of the route of the Panama Canal.[8] Many Colombians of position and means, aware that the United States now occupies a commanding position financially and otherwise among the nations of the world, seem also to be convinced that it is not disposed to make use of its power to the detriment of the interests of weaker peoples. General Pedro Nel Ospina, whose term as president recently expired,[9] said to a representative of the American press in May, 1924:

"When the Panama indemnity treaty was being negotiated in Washington, the United States proposed that it be followed by a treaty of amity and commerce . . . At any time the State Department wishes to take the matter up, Colombia will be ready to discuss the question on a friendly and honorable basis . . . The larger part of Colombia's business is now being done with the United States, both in imports and exports. Our business men are looking to the United States for capital and assistance . . . We want United States bankers to refund our national debt, which is very small, establish and handle our credit, and loan us sufficient money to complete our railroad building program, as transportation is our greatest need. We look upon the United States as our friend. We do not fear the so-called danger of United States aggression. It is only a myth. I, especially, know the United

[8] The treaty also provides that Colombian materials and the products of Colombian soil and industry shall have passage through the canal subject only to the charges or duties imposed on products and materials of the United States; and that Colombian troops, matériel and ships-of-war shall have the right of free passage through the canal except in the case of war between Colombia and another power. By a tacit understanding considerable portions of the treaty money were to be expended for the improvement of transportation lines in Colombia. The latter also agreed to recognize the republic of Panama as an independent state.

[9] General Ospina was educated in the United States, speaks English fluently, and is considered to be pro-American in his inclinations.

States, and have faith in her good intentions. We want the American people to get acquainted with us. We want them to know we are intelligent and cultured people; that Colombia is not a country addicted to revolutions but has been at peace for over twenty years."

American companies occupy a leading position in the development of the petroleum resources of the country; and several years ago a commission of American experts,[10] invited by the Colombian Government, completely reorganized the national financial system, establishing a central bank of issue somewhat similar to the United States Federal Reserve Bank. The result has been much more efficient administration, and greater financial stability. The International Health Foundation (Rockefeller Institute) is also cooperating with the Colombian Government, as with other governments in tropical America, for the betterment of the national health service and the improvement of sanitation in general. In short, Colombia, willingly or unwillingly, is accepting close economic and social relations with the United States.

Views like those attributed above to General Ospina, however, do not find expression in the Colombian newspaper press, and the Liberal, or opposition, Party, especially as evidenced by the attitude of its principal dailies, is strongly anti-American. This Liberal stand may be explained by the exigencies of local politics, and

[10] The Kemmerer Commission arrived in Colombia in March, 1923, and remained till the following August. One member continued in Bogotá under contract for a year to interpret the new laws, prepare a budget, and organize a Comptroller General's Department.

by the fact that the "traditional" leaders of the party —old men, generals in the revolution of twenty-five years ago—still live in the intellectual *milieu* of an earlier generation, and, despite their party label, are frankly reactionary in policy and anti-foreign.[11] Perhaps some of the Liberal politicians by their opposition hope to secure a share in whatever benefits may be obtained from the disposition to foreign capitalists of the petroleum and other natural resources of the country; while an appeal to the anti-American sentiments still latent in the minds of most Colombians may serve to consolidate the strength of a party today somewhat disorganized and ineffective. European Latin interests, i.e., Spanish, French and Italian, occupy only minor positions in the commercial and business life of the country, and Pan-Hispanic stratagems are less evident than in more "exposed" positions like Buenos Aires and Montevideo. But they are unnecessary. Misrepresentation of American customs, manners and ideas is as common in the newspapers of Colombia as it is elsewhere in South America. And much of it comes out of New York, from the pens of Latin-American correspondents there resident.[12]

In the neighboring republic of Venezuela in recent years not only the government but the people generally

[11] Their influence, however, is waning, and in the course of nature will disappear. The larger groups within the party, representing important business men and professional and intellectual elements, sometimes associated with freemasonry, are much more progressive.

[12] See also the hysterical diatribes of the Colombian littérateur, J. M. Vargas Vila, as in his volume entitled, *Ante los bárbaros el Yanki; he ahí el enemigo* (Barcelona, 1917).

have been cordial in their dealings with foreigners, whether American or European. So far as this country is concerned, Venezuela owes it no money; and on the only two occasions when the United States interfered in Venezuelan affairs it was in the interest of the Venezuelans themselves, to protect them from the threatened encroachments of European powers. These occasions were the Guiana Boundary Crisis of thirty years ago, and the blockade of Venezuelan ports by Great Britain, Germany and Italy in December, 1902. Of popular feeling against the British, engendered by the Guiana boundary dispute, apparently little or no trace remains. The remarkable oil developments in the western part of the republic about Lake Maracaibo in the past few years have raised the question in some quarters whether the exploitation of the country's resources should not be a monopoly of native capital; and because of these developments Americans and Dutch figure most prominently in native eyes as the foreign intruders. But as yet there seems to be no real unfriendliness toward either, and the insufficiency of native capital to finance or manage the oil industry is too obvious to require comment.

El Heraldo of Caracas, the only nearly independent newspaper in the country, in 1925 published a series of news-letters from New York furnished by a "Pan-American Press Service" (!) which were very anti-American in tone. But the paper has printed the same sort of information from France and Italy, and when the editor, who has never visited the United States,

had explained to him the misleading character of the American news he was publishing, the letters ceased to appear. Deliberate foreign propaganda of any sort is completely absent from the Venezuelan press, for the foreign news printed is extremely meager and confined to the barest facts, comment being virtually forbidden by the powers that be. On the other hand, the only cable connecting Venezuela with the outside world is owned and operated by a French company; all cable news necessarily enters the country through this channel; and the character of the foreign news supplied is therefore under French control. This is peculiarly unfortunate, especially at a time when French propaganda relating to the war debts issue is so active throughout Latin America.[13]

Mexico at present exercises no influence upon public opinion or international policy in Venezuela. Diplomatic relations were severed by the Mexican Government in 1922, because the Venezuelan authorities refused admission to a Mexican theatrical company at La Guaira, and they have not since been resumed. The real causes for this refusal seem to have been two: criticism in Mexico of the Venezuelan system of government, and the fact that certain members of the company were *persona non grata,* doubtless for political reasons, to President Gómez. Some of the radicals in Mexico, of the intellectual type, believe themselves to be the apostles of a new era not only in Mexico but

[13] Old American residents in Caracas have told the writer that underhand French propaganda against the United States is always present there and very insidious.

in Latin America at large, and are prepared to carry their gospel to other and more "benighted" lands. They naturally associate themselves with the dictator's enemies living in exile, and there is evidence that several years ago they approached the representatives of some American oil companies in Mexico for financial support in a revolution to be staged in Venezuela, the backers to receive the usual rewards in the form of oil concessions if the revolutionists succeeded.

Nature's gift to Venezuela of large reserves of oil has not as yet poisoned her relations with peoples possessing the capital to exploit them. But in the oil region itself there has already been some friction, part of which under the circumstances was probably inevitable, part of which might have been avoided were the executives of oil companies conscious of the importance of considering anything like a native point of view. The city of Maracaibo, which a few years ago had a population of perhaps forty or fifty thousand, today contains more than double that figure. Great numbers of American oil men, engineers, drillers, adventurers, have flocked in and taken possession, treating the natives, whom they affected to despise, in grog-shops and on the street as dust beneath their feet. At the same time there has been a vast demand for native workmen, which has drawn labor from the fields in a country which at best is deficient in manual workers. The food requirements of the region have greatly increased, while the districts supplying them were being depopulated. Food prices have therefore risen pro-

digiously,[14] and rents and the prices of clothing and other necessaries have increased in proportion. While wages have also advanced, the native feels that they scarcely compensate for the unheard-of advance in his cost of living; and he has a bitter consciousness that the arrogant American who receives a high salary and is withdrawing great wealth from the country, is responsible for these untoward changes in his daily circumstances.

This is doubtless an old story in the oil business, and some of it, as suggested above, was unavoidable in a primitive agricultural region suddenly exposed to the assault of an intense capitalistic development. But at least in the personal relations between new comers and the natives something might have been saved, had a proper control been maintained by the oil companies over their personnel in the field. The companies are said to have become aware more recently of the situation, and to have issued appropriate regulations, so that conditions have improved. But more than this is needed. The oil men have made Maracaibo what it is today. The ultimate result of their coming will undoubtedly be a higher standard of living and increased prosperity for all western Venezuela. But meantime there is much inconvenience and irritation. The oil companies are there to make money out of the country, and if they do, their profits will be rich. *As* they do, they should feel the responsibility of contributing

[14] Bananas, the chief diet of the native poor, which formerly cost a few cents a bunch, now retail at five cents apiece.

something directly to the well-being of the country and people which serve them.

In the past, in foreign, capitalistic enterprises of this sort, the guiding principle too often has been to take everything out and put nothing in. Such a course, in these days when raw materials must be sought for in the uttermost corners of the earth, can only make doubly arduous the task of maintaining and increasing international comity and good will. Exploitation of other countries for exploitation alone can never ultimately succeed. Money and brains invested in undeveloped or "inferior" nations, without a corresponding effort to assist them to higher levels of social and material welfare, can only end in mutual hatred and eventually open conflict. On the other hand, any contribution to the growth of these nations, by helping to raise their material, and if need be their political and moral standards, is also a contribution to the cause of international peace. The "social" program of the great American copper enterprises in Chile is in this respect an example to the world. When the executives of all American corporations engaged in the development of natural resources abroad come to realize that in the end such a policy pays, a long step forward will have been taken in the progress of Pan-Americanism.

Date Due

28	DEC 13 '47		
My 10	MAY 18 '48		
N 21	APR		
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MAR 22			
APR 9	MAY 7 '52		
APR 3	APR		
MAY 3	DEC		
MAY 22	JAN 2 3 1957		
My 11	JUN 5		
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FE22'43			
Mr16'43	JUN 1 '60		
D 13 '43	DEC 6 '61		
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APR 8 '45	DEC 17 1966		
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